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UK COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKETS IN THE CONTEXT OF
THATCHERISM: 1979 - 1990
This work investigates the UK commercial property markets in terms of their 
response to the macroeconomic and supply side policies of the Thatcher 
Government. The work is structured around three elements: Thatcherism, 
the macroeconomy and the commercial property markets. These three 
elements form the basis for a three stage assessment of the economy and 
commercial property markets from 1979 -1990.
The first stage comprises an assessment of Thatcherism. The discussion 
establishes the origins of Thatcherism, the main tenets of the ideology of 
Thatcherism and the policies which were implemented. This allows an 
informed discussion of the political strategy from which the policies 
implemented by this government arose. This forms the foundation for the 
investigation which follows.
The discussion of Thatcherism leads into the second stage of the 
assessment, an investigation of the impact of the political strategy of 
Thatcherism on the macroeconomy. A framework drawing on long term and 
short term cyclical patterns within the UK economy is established. Economic 
time series data is then used to establish the major changes in the 
macroeconomy over this period. These are analysed in the light of the 
preceding discussion of policy.
The third stage within this work is a two - fold study of the commercial 
property markets. The impact on the commercial property markets of 
changes in the macroeconomy brought about by the Thatcher Government's 
economic policies is explored. This leads to an investigation of the impact on 
the commercial property markets of the Thatcher Government's supply side 
policies.
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Conclusions are drawn in two areas, changes within the performance and 
structure of the commercial property markets arising from
i) the Thatcher Government's policy reponse to long term economic change 
and
ii) the Thatcher Government's policies aiming to create short term economic 
change.
This culminates in an increase in the understanding of the impact of 
government policy on commercial property markets and of the impact of 
changes in the performance of the commercial property markets in the rest of 
the economy.
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I
CHAPTER ONE 
THATCHERISM - IDEOLOGY, POLITICS AND POLICIES
The Thatcher Government is associated with an elevation of the importance 
of land and buildings (property) as a component of the nation's wealth. This 
shift in the role of property affected both the residential and domestic property 
sectors and continues to be acknowledged in the formation and 
implementation of economic policy some five years after Thatcher's term of 
office ended. That having been said, there has been no investigation of the 
process through which this increase in the importance of property manifested 
itself. There is no study of how the policies of the Thatcher Government 
brought about this change in the role of property.
This work focuses on the commercial property markets and is concerned with 
this association between the policies of the Thatcher Government and 
movements within the property markets. An exploration of the ideology 
behind what has come to be termed Thatcherism leads to a discussion of the 
macroeconomic and supply side policies which were actually implemented 
between 1979 and 1990. This provides the background from which an 
analysis is made of the impact these policies had on the commercial property 
markets.
The analysis of Thatcherism within this work is made in three stages. Initially 
an investigation is made of what the originators of Thatcherism said 
Thatcherism was about. The ideology behind Thatcherism is explored along 
with the changing climate of opinion through which its popular appeal 
developed, and the objectives of Thatcherism as a governing force are 
identified.
The second stage of the analysis concentrates more specifically on the detail 
of stated policy, moving from a consideration of the ideology of Thatcherism 
to a consideration of Thatcherism as a political strategy. This provides an 
ordered and critical review of the literature of Thatcherism which, whilst
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establishing the main economic policy instruments of this period of 
Government, allows contradictions between the political strategy and the 
ideology to be identified. These first two elements of this three stage 
analysis are contained within Chapter One of this work.
The analysis of the impact of Thatcherism is undertaken throughout the 
remainder of the work. Chapter Two draws on the literature relating to 
property and investment cycles and explores the longer term cyclical trends 
which have affected industrialised economies over the post-war period. This 
provides a methodological foundation for the analysis of the impact of policies 
on the commercial property markets through the interpretation of time series 
data in Chapters Three and Four. Through this investigation of the UK 
commercial property markets within the context of Thatcherism as a political 
ideology, political strategy and range of policies, a greater appreciation of 
the way in which the commercial property markets respond to changes within 
the wider economy can be established. The diagram on page 8 provides a 
schematic representation of this structure.
i) The development of Thatcherism as an ideology
Establishing an approach
The complexity of Thatcherism makes it necessary to identify a single, 
consistent approach to the subject which is appropriate to the work in hand.
In their assessment of Thatcherism Jessop et al. (1988) suggest six different 
approaches for a study of Thatcherism. These are used here to establish an 
approach which will facilitate a clear and focused discussion. The six 
approaches are outlined below.
1. Ignore Thatcherism.
Adopting this approach would make it possible to study specific themes, 
political acts or decisions made over this period of Conservative Government 
independent of the rhetoric of the party at that time. As Jessop et al. (1988) 
comment, this may be a very useful exercise in providing a contrast to those 
studies of the political acts and decisions of that time within the context,
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specifically, of the party leadership and its influences. Such an exercise may 
highlight the impact, or lack of it, that her leadership had and expose deep 
contradictions within the perceived ideology of Thatcherism. Whilst such an 
approach would provide a thorough analysis of the legislation of the time it 
would not provide the necessary discussion of the impact of the ideology and 
political strategy that comprised Thatcherism.
2. Make a study of uses of the word itself.
This may provide an insight into the different responses brought about by the 
different interpretations of the concept of Thatcherism. For instance East 
European countries see Thatcherism very differently from the way the British 
trades unions see it and from the way the British political parties see it. Such 
a study in itself would be enormously interesting but would not contribute to 
the analysis of the policy of the Thatcher Government which is so central to 
this work.
3. Study the personal qualities of Thatcher.
This assumes that she is a very special person and that Thatcherism is about 
her personality rather than her government and derives from her ideas of 
morality, her personal beliefs and political philosophy, her personal ideology. 
The lack of self-consciousness and distance with which Thatcher discusses 
Thatcherism belies this interpretation. She may well have given her name to 
it but it is more than a personal philosophy and to limit a study of it to a study 
of the personality of the woman, although fascinating, would be inappropriate 
within the context of this work. As Holmes (1989) states so categorically "It is 
as facile to argue that Thatcherism is what Mrs Thatcher does as it is to 
argue the socialism is what a Labour Government does". (Holmes, 1989:9)
This is not to suggest that Thatcher herself is irrelevant to a discussion of 
Thatcherism as a concept. As a strong and confident leader of the 
Conservative party and the government, the impact of her personality on the
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emergence of the political ideology behind Thatcherism and the objectives 
and actions of her government require consideration and are addressed.
4. A consideration of Thatcherism as a style of political leadership.
This is obviously related to the third idea but goes slightly further in that it 
embraces the idea that Thatcher's brand of politics is intrinsically linked with 
her personality and that her personality has a direct impact on the politics of 
the period. It is clear that one can identify phrases and descriptions which 
are repeatedly applied to her; 'conviction politics', 'governess style', 
'overbearing manner' etc. To study Thatcherism at this level alone would be 
to reduce it simply to a discussion of personality issues. In order to look at 
the effects and consequences of Thatcherism itself an approach with greater 
political depth is required.
5. Study Thatcherism as the Conservative party under her leadership.
There are certain common elements to the policies of the party under 
Thatcher's leadership which are often referred to. Stated aims such as 
reduction of the public sector borrowing requirement and removing 
restrictions within the labour market are two examples. If however, one 
defines Thatcherism as the Conservative Party under her leadership one has 
to be convinced that this period of Conservative government is distinct in 
terms of its policies from any preceding period of Conservative government, 
that the policies were consistent and evolved in a progressive manner 
forming no distinct changes within the framework of policy from 1979 until the 
end of her period of office.
The following of a continuous and coherent set of structured policies based 
upon an identifiable political ideology may or may not have been the original 
intention but it was not the reality. Not only did policies change they 
frequently contradicted stated policy objectives and the political ideology 
behind these objectives. A less rigid definition of Thatcherism is required if a
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thorough exploration of the ideology, the political strategy and the impacts of 
the policies is to be achieved.
6. Look at the strategy which emerged over the years of her leadership and 
was followed by her and her political allies.
By identifying the existence of a strategy this approach makes it possible to 
explore: the ideology upon which the strategy was based, the strategy itself 
and policy objectives and effects which may deviate from or conform to both 
the ideology and the strategy. This approach has been adopted in this 
instance as a framework for the analysis of Thatcherism as it pertains to the 
commercial property markets during the 1979 -1990 period. The approach 
does not assume that a single strategy was formed and then followed. The 
idea that certain policy objectives were identified prior to the 1979 election 
and a strategy was formed as a means of achieving these objectives can be 
developed. However, the approach avoids the rigidity of analysing 
Thatcherism as a cohesive and identifiable set of policies and objectives. It 
allows the exploration of inconsistencies between the ideology, the political 
strategy, the policies which were actually implemented and the impacts of 
those policies.
Having established an approach to Thatcherism which is appropriate to the 
objectives of this work, the following section begins the analysis by exploring 
the ideology of Thatcherism. This forms the first stage in the three stage 
analysis of Thatcherism contained within this work as identified in the 
introduction above.
The formation of the ideology of Thatcherism
The climate of opinion within the Conservative Party changed in the mid 
1970's as a re-evaluation of existing policy assumptions began. Keith 
Joseph's famous speech at Preston in which he attacked the so called 
'middle ground' which the Conservative Party occupied, particularly on 
economic policies, introduced the idea of monetarism as an antidote to the
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decline of the UK economy. The response to this speech was mixed, 
particularly as it indicated a major difference of opinion between senior 
figures of the Conservative Party regarding fundamental policy objectives 
shortly before the Labour Party was expected to call a general election. 
However, Joseph's speech marked his personal break from the traditional 
policies of the Conservative party and the post war consensus. It also had 
the important effect of forcing a re-evaluation of existing policies and policy 
objectives through the ensuing debate. Margaret Thatcher has frequently 
discussed how impressed she was by Joseph's frank reappraisal of his own 
political standpoint:
"Keith Joseph made a remark which reverberated 
powerfully in my mind. 'I have only recently become a 
Conservative,' he said,... I had always been an instinctive 
Conservative, but I had failed to develop these instincts 
either into a coherent framework of ideas or into a set of 
practical policies for government." (Thatcher, 1993:14).
Both Joseph and Thatcher were important political actors within the process 
of developing an ideology from which a new political strategy would emerge. 
Joseph established the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 1974 with 
Thatcher as its president. Unsurprisingly the work of this body can be 
identified in policies implemented under her leadership. Other groups 
involved in the formation of policy ideas and objectives from the mid 1970's 
onwards included: the Institute for Economic Affairs; Adam Smith Institute; 
Aims of Industry and Institute of Directors.
These groups were impressed by ideas emanating from the USA such as the 
encouragement of free enterprise, small businesses and free market policies 
in welfare and education. F. A. Hayek was Chairman of the Board of the 
Adam Smith Institute (ASI). His ideas were popularised by the ASI and other 
groups and permeate the arguments for major policy changes made by 
Thatcher and Joseph. Ideas attributable to Hayek which recur as themes 
within the ideology of Thatcherism include: the dangers and economic 
inefficiencies of centralised economic planning by government; that granting
14
too many discretionary powers leads to a reduction in group and individual 
liberties, weakening of the role of Parliament and undermining of the 'Rule of 
Law'; and the virtue of the market in the efficient encouragement and use of 
entrepreneurial talents and skills. Hayek saw the role of the markets as 
fundamental within an economy. This idea of the prime importance of 
markets particularly as the most efficient system of resource allocation is a 
strong feature of the ideology of Thatcherism.
Another major influence on what was to become the ideology of Thatcherism 
was Milton Friedman who was a supporter of and spokesman for monetarism 
(Kavanagh, 1987). He emphasised the importance of the supply of money in 
causing inflation. Other important themes within his ideas also became 
familiar: the inefficiencies of government; the benefits of lower taxation; the 
need to deregulate and denationalise industries and services; the idea that 
markets disperse power where politics concentrate it and the abolition of 
protective legislation such as rent controls, minimum wages and regional and 
industrial subsidies all of which restrict the operation of the market as a 
regulator of the allocation of resources. Friedman saw freedom for the 
individual as the freedom to make choices without coercion. Thatcher reflects 
this notion in what she saw as the role of government;
"It was the job of government to establish a framework of 
stability - whether constitutional stability, the rule of law or 
the economic stability provided by sound money - within 
which individual families and businesses were free to 
pursue their own dreams and ambitions." (Thatcher,
1993:14).
The ideology of Thatcherism emerged from these bodies of new right thinking 
and reflected many of their ideas. Sullivan (1989) describes the ideology 
developed by Thatcher and Joseph as favouring industrial self reliance and 
thrift and aiming for welfare provision not to burden the private sector. 
Thatcherism sought to provide the economic circumstances within which 
private enterprise could flourish and saw the private sector as the
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fundamental element within this process. The dominant themes that can be 
identified within the ideology of Thatcherism became:
♦ the promotion of an individual's freedom and responsibility through the 
promotion of their economic freedom;
♦ the promotion of economic and social development as a product of this;
♦ the reduction of the role of government within the life of the individual 
embodied in the desire to 'roll back the state';
♦ the promotion of the entrepreneurial talents of the British public;
♦ the promotion of the role of the market as the most efficient system of 
resource allocation;
♦ the upholding of law and order and,
♦ the importance of the family.
In order for the tenets of this ideology to be put into effect its exponents had 
to garner the support of both the Conservative Party and the electorate. This 
process of popularising the ideas was undertaken by Joseph and his 
supporters. They were helped in their task by Labour winning both general 
elections in 1974. If Joseph's speech at Preston crystallised a desire for 
change within some sections of the Conservative Party, losing the second 
1974 general election reinforced the validity of this exercise within the 
remainder of the party (Kavanagh, 1987) making them much more receptive 
to new ideas.
The popularising of the ideology of Thatcherism
Jessop et al. (1988) in their assessment of the rise of Thatcherism, refer to 
the importance within its formation, of the recent (at the time) failures of both 
Enoch Powell and Edward Heath in their separate attempts to provide an 
alternative to the post war consensus. Having been the main voice for the 
neo-liberal element of the Conservative Party in the 1960's, Powell had 
promoted individualism and the virtues of the free market and competition as 
such an alternative (Kavanagh, 1987). His racism and 'little Englandist'
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attitude had, however, failed to win him popular support. Elements of the 
arguments being made by Powell could nonetheless later be identified, albeit 
perhaps in more developed form, in Joseph's speeches.
The ideas being expressed by Joseph were not new but had been detached 
from the unpopular racist sentiments attached to Powell. The alternative to 
the post war consensus attempted by Heath had comprised a combination of 
Keynesian demand management and elements of monetarism. Heath had 
been forced to back away from monetarist policy once the effects on 
employment became clear. His policies had not formed any substantial 
alternative to the post war settlement and gave way to a new Labour 
government.
These events signalled clearly to the Conservative Party and to the research 
and policy groups that the Keynesian demand management policies and 
Fordist principles common to the post war consensus were no longer 
appropriate to the UK economy or convincing to the electorate. Changes in 
the domestic and international economies demanded a new political strategy 
such as that which was germinating within the research and policy groups of 
the new right.
These events also signalled to the Conservative Party the requirement for a 
new leader. According to Kavanagh (1987) many senior Conservative 
politicians of the time who may have been a more obvious choice than 
Thatcher for party leader did not stand against Heath either out of loyalty to 
him or out of a feeling of responsibility for their involvement with the policies 
of the last Conservative Government. Joseph's decision not to stand against 
Heath made Thatcher consider standing and his support for her in the contest 
was a major contribution to her becoming leader.
This drive for change within the Conservative party reflected a desire for 
change which was developing within the electorate. Jessop et al. (1988)
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make reference to a climate of discontent amongst the electorate displayed 
through the setting up of various groups particularly in the 1970's. Groups 
emerged which were concerned with the moral issues of the day such as the 
National Viewers and Listeners Association, or with the difficulties suffered by 
businessmen under existing government policies such as the National 
Federation of the Self Employed, the Independent Business Persons 
Association. Some groups had a more radical flavour such as the National 
Association of Freedom. These groups were a manifestation of the 'mood' of 
the period, as referred to by Kavanagh (1987) which it was essential for 
Thatcherism to respond to. They illustrate a discontent with the political and 
economic situation as it existed.
The issues these groups focused on are reflected in the overriding themes of 
Thatcherism such as the concern with the freedom of the individual, law and 
order, the promotion of the entrepreneurial spirit of the British people and the 
importance of the family. The first two of these themes contradict each other 
in many ways but they were concerns of the electorate and were therefore 
pertinent to the 'rise of Thatcherism as a social movement' described by 
Jessop et al. (1988).
The concerns of the electorate were captured by some of the policies of 
Thatcherism where they had not been acknowledged by Heath or the existing 
Labour government. Thatcherism began to form into a movement which 
could capitalise on much of the support these groups had. Leys (1989) in 
his discussion of Thatcher's strategy refers to the importance of its populist 
appeal. A link is identifiable between the groups emanating from this 
dissatisfaction within the electorate in the late 1960's and 1970's, the 'rise of 
Thatcherism as a social movement', as described by Jessop et al., the new 
right policy groups and a political strategy which seemed to be offering an 
alternative to the post war consensus and acknowledging the issues troubling 
the electorate. The policies which were ultimately implemented were in no 
way unique to Thatcher's period of leadership but they were successful in
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catching the mood of the period, as described by Kavanagh (1987) and 
offering an alternative to the post war consensus which was couched in 
accessible language and responded to the desire for change.
The subject of the post war consensus, whether or not it existed and whether 
or not the Thatcher Government made a distinct break from it is far too large 
to be addressed fully here. Jessop et al. (1988) feel that a complete break 
was not made and that patterns can be identified post 1979 which were 
relevant pre 1979. In contrast to this Vane (1992) uses the phrase "a radical 
change in both economic and political philosophy" (Vane, 1992:28) to 
describe what happened after the 1979 election. It seems fair to say, 
however, that Thatcher abandoned certain ideas and objectives which played 
a dominant role within the governing of the UK during the post war period and 
that enough of a change, whether radical or not, can be identified to allow a 
consideration of government objectives post 1979 independent of a full 
discussion of the arguments surrounding the existence of a post war 
consensus.
ii) The development of Thatcherism as a political strategy
Opportunity for change
Kavanagh (1987) in his discussion of the contribution made by Thatcherism 
to change within British politics makes the following point:
"Radical governments depend in large measure on 
opportunities - for example an inept opposition or a crisis 
- and have to catch a mood. In due course they will 
suffer from the mood of 'time for change' either to 
consolidate or review policies or from the rise of new 
issues." (Kavanagh, 1987:318)
Any radical change attributed to Thatcherism has to acknowledge the 
importance of the opportunity that was embodied within the crisis of the 
winter of discontent and other events leading up to the 1979 election. Crucial 
to the establishment of electoral support for the 'radical' policies of the 
Conservative Party were:
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♦ The failure of the 'social contract' to control wages inflation, which in 1975 
reached 26.9% over only 11 months;
♦ the inflation rate seeming out of control throughout large periods of the 
1974-79 Labour government and being accompanied by rising 
unemployment;
♦ the apparent inability of Keynesian demand management policies to 
control either inflation or unemployment any longer;
♦ a world wide recession which had been in effect since the 1973-74 oil 
crisis;
♦ the IMF dictating specific economic policies to the government in 1976 and 
these being policies of monetary and spending control;
♦ the much publicised and emotive issue of the 'Winter of Discontent'.
At the time of the 1979 General Election the electorate was thus concerned 
with: the power of the unions, the Labour Party's reputation as the Party that 
could negotiate with and control the unions now lying in tatters; 
unemployment (ironically given what was to follow) and inflation.
The discussion so far has considered what Thatcherism was said to be about 
by its supporters. The following section of this chapter looks at the policies 
which were implemented by the Thatcher Government in response to the 
problems identified above. The discussion is concerned with the political 
strategy which was implemented under Thatcherism and the conflicts 
between policy and ideology.
The policies which embodied the political strategy of the Thatcher 
Government
The Conservative election manifesto of 1979 gives the following five 
headings to its proposals;
1. The control of inflation and trade union power.
2. The restoration of incentives.
3. Upholding Parliament and the Rule of Law.
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4. Supporting family life by a more efficient provision of Welfare services.
5. Strengthening defence
The 1987 Election Manifesto also refers to the control of inflation, reduction 
in taxation, encouragement of home ownership and deregulation. Clearly 
certain objectives consistent with the ideology of Thatcherism remained 
common to the political strategy and stated policy objectives of the Thatcher 
Government throughout this period. However, in spite of this apparent 
consistency in policy, contradictions can be identified between the economic 
policies imposed in the first year of the Thatcher administration and the 
stated objectives of her government.
In the period immediately following the 1979 general election Thatcher's 
position in the Cabinet was relatively weak (Jessop et al., 1988). There was 
an identified need to reward sections of the electorate for their support and 
this led to contradictions between the ideology of Thatcherism and the 
policies which were implemented in these early stages of the Thatcher 
Government. The commitment to reduce inflation was undermined by the pay 
settlements which were made, particularly the public sector pay settlements 
which took account of recommendations made by the Clegg Commission on 
Pay and Comparability that pay reviews be in line with inflation. It was 
undermined further by the reduction in direct taxation both through the 
reduction of the basic and marginal income tax rates and the increase of the 
tax threshold by more than inflation. These policies stem from the 
requirement to reward the support of the electorate, as identified earlier, and 
to honour commitments made during the election campaign. The additional 
impact on inflation of the increase in VAT which represented the transfer from 
direct to indirect taxation can be differentiated as a 'one off' effect as, in 
Thatcher words;
"This would be a once and for all addition to prices (and
so it would not be 'inflationary' in the correct sense of the
term which means a continuing rise in prices)."
(Thatcher, 1993:43)
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By the end of 1980 Thatcher had consolidated her support in Cabinet giving 
her much greater freedom to implement policies more in line with the themes 
of the ideology that had been developed. Jessop et al. label this period of 
government as "the period when Thatcherism was consolidated" (p.59).
In his discussion of Thatcherism, Vane (1992) outlines three major changes 
which were made in the conduct of economic policy at this time:
i) The change in emphasis from the maintenance of high and stable 
levels of employment to the control of inflation and the freeing up of 
the labour markets to work more 'efficiently' through trade union reform 
and providing help for the unemployed.
ii) macro-economic policy was to be used to control inflation, the idea 
that inflation could be controlled by controlling the money supply was 
wholeheartedly adopted;
iii) the 'supply side strategy' was adopted as the government's method 
of stimulating economic growth. The objective behind this was that the 
government should strive to provide the right economic conditions and 
the right stimuli for growth but the market through private enterprise 
should provide the breeding ground for that economic growth.
The change in policy emphasis, abandoning the prime objective of full 
employment in favour of control of inflation, reflects quite directly Joseph's 
speech at Preston in 1974 and many of his subsequent publications (e.g. 
'Monetarism is not Enough' CPS, 1977). The control of inflation became a 
theme and objective of Conservative Party policy from 1979 onwards and 
remains a stated objective today. It was implemented initially through the 
Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) introduced in the 1980 Budget by 
Geoffrey Howe as Chancellor of the Exchequer. This established more firmly 
the government's commitment to the ideology of Thatcherism and to the 
implementation of the political strategy which had been developed and of 
which the MTFS formed part. It was through the policies and targets
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contained within the political strategy that the Thatcher administration 
proposed to bring about a new period of growth within the UK economy.
Following the introduction of the MTFS and the re-emphasis in 1981 of the 
objectives it contained the consolidation of Thatcher's power within the 
cabinet became crucial to the avoidance of a 'u' turn similar to that made by 
the Heath Government during the 1970 -1974 administration. Once the 
consequences of monetary policy aiming to reduce inflation rather than 
maintain full employment began to emerge, the rapidly increasing 
unemployment and personal hardships which emanated from the resulting 
acceleration of the process of deindustrialisation brought fierce criticism.
This came from within the Conservative Party and even the Cabinet itself, 
from the electorate, from industry and from the newly established Social 
Democrat Party (Jessop et al., 1988:63). The policies were maintained in 
spite of this opposition as a result of, amongst other things, the power 
Thatcher had consolidated in the Cabinet and the weakening of these 
opposing forces through divisions within the Labour Party, the disorganising 
of labour power through employment legislation and mass unemployment and 
the continued support of the Thatcherite press.
The medium term financial strategy
The government based its monetary policy on the assumption that if inflation 
was controlled, i.e. stable and either low or zero, productivity and 
employment would follow. In order to control inflation the money supply had 
to be controlled by reducing both credit and the amount of money circulating 
in the private economy. The methods by which inflation was to be controlled 
were embodied within the MTFS.
The main tenets of MTFS were;
i) control of the money supply, defined initially as sterling M31,2.
1 This is based on the statement MV=PT where M is the money supply, V is the velocity of circulation, P is the
level of prices and T the number of transactions. The statement is one of truth, not an idea. The policy was to control 
the level of M thereby encouraging the level of P to fall in order for the two sides of the statement to remain balanced.
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ii) reduction in the public sector borrowing requirement.
i) Control of the money supply
The government proceeded to set target rates for the growth of the money 
supply and in doing so demonstrated an acceptance of the monetarist view 
that inflation can be controlled in this way. This can not necessarily be relied 
upon as an unassailable truth. Nonetheless targets were set for levels of 
growth in sterling M3. Interest rates were kept high in order to discourage the 
creation of credit. The targets were not met and other government policies, 
such as the removal of the restrictions on bank lending imposed by the 
supplementary special deposit scheme, deregulation of the financial markets 
and the promotion of competition between banks and building societies, 
worked against the government in its attempts to control growth in M3. 
Subsequently sterling M0, or narrow money, was also adopted as an indicator 
as it was said by the government to be a fairer reflection of growth in the 
money supply.
The abandonment of M3 in favour of M0as an indicator and the effective 
disregarding of the targets set in 1980 once they had not been met3, in 
practice amounted to the abandonment of monetarist policy by the Thatcher 
Government in the form it had been adopted. In his 1986 Mansion House 
speech Nigel Lawson officially abandoned both M3 and M0 and adopted 
inflation itself as the most important indicator for the economy, it was referred 
to as "judge and jury". This represented a very late official abandonment of a 
monetarist strategy that had been abandoned in terms of policy 
implementation as early as 1982.
ii) Public Sector Borrowing
Setting targets for the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) 
expressed a belief in the existence of a direct relationship between the size of 
the PSBR and the level of monetary growth. Vane (1992) cites Milton
2
Sterling M3 = currency + private sector sight and time deposits + public sector time and sight deposits
3
New targets were set but they incorporated the higher level of M3 so after 1980/81 no real reduction in M3 was 
actually targeted.
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Friedman as a leading orthodox monetarist, influential in the development of 
the ideology of Thatcherism, who denies the existence of such a link. 
However, the Thatcher Government was not unique in it's adoption of this 
policy of public expenditure cuts. In many ways they were continuing policies 
which had been used by the Callaghan Government following Healey's 
insistence that "you can't spend your way out of a recession" at the Labour 
Party Conference in 1976.
Public sector spending controls were implemented by the Thatcher 
Government to supplement the restrictive monetary policy in achieving 
monetary growth targets. Naturally one of the main targets for the 
government in its reduction of the PSBR was spending on welfare in the form 
of the national health service (NHS), social security and related benefits and 
state pensions. Promises made during the election campaign to maintain the 
NHS in particular, restricted the government's options within this cost cutting 
exercise. Pledges to increase defence and maintain law and order created 
further contradictions between the implementation of the monetary policy 
objectives of the political strategy and other aspects of the ideology of 
Thatcherism as discussed above.
Government proposals for restructuring the welfare state were not enforced in 
great measure, whilst less radical changes were made and efficiency 
improved. Proposals to encourage the use of private health insurance 
through tax incentives for the elderly were brought in but did little to reduce 
the cost of the NHS at a time when increasing unemployment was adding to 
its burden.
Proposals to abolish the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) 
met with extreme political and public opposition. They were replaced by a 
gradual phasing out of the government's responsibilities under the scheme 
initiated by encouraging workers to opt out of it in return for lower national 
insurance payments. The introduction of tax incentives for the purchase of
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'Personal Equity Plans' accompanied these proposals as the government 
attempted to encourage the public to provide for their own old age through 
the private sector. These policies conform to the ideology of Thatcherism in 
that they have the potential to reduce an individual's reliance on the state. 
Furthermore, they may be of benefit to a future government when today's 
working population retires and relies less heavily on the state for support and 
medical help. However, it was of little assistance to the Thatcher 
Government in achieving the targets established in the MTFS and reducing 
the level of public expenditure.
Further problems, and possibly the most damaging problems, were faced with 
the rising cost of social security payments. The dramatic and sharp rise in 
unemployment which followed the 1979 election had the expected double 
blow effect on the PSBR by increasing the level of social security payments 
whilst at the same time reducing contributions to the treasury in the form of 
tax receipts. Reforms were made to the system of payments such as the 
linking in 1980 of increases in long term benefits to price rises rather than the 
higher of price or wage rises, the abolition of earnings related sickness and 
unemployment supplements in 1982. Increases in benefits were kept to a 
bare minimum over the period of the Thatcher administration and remain that 
way today. This was in part an attempt to control the social security budget 
but also conforms to the policy of increasing the incentive to work and 
reducing the effects of the poverty trap. The poverty trap was felt at the time 
to be discouraging people from seeking employment by placing them in the 
incongruous position of being better off unemployed than employed4.
The pressures on public expenditure combined with extended spending in 
areas such as defence and law and order forced the government to abandon 
the target of real reductions in public spending. A levelling off in the 
proportion of GDP represented by public spending became the objective as a
4
The poverty trap is clearly as easily created by low wages and a  relatively high incidence of tax for the low paid 
as by over generous state benefits.
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means of supporting monetary policy in controlling inflation. By 1988-89, 
including revenue from privatization, public spending represented 39.5% of 
GDP as compared to 43.2% in the last year of Labour government (Riddell, 
1987:34).
The interest rate remained high over the early period of the Thatcher 
Government in their efforts to control inflation and the money supply. Interest 
rates were brought down in 1981, but to accommodate this relaxation of 
monetary control and the tax reductions that the government required, a more 
restrictive fiscal policy had to be implemented. This was an unusual decision 
in the face of rising unemployment and elicited substantial criticism from 
many economists. Nonetheless, many point to 1981 as the turning point for 
the Thatcher administration and clearly it represented a change in 
government policy in response to events within the domestic economy.
The manufacturing sector was worst affected by the policies adopted which 
increased the recession, unemployment and public discontent. It was at this 
point that a repeat of the 'IT turn which so undermined the Heath Government 
was expected in the face of strong opposition from within the Party as well as 
from other quarters as discussed earlier. Thatcher's strength within the 
Cabinet and the disorganisation of the opposition allowed her to avoid the 
retreat with memorable party conference statements. The policies thus 
continued through 1982 until the objective of deflating the economy had been 
achieved and the economic cycle was moving into an upswing.
Jessop et al. (1988) describe the period from 1982 onwards as "consolidated 
Thatcherism" (p.59). They refer to the themes and strategies of the 
Government as drifting during this period as the Conservative politicians 
supporting further consolidation were gradually defeated by those in support 
of more radical policies. Monetarism gave way to a greater emphasis on 
supply side policies and the programme of deregulation within the land, 
capital and labour markets. The development of an entrepreneurial society
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and popular capitalism emerged at this time and were to be achieved 
primarily through supply side policies. It is this aspect of the Thatcher 
Government's political strategy which we turn to next.
The Supply Side Strategy
The supply side policies introduced by the Thatcher Government aimed to 
provide the economic conditions within which private enterprise could flourish 
by removing any identifiable constraints to the supply of resources. The 
labour market was deregulated through trade union reform, the capital 
markets were deregulated both through financial deregulation and the 
removal of restrictive practices within trade in the City, the market for 
development land was deregulated through changes to the development 
control system.
The removal of supply side constraints from the markets for these three 
resources formed the basis of the supply side strategy. In addition to these 
overriding themes the government introduced further measures to improve 
the efficiency of the economy and tap the entrepreneurial spirit of the British 
people. At all levels of the economy competition was encouraged and what 
became commonly referred to as the 'enterprise culture' was introduced 
during this period through these supply side policies. The overriding themes 
were of increased competition, deregulation and the encouragement of 
entrepreneurial activity in pursuit of the accumulation of capital.
In order to provide a coherent overview of the supply side policies this 
discussion is divided into five sections. It begins by focusing on the policies 
relating to taxation and privatization and ends with the deregulation of the 
labour, capital and land markets. The identification of policies as they relate 
to the three major resources in the latter part of the discussion is a theme 
which recurs throughout the remainder of this work.
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i) Taxation policies
The government's stated commitment to reductions in direct taxation was a 
major part of the supply side strategy, high income tax rates being seen as a 
disincentive to work. In 1979 the highest marginal rate of tax on earned 
income was cut from 83% to 60% and on income from investments the rate 
was reduced from 98% to 75%. By 1988 the earned income tax rate had 
been reduced to 40% where it remains today. Simultaneously the lower, 
'basic' income tax rate was reduced from 33% to 27% in 1987 and 
subsequently to 25%. Personal allowances and income thresholds at which 
the higher rates became applicable were increased in real terms over this 
period to consolidate these reductions.
The tax reductions favoured higher income earners and looked at in 
combination with increases in VAT and national insurance contributions, the 
incidence of taxation as a proportion of GDP actually rose during this period 
of government. According to Riddell (1989) it rose from approximately 34% 
of GDP in 1978-79 to 39% in the mid 1980's followed by a fall to 38% in 
1988-89.
The VAT increases represented a change in the way revenue was raised by 
government which conforms with the political strategy of Thatcherism 
regarding choice for the individual. A shift was brought about from direct to 
indirect taxation much as was expressed as desirable by Heath in 1970. 
Such a shift was seem as increasing choice and freedom for the individual in 
spending income which would be denied through increasing tax at source.
The assertion that lower levels of direct taxation improve the incentive to 
work is by no means a proven rule. Arguments against this abound and 
studies have been carried out to show that the effects differ between sectors 
of society and not everyone will work harder in a response to a potential 
increase in the gains to be made. Reductions in direct taxation make less 
work necessary in order to achieve the same real income. Furthermore, tax
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reductions which favour the higher income levels will have less effect on 
aggregate demand than reductions affecting the lower income levels as the 
marginal propensity to spend is lower in the upper income brackets than in 
the lower income brackets.
Other anomalies exist within the Thatcher Government's polices regarding 
taxation. One of the major contradictions relates to the policy on tax relief for 
mortgages. Although the limits for this tax relief were reduced over the 
1980's, most noticeably in 1988, the subsidy was in fact expanded in 1983 
from applying to the first £25,000 of a mortgage to the first £30,000. As a 
policy it contradicts the anti government-subsidy ideology of this government, 
being a measure through which the government subsidises home ownership. 
The government had given strong encouragement to home ownership 
through right-to-buy legislation and by introducing greater competition 
between mortgage lenders through the deregulation of the financial services 
sector. This complicated the position the government could take on 
mortgage tax relief. Home ownership having become a responsibility held by 
approximately 67% of households by 1986 (Finer, 1987) the government 
would have made itself extremely unpopular if it had removed this subsidy.
ii) Privatisation policies
The main objectives of the privatization programme as listed by the Treasury 
in 1985 were: greater efficiency; reduction in the role of the public sector; 
provision of substantial sales receipts; changing attitudes in industrial 
relations by selling to the employees a direct stake in the company and 
promotion of wider share ownership. The policy appeared to conform to three 
of the government's stated objectives:
♦ increased competition in industry;
♦ reduction in the PSBR - increased government investment in these 
industries in the run up to privatization was justified through the ultimate 
removal of this burden from the public sector and the contribution to the 
reduction in the PSBR made by proceeds of the floatation;
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♦ reducing the role of the government within the economy or 'rolling back the 
state'.
Inherent within the privatization programme is the belief that the private 
sector, in itself, is more efficient than the public sector in organising economic 
activity. However, given that it is clearly not simply ownership which dictates 
the level of competitiveness within an industry, strong arguments can be 
made against this. Transferring ownership of previously state run industries 
to the private sector directly benefited those people who bought shares, 
especially as the share floatation price was relatively low in some cases. It 
was also said to have benefited the tax payer by removing the state subsidy 
of these industries from the public purse and removing some 600,000 
employees from the public sector. This point is also arguable however, given 
the increase in government investment required prior to the privatization of an 
industry and the ultimate loss to government revenue of the profits made by 
industries such as British Airways.
Where the consumer has no alternative supplier of the service provided, as 
was the case with most of the flotation's, the objective of increased 
competition was also not clearly achieved. The consumer was no better off 
in terms of choice and, given the new priority of the privately run monopolies, 
to provide a dividend for the share holders, there is every chance that the 
consumer could get a worse and more expensive service than before.
The privatization programme increased the number of individual share 
owners in the UK. According to a National Opinion Poll survey the number 
increased from 3 million to 9 million between 1979 and 1989 (Riddell, 1989). 
The long term pattern of share ownership did not change substantially with 
those people who became share owners through the privatization issues 
either selling relatively quickly afterwards or retaining a relatively small 
number of shares. Existing shareholders tended to increase the number of 
shares they held in the long term.
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It has been suggested that by popularising share ownership, particularly 
through privatization, a larger proportion of the population had an interest in 
retaining a Conservative government for as long as the Labour party policy 
remained to re-nationalise these industries (Finer, 1987). However, Labour 
policy relating to renationalisation changed relatively quickly and the short 
period of time for which many of the new shareholders retained their shares 
limited the effectiveness of privatization in these terms.
The increase in the number of share holders, even if ownership was only 
short term, increased trading activity on the stock exchange. Once combined 
with the deregulation of the financial services sector and the removal of 
restrictive trading practices within the London stock exchange a larger volume 
of trading would be being conducted by a larger number of traders 
substantially increasing the profits to be made by this area of the financial 
services sector.
iii) Deregulation of the labour market
The target of increased competitiveness as the route to greater efficiency in 
the allocation of scarce resources is clearly identifiable in the trade union 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the labour markets. It was 
commonly felt by the government that the British workforce was pricing itself 
too highly and only by moving towards individual wage negotiations and 
greater flexibility in working practices was this going to change. The 
Thatcher Government's trades union reforms were rooted not only in a 
distrust and dislike of bureaucracy but, on a more economic level, in the aim 
to improve the efficiency of this market. The objective was to encourage the 
demand for labour by increasing the flexibility and lowering the price of 
supply.
Government attitude towards the trades unions changed completely in 1979. 
Rather than seek the co-operation of the trades union congress (TUC) the 
government sought to reduce the significance of the trades unions in the 
political arena. The government tried to convey the message that industrial
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relations, where they took the form of disputes, were the province of the 
relevant workforce and its management, and were not something which the 
government should, or would, willingly become involved in (Thatcher, 1993). 
Thus, in a relatively short space of time, the situation changed from one 
where concern was voiced as to the ability of any political party to govern the 
country effectively in the face of trade union power, to one where that power 
was first to be ignored, later to be challenged and finally to be defeated.
Collective responsibility for the high price and wages inflation and the rising 
level of unemployment experienced during the 1970's was largely attributed 
by the electorate to the trades unions as the embodiment of a powerful labour 
movement. This afforded the Thatcher administration the opportunity it 
required to realise the stated objective of union reform. Whilst deflating the 
economy through the MTFS the government implemented new policies 
regarding trades unions which ultimately brought about a significant 
restructuring of the labour market as a whole.
Legislation was brought in which aimed to reduce the number of strikes called 
by requiring the use of secret ballots, restricting picketing and restricting 
secondary industrial activity. Greater flexibility in working practices was 
promoted through the restrictions on 'closed shop' practices particularly 
through support given to workers not involved in such practices in industries 
where they existed, and to conscientious objectors to union membership.
The power of the trade unions was further weakened by the severity of the 
recession of the early 1980's. It has been suggested (Biddis and Minogue, 
1989) that the rise in unemployment in this country in the 1980's did more to 
reduce the power of the unions than government legislation. Thus 
unemployment could be said to have had a positive political function in 
furthering the Thatcher Government's political strategy by encouraging more 
flexibility within the labour market as a whole.
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The government's continued successes against the unions during the 1980's 
served to further weaken these organisations both in terms of credibility and 
resources. The large scale redundancies in the manufacturing sector, 
traditionally an area of union support, the impact of employment legislation 
and the revival of management confidence which accompanied the 
government's policies all contributed to the removal of the trade unions from 
the political debate at this time.
Unfortunately the trades union reforms failed simultaneously to reduce the 
level of unemployment, particularly within the unskilled labour force which 
had been worst affected by the large scale redundancies in the 
manufacturing and extractive industries. The expanding service industry, by 
the very nature of the processes involved, demanded skilled labour on 
flexible employment terms and conditions. This did nothing to alleviate the 
large levels of unemployment within the unskilled sectors but it placed 
pressure on the supply of skilled labour where a shortage became apparent 
in the late 1980's.
One of the criticisms made of the Thatcher Government is that it failed to 
educate the work force (Kavanagh, 1989). Education initiatives were 
introduced such as technical and vocational programmes for 14 -18 year 
olds, two year youth training schemes and the encouragement of links 
between industry and schools. These were supplemented by training 
initiatives such as the community programme and enterprise allowance but 
this combination of education and work based training schemes formed a 
piece meal approach and provided little in the way of useful qualifications. 
The aim within all these initiatives seemed to concentrate on reducing the 
unemployment figures rather than improving the skills level of the workforce.
Self employment was actively encouraged by the Thatcher Government and 
expanded dramatically over the 1980's rising by approximately 1 million to 3 
million over the 1980's to 1988 (Riddell, 1989:75). This represented 11% of
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the workforce. In conjunction with this the number of small businesses 
operating expanded very dramatically during this period; an expansion rate of 
500 per week is suggested by the VAT statistics (Riddell, 1989:75).
The government failed to accept the complex nature of the labour force and 
the complexity and imperfections of the labour market which limit its suitability 
for deregulation. The lower limit to the wage level provided by the 
unemployment benefit system prevents the market responding with complete 
flexibility during periods of over supply. Trades union representation 
although weakened continued to slow the response of the labour market to 
changes in demand and supply. It also helps to maintain relatively high wage 
levels for those remaining in employment and to secure redundancy 
packages for its members.
Furthermore, the labour force itself is not uniform, labour skills are spread 
unevenly across the country. Areas previously dominated by manufacturing 
industries have persistently high numbers of unskilled unemployed. These 
problems are exacerbated by the traditional immobility of the British 
workforce and the tendency for companies to locate close to pools of skilled 
labour. Imperfections within the market are created by the varying levels of 
skills and training which can provide shortages in particular types of labour 
whilst an excess level of supply is affecting the market as a whole.
A shortage in skilled labour demanded by the service sector industries in the 
mid to late 1980's produced high wages inflation during a period of excess 
overall supply within the labour market. Increased per capita production 
levels over this period added to the high wage levels as managers rewarded 
those who were in employment for their increased efficiency and production. 
Companies were being inhibited in their productivity by the lack of skills 
within the workforce (Riddell, 1989).
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The government relied substantially on the 'stick' of unemployment to force 
people into low paid work and the 'carrot' of lower marginal tax rates to 
increase the productivity of higher paid skilled workers who were in short 
supply. The overall level of skills within the workforce was allowed to 
deteriorate rather than improve with no organised system of training and 
retraining. Consequently the skills of the workforce failed to keep pace with 
the requirements of the new growth industries the government was so 
committed to encouraging. This inhibited their growth and created strong 
wage inflation as firms raised salaries in order to retain qualified staff. In the 
longer term having an under-trained workforce, particularly in comparison 
with other EC countries reduces the competitiveness of the UK as an 
economy (Riddell, 1989).
Government objectives regarding training initiatives were less successfully 
achieved than those relating to trade union reform. The labour market has 
become more flexible and increased competition has reduced the level of 
wages in some sectors of this market, particularly for unskilled labour but 
high unemployment is still a feature of the UK economy which in itself 
represents wasted resources. Furthermore the high wages inflation within the 
skilled labour market is also indicative of inefficient resource allocation given 
the oversupply in the labour market at that time. The large numbers of 
unskilled manual workers who were no longer required by the manufacturing 
sector industries were not effectively retrained and remained a burden to the 
welfare system and a wasted resource.
iv) Deregulation of the capital markets
The deregulation of the capital markets essentially began in 1979 with the 
removal of restrictions on overseas investment. The supplementary special 
deposit scheme which had been introduced to control the expansion of credit 
was also removed as it formed a restriction to supply. This was counter to 
the government's attempts to control the money supply, as has been 
discussed above, but complied with supply side policy.
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These initiatives were supplemented by the introduction of greater 
competition to the domestic lending markets in 1986. Banks and building 
societies were encouraged to compete with each other for business, 
particularly lending, and the sources from which building societies could 
obtain funds were increased. Restrictions on the accounts they could offer 
and the types and level of lending they could offer were removed. This 
coincided with the government's encouragement of home ownership. Rising 
mortgage demand was therefore met with increased supply of mortgage 
funds and more competitive interest rates.
In order to compete effectively and retain a level of profit the banks and 
building societies had to increase the number of borrowers they had by 
becoming more competitive. This necessitated accepting greater levels of 
risk in the loans they made and increasing the size of the loans they were 
willing to offer relative to income and security. The supply of domestic credit 
thus expanded sharply and, simultaneously, the risk inherent within the debt 
held by the private sector also increased.
The deregulation of the financial service sector also increased the supply of 
funds for commercial loans and similar changes were made to the level of risk 
lenders were prepared to accept. By increasing the level of competition 
within the market a greater volume of business had to be made for profit 
margins to be maintained and market operators again had to become more 
competitive. The operators within the market had to be willing to take on 
more risk in order to do this. Thus within the commercial sector too there was 
an increase in the level of risk inherent within the debt being held (Ball,
1994).
The significance of this increase in competitiveness is remarked upon by 
Pratten (1987). He suggests that lack of competitiveness not lack of 
competition was the problem facing the UK economy. The removal of 
restrictions to competition was addressed by the Thatcher Government but
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the problem of competitiveness was not. By increasing the level of 
competition in the capital markets the operators were forced to become more 
competitive but had limited means by which to achieve this. The resulting 
increase in the level of risk accepted by the financial services sector has 
implications which will be explored in later chapters but is important to note 
here.
The removal of restrictive trading practices in the City of London in 1986 
clearly affected the capital markets. The changes expanded the number of 
companies eligible to make share flotation's and increased the number of 
organisations eligible to trade in shares. This represented an expansion in 
the supply of shares and in the volume of transactions. It also opened new 
avenues of finance to companies within the development sector which had 
previously found it difficult to comply with the regulations for making share 
flotation's. Again, the consequences these changes had for the commercial 
property market will be considered in more detail later but it is important to 
highlight the extent of the changes which were made to the capital markets 
and the apparent lack of attention paid to the possible responses from those 
operating within these markets. The full implications of such an increase in 
competition do not seem to have been addressed.
v) Deregulation of the land market
In 1979 concern was expressed by both the government and the property 
industry over restrictions on the development of land. A memorandum sent 
by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) to the Property 
Advisory Group (PAG) in February 1979 outlined what they felt were 
disincentives to property development and investment. These included:
i) planning and other delays;
ii) office development permits (ODP's) and industrial development certificates 
(IDC's);
iii) the Community Land Act 1975 ;
iv) Development Land Tax.
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Each of these disincentives placed a restriction on supply, according to the 
Thatcher Government, and each was addressed over the 1979 - 1990 period. 
The government objective of deregulation of the land markets was to be 
brought about by the removal of direct restrictions on supply and the 
restructuring of the development control system. The supply of land for 
development was felt to have been restricted in the years preceding the 
Thatcher Government, by the discouraging effects of Development Land Tax5 
(DLT) and the Community Land Act, which effectively forced the local 
authorities to take land suitable for development into public ownership 
(Simmie, 1993).
These measures were a direct contradiction of the policies of the Thatcher 
Government. In theory, they reduced the supply of land for commercial 
development by discouraging any land owner from obtaining planning 
permission; any profit made from a subsequent sale of the land would be 
taxed and the land was at risk of being taken into public ownership. In 
practice local authorities were reluctant to implement the measures contained 
within the Community Land Act, so very little development land was taken 
into public ownership. Development Land Tax was also largely avoidable 
and was removed altogether by 1985. Nonetheless, the possibility of 
development land being taken into public ownership would have a negative 
effect on the supply of development land and the Community Land Act was 
repealed in August 1979.
The development control system was made more efficient with the 
introduction of time limits for development control decisions. Local
Development Land Tax as a tax on the 'windfall' profits accruing to property developers following the granting 
of planning permission, had affected the development of residential property more than it had affected the development 
of commercial property which had been the intended target. The commercial property developers tended to purchase 
land for development which already had the benefit of planning permission. Thus the tax was 'invisible' in the price of 
the land and would ultimately be passed on to the purchaser.
The effect the tax had in restricting supply in the residential market may, however, have been reflected in the 
dramatic demand for residential mortgage finance which refused to be abated by increasing interest rates in the mid 
1980's and contributed to the expansion of the money supply which the government was trying to control at that time.
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authorities were encouraged to sell under-used and vacant land in their 
ownership through the setting up of Land Registers. The development 
control system was made more responsive to market forces with government 
circulars which emphasised a presumption in favour of planning permission 
being granted and alterations to the General Development Order (GDO) and 
Use Class Order (UCO) to increase flexibility within land use. The 
presumption in favour of planning permission was reinforced through the 
appeal process as the government stated clearly that the advice of its 
circulars would be taken into account by the secretary of state.
Changes were made to the use of planning conditions within development 
control. Emphasis was placed on the role of planning conditions as a system 
whereby a planning application that would otherwise be turned down could 
be transformed into one which would be approved. The role of planning 
conditions as a system for improving upon a development proposal which 
could be approved in it's original form was reduced. This clearly reduced the 
powers of the local planning authority in terms of placing obligations on 
developers. It also increased the opportunities open to developers to obtain 
planning permissions for sites by encouraging the use of planning conditions 
as a system for improving unacceptable development proposals.
The system whereby local authorities exact planning gain from developers 
was also changed. Emphasis was placed on the importance of a clear 
connection between the gain and the development proposal and on the gain 
being 'reasonable'. This change also favoured the developer and reduced 
opportunities for local authorities to exercise control over local development.
The development control functions of the local authorities were further 
reduced in areas of the country in need of regeneration, particularly in inner 
city areas. The government set up Urban Development Corporations (UDC) 
which had their own development control powers, to generate growth within 
local economies. These were supplemented by Enterprise Zones (EZ's) set
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up to encourage employment generating businesses to locate in specific 
areas. Incentives were offered in the form of tax relief and rates 'holidays'. In 
addition to the tax subsidies within the EZ's, which were available to 
everyone investing in the designated area a range of grants was introduced 
to tackle specific urban regeneration problems. Derelict Land Grants 
(DLG's), Urban Development Grants (UDG's) and, later City Grants were 
available for qualifying sites and projects.
These measures were aimed at increasing the supply of development land 
which conformed to the areas of Thatcherism which sought freedom from 
constraints on supply in order to provide conditions suitable for economic 
growth. However, they also contradicted the areas of Thatcherism which call 
for a reduction in the role of central government. Development control 
powers were removed from the local level and placed more firmly with central 
government or non elected bodies by almost all of the measures mentioned 
above.
The land related supply side measures implemented by the Thatcher 
Government are clearly fundamental to this work. The deregulation of the 
land markets facilitated the increase in development activity during the 1980's 
which is to be explored within the context of changes within the commercial 
property markets as a whole in the next two chapters. The land related supply 
side policies and the implications they had for the commercial property 
markets will be explored fully in Chapter Four where the discussion will be 
supported by the analysis of commercial property market data.
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Conclusion
The deregulation of the markets for the three major resources conformed to 
the government's supply side policies and to some of the overriding themes 
of Thatcherism. A major restructuring of the UK economy took place in the 
early 1980's and was consolidated through the policies contained within the 
supply side strategy. By removing any identifiable constraints to supply 
wherever possible, market forces were given more freedom to govern the 
allocation of these resources. The supply of labour, capital and land were 
increased and the economy expanded very rapidly during the upswing of the 
latter half of the 1980's. The reflationary monetary policy particularly of the 
1988 and 1989 Budgets, reinforced the economic growth experienced during 
this period but ultimately at the expense of a deep recession in the early 
1990's.
As established in the introduction, this work is concerned with the response 
of the commercial property markets to the policies of the Thatcher 
Government. The context set by Thatcherism in terms of the political strategy 
this came to represent and the accelerated restructuring process which it 
encouraged is essential to a deeper discussion of the changes which 
occurred within the commercial property markets. By establishing the 
ideology behind the political strategy which was developed by the Thatcher 
Government it has been possible to explore the aims and objectives of the 
policies that were implemented within the context of that ideology.
Having established the political context represented by Thatcherism this work 
now goes on to look in more detail at the policies which were implemented 
and to focus on the response of the commercial land and property markets to 
those policies. In order to facilitate an ordered an critical analysis of these 
markets the operation of cycles within the economy and the commercial 
property markets is discussed in Chapter Two. This discussion focuses on 
the literature relating to long term and short term cycles which affect the 
commercial property markets. This provides a foundation from which the
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impact government policies had on these markets can be investigated in 
Chapters Three and Four.
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CHAPTER TWO
ANALYSING CHANGE IN COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKETS
Introduction
Chapter One identified the concept of Thatcherism, its ideology, political 
strategy and policies, and it's significance within the context of this work. 
Chapter Two provides a methodological foundation for the analysis of 
property market data which is the major source material for this work. These 
two chapters together establish the methodology through which the response 
of the commercial property markets to government policy are to be analysed.
This chapter draws upon two areas of work in providing a foundation for the 
data analysis. The literature relating to commercial property market cycles is 
discussed to establish some criteria against which movements within the 
commercial property markets can be assessed. These cycles are then 
placed within the context of a longer time frame through a discussion of the 
literature relating to longer term economic development cycles and the 
process of deindustrialisation.
Cycles Within The Commercial Property Markets: 1977 -1990
Cyclical fluctuations in building activity are well established (see Kuznets, 
1930, Long 1940, Isard 1942, Parry-Lewis 1965, Ricardson and Aldcroft 
1968). Rising user demand encourages increased development activity 
which brings the market to the point of over supply, discouraging 
development activity to the point of insufficient supply. The time lags within 
the development process make supply relatively inelastic in the short term 
reinforcing this cyclical pattern. This can be identified as a recurring pattern 
as far back as 1865 (Barras and Ferguson, 1985). The impact is felt within 
the rest of the economy because the scale of the investment during periods 
of increasing development activity is so large. This also means that these 
cycles can affect and will be affected by public policy.
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Studies have been made of various aspects of commercial property cycles 
and three types have been commonly identified (see Barras 1983, 1984, 
1987, Barras and Ferguson, 1985 and 1987, Case 1991, Key, 1994). Barras 
and Ferguson, (1985), report on the first phase of an examination of "the 
incidence and causes of building cycles in Britain" (p. 1369). They identify 
long swings or urban development cycles, of approximately 19 years duration 
for non-dwelling construction. Dates are.provided for five long swings, 
starting in 1856 and ending with the last downswing at the time of this work 
as 1973 - 1981. This implies an upswing ending in the early 1990's which 
coincides with the evidence produced here in Chapters Three and Four. 
These long swings are related to growth cycles in the whole of the economy 
and it is possible to identify each one with a major wave of urban 
development (Barras and Ferguson, 1985:1389).
A short cycle of approximately four years duration is identified that "can be 
associated with the influence of the 18 quarter business cycle, which 
produces demand-side fluctuations in private sector building" (Barras and 
Ferguson, 1985:1389). The relationship between the building cycle and 
demand is complicated by demand for buildings emanating from two sources; 
investors and occupiers. Demand from occupiers is dependent upon their 
economic activity and the price of the building (rent). Demand from investors 
will depend upon the level of return achieved on other investments compared 
with property. Thus, although the building cycle will be affected by the 
business cycle the affects may be muted by changing conditions in the two 
separate sources of building demand. Such circumstances were in evidence 
in the late 1970's and early 1980's when investor demand maintained a low 
yield level in the office sector in spite of weak demand from occupiers during 
much of the period.
A cycle of approximately nine years is identified in the same paper by Barras 
and Ferguson and is described as being "associated with supply-side 
production lags in construction" (p. 1389, see also Schumpeter, 1930 and 
Hanson,1964). These cycles particularly affect commercial and industrial
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property development and contribute to this particular analysis of market 
trends and movements. The following section therefore looks more closely at 
the characteristics of the nine year cycle described by Barras.
The Nine Year Cycle
Barras (1983), sets up a simple theoretical model of the office development 
cycle focusing on the nine year cycle. The causal factors of these cycles have 
been identified as "exogenous to the development process itself" (Barras, 
1983:1383). Barras feels that this interpretation neglects the importance of 
the development lag, inherent within the development process, as a causal 
factor. The time lag between order and completion of a building, sometimes 
as long as 4-5 years, places a restriction on supply, making it more price 
inelastic in the short term, leading to an increase in price which encourages 
more development. Thus the time lag becomes at least a contributing factor, 
if not an essential factor, within the cycle. Barras in no way dismisses the 
importance of exogenous factors. The point to focus on particularly in terms 
of this analysis is that both the development lag and the exogenous factors 
contribute to the cycle;
"It is recognised that exogenously determined economic 
factors such as the variation in user activity, construction 
costs, or the terms and availability of credit, plus public 
policy instruments such as planning and building 
controls, will act upon this inherent cyclical tendency, 
either reinforcing or dampening the cycles according to 
circumstances." (Barras, 1983:1383)
Three parameters are determined as being crucial to the characteristics of 
the nine year cycle (Barras, 1983). These are;
the length of delay between order and completion (this averages 2 
years in the UK).
the adjustment rate, i.e. the responsiveness of supply to demand, a 
parameter of unity would equate to supply increasing exactly to match 
rising user demand;
the depreciation rate of buildings (based on a building life of 50-100 
years and 1 -2 year development lag)
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The price inelasticity brought about by the development lag gives rise to 
fluctuations in the level of supply both above and below market demand. A 
change in the average length of the development lag will exacerbate this 
tendency in the short term. Furthermore, the cycle is described by Barras as 
being capable of 'explosive' fluctuations if the adjustment rate greatly exceeds 
the depreciation rate. This tendency is muted by the short term capacity of 
the construction industry to restrict the adjustment rate, and the inability to 
'disinvest' from this type of asset which provides a 'floor* to the cycle. It is not 
possible to massively under produce buildings as once they have been 
developed the investment can not be readily 'disinvested' or undone.
The shortest cycle identified by Barras, the four year demand cycle, is 
described as forming enough of a disturbance, transmitted through user 
demand, to trigger and sustain a cycle of development activity. Thus 
alternate business cycle peaks reinforce the corresponding peak in 
development activity . A secondary wave of development activity should then 
be observed mid way through the nine year cycle.
Four complete nine year development cycles are identified up to 1980, with 
peaks occurring in 1963, 1969, 1973 and 1979, the 1963 and 1973 peaks 
being reinforced by peaks in the business cycle (Barras, 1983:1390). The 
ending of a nine year development cycle in 1979 implies that the property 
markets should have experienced some oversupply in the market as the 
economy moved into recession in 1979 and 1980. Construction orders would 
be discouraged as demand fell and capital values fell. This would be followed 
by a rise in building activity in the early 1980's as the economy began to 
expand again. The peak in the four year business cycle in 1982/3 would 
encourage development activity through real rental growth and rising capital 
values. The development lag would increase pressure on supply during the 
early to mid 1980's and user demand would encourage further development 
activity in the next peak in the business cycle in 1986/7. This would add to 
supply in the mid to late 1980's, the cycle reaching another peak in 
development activity in approximately 1988.
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One element of the argument being made here is that government policy 
impacted upon the property markets in such a way as to exaggerate the nine 
year development cycle and make the cycle an explosive one. Barras 
identifies a similar, although less exaggerated, situation in his paper;
"Furthermore, special circumstances can arise under 
which there is a particularly strong development 
response to increases in user demand for floorspace (as 
in the office boom of the early 1970's)" (Barras,
1983:1388).
Part of the analysis of the commercial property markets' response to changes 
in Government policy will be made through a consideration of the impact on 
the parameters identified by Barras.
The cycles discussed by Barras are essentially short term cycles. For the 
purposes of this work the analysis of the commercial property markets' 
response to government policy benefits from being placed within the context 
of longer term cycles particularly within investment and construction. Harvey 
(1985) identifies a 15 to 25 year building cycle or 'Kuznets cycle' being 
formed by the rhythmic fluctuations in investment. He also identifies "a strong 
relationship between these long cycles and fluctuations in the money supply 
and in the structure of capital markets." (Harvey, 1985:22). It is important to 
make clear that he is discussing an investment cycle as opposed to the 
building and demand cycles which were discussed in Barras' work.
Harvey bases his discussion on what he describes as circuits of capital. The 
primary and secondary circuits of capital he identifies are pertinent to this 
discussion and can be described as follows:
i) the primary circuit - production processes using labour power to create 
surplus value in exchange for wages in order to produce consumption goods.
ii) the secondary circuit - surplus value created in the primary circuit of capital 
is transferred into the secondary circuit to create fixed capital: producer 
durables, consumer durables and the built environment.
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The flow of capital into and out of fixed investment is one of the main issues 
being investigated here. The flow between Harvey's primary and secondary 
circuits of capital clearly influences supply and demand within the commercial 
property markets through the activities of investors. Investment in fixed 
capital only takes place if a surplus of capital and labour exists within the 
primary circuit of capital. The capitalist system of capital accumulation gives 
rise to such surpluses of capital through the constant pressure for more 
efficient exploitation of resources. This ultimately results in crises of capital 
which tend to take the form of over accumulation (Harvey, 1985). This is 
exacerbated by the flow between the circuits of capital being extremely 
difficult to balance.
The transfer of capital from the primary to the secondary circuit requires over 
production to be turned into a capital flow, i.e. into money or credit. The 
efficiency With Which this can be carried out depends upon "the existence of a 
functioning capital market" (Harvey, 1985:7). It is difficult for individual 
investors to transfer funds from the production of consumer goods to capital 
investment without the assistance of a capital market to provide a system of 
credit creation. Whichever institution controls this financial system will have 
the means by which to affect flows of capital between the production of goods 
and services and fixed capital formation.
"An alteration in these mediating structures can therefore 
affect both the volume and the direction of capital flows 
by constricting movement down some channels and 
opening up conduits elsewhere." (Harvey, 1985:7)
The Thatcher Government made some fundamental changes to this system 
through supply side policies, all of which will have affected the flow of funds 
between these capital circuits and, therefore, the amount of capital available 
for investment in the built environment. The impact of supply side policies on 
the commercial property markets will be assessed in Chapter Four by 
looking, amongst other things, at their impact on these flows of capital.
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Harvey uses the early 1970's as an example of over accumulation within the 
primary circuit of capital leading to over investment in the built environment as 
an alternative productive form of employment for surplus capital. The late 
1980's illustrates the same process only with exaggerated swings to the 
cycle. Productive capacity had been reached in terms of goods and services, 
as evidenced by the rising inflation rate and increasing level of imports. 
Surplus capital was attracted towards the built environment as a productive 
form of employment.
The major difference from the early 1970's was the changes which had been 
made to the capital markets and financial services sector, increasing the 
efficiency of the mechanism for switching capital between the primary and 
secondary circuits, thus increasing the supply of capital to the built 
environment. The resulting over-investment, although very similar to that 
which occurred in the early 1970's, was much more exaggerated. Chronic 
overproduction was the predictable outcome which led to the "devaluation of 
fixed capital" (Harvey, 1985:12).
This devaluation is in financial terms, not in terms of use. The situation or 
'crisis' may produce financial difficulties for the institutions and individuals 
involved but the fixed capital structures left behind can provide the 
foundations for future growth or, as Harvey expresses it;
"This physical resource can now be used as "devalued
capital," and as such it functions as a free good that can
help to re-establish the basis for renewed accumulation."
(Harvey, 1985:16)
Whereas this particular aspect of Harvey's work is concerned with longer 
term investment cycles, Ball (1994) is concerned more specifically with long 
run building investment patterns. Aspects of Ball's work are used here to 
allow changes in the characteristics of building patterns within the UK 
commercial property markets to be considered within the context of this work. 
Ball identifies three long run characteristics within building investment:
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i) building investment has become increasingly expensive over time;
ii) building investment is of far greater importance in terms of economic life 
now than it was in the nineteenth century;
iii) building investment is subject to long waves which exceed the normal 
business cycle. (Ball, 1994:2).
Ball identifies two building cycles:
1955-1982, peak in 1970;
1983-1994, peak in 1990.
He suggests that the relative autonomy of the building cycle from economic 
fluctuations is one of it's most fundamental features. Depending upon what 
stage the building cycle has reached it will either protect an economy from 
recession or exaggerate the affects of recession.
The building cycle reached a trough in 1982, allowing the subsequent upturn 
in building activity to lessen the impact of the early 1980's recession in some 
regions. However, this must be considered in the context of the rapid 
restructuring of manufacturing industry which took place during this period. In 
order to have been protected from the affects of the decline of the 
manufacturing sector, investment in built structures in these areas would 
have had to increase in the 1980's. Whereas such investment did increase in 
areas of the south east and London in particular, the more regional inner city 
areas were disadvantaged by the rising cost of investment in built structures 
and their inability to offer locational and cultural advantages as a form of 
compensation or added value. Thus, whereas London was relatively 
protected from the restructuring of the manufacturing sector in the early 
1980's by the increased building activity which commenced as the building 
cycle entered an upswing in 1983, many regional cities suffered substantial 
inner city decline, not simply as a result of government policy but because of 
the combination of government policy and the long term increase in the cost 
of building investment.
The increase in the cost of building investment is largely attributed to the 
slower increase in productivity in this sector relative to other sectors in the
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economy, particularly manufacturing. Given that wage levels are set within 
the rest of the economy, the cost of construction labour increases. This cost 
is passed on in higher building prices. These costs exclude land values, 
once land values are added in it becomes clear that, in the main, areas in 
which land is scarce will be more disadvantaged by these rising costs. The 
trend towards suburbanisation will be encouraged by these trends given the 
greater availability of land outside cities.
Three factors are identified in Balls discussion of long term investment 
patterns, each of which feature within the period being studied. Changes in 
demand for space form part of a longer term pattern described as 'catch-up', 
a continuing process through which technological change alters the pattern of 
building. Technological developments and advances made within one 
economy require other economies to 'catch-up' through the adoption of these 
new technologies in order to remain competitive and continue to expand.
The 'catch-up' process leads to changes in patterns of demand for buildings 
as the functions and activities of occupiers change.
An interesting feature of the 'catch-up' process discussed by Ball is its 
application to consumer demand. According to Ball, periods arrive during 
which wage increases, economic and political changes and changes in the 
terms and conditions of credit availability augment the satisfaction of 
consumer demand. During these periods the consumer is able to 'catch-up' 
with the new technologies and designs which have become available through 
technological developments. One argument explored within this work 
suggests that such a period of prosperity was provided through the changes 
the Thatcher Government brought about in the capital markets, particularly in 
relation to the creation of consumer credit. Within the context of this 
argument the consumer boom of the 1980's is seen as a manifestation of the 
catch-up process operating within consumer demand. The increased 
consumer demand could be identified as a response to supply side policies 
which improved the terms and conditions of credit availability after a period of
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restricted consumer expenditure in the 1970‘s and early 1980's largely 
attributable to high inflation and high interest rates.
The technological changes which drive the catch-up process have to be 
accommodated within building design. This is encouraged by the second 
factor Ball suggests as being important within the development of building 
cycles, innovation and uncertainty. Within the context of this work, innovation 
and uncertainty relate not simply to physical building design but also to other 
elements of the building process such as funding. The point to be explored 
here is that new building designs are initiated and, in this instance, new 
funding techniques are developed and adopted through innovation and the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to suffer uncertainty in the form of risk.
The final factor within the building cycle explored by Ball is what he describes 
as 'hysteresis' "whereby the trajectory of city development is knocked onto a 
new course in the aftermath of a property boom." (Ball, 1994:18). The over 
supply of office buildings in many regions unsuited to office occupiers, can 
not easily be removed. The site clearance problems this creates increases 
the cost of developing buildings more appropriate for other types of occupier 
and simultaneously the investment of capital funds in built structures is 
discouraged by the reduced value of these capital assets.
This concept of oversupply affecting investment patterns relates to the ideas 
presented by Harvey (1985) regarding the difficulty of dis-investing in 
buildings once development had taken place and the resulting de-valuation of 
the asset which becomes inevitable once such excessive over supply is 
experienced. Whereas Ball highlights the discouragement of investment 
funds it is Harvey's point that the crisis of capital which culminates in this 
over-accumulation leaves these devalued capital assets "littering the 
landscape" (Harvey, 1985:23) and available to form the basis for further 
development of capital in the future.
The three areas of cyclical analysis I have outlined are not adopted in a 
formal manner for the interpretation of the markets being studied here. The
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aspects of each which have been described, however, provide very pertinent 
and appropriate mechanisms through which changes and trends in 
government policy can be related to movements and trends in the UK 
commercial property markets and have been adopted for this purpose.
Barras' discussion of the nine year building cycle provides a point of 
reference from which the building cycle of the period in question can be 
studied. The longer term cycles identified by Harvey and Ball are used simply 
as a means of identifying changes and developments in the characteristics of 
the investment, development and occupier markets for commercial property.
The next stage in this discussion identifies the importance of longer term 
cycles within the commercial property markets. It is not possible to study 
changes in the commercial property markets without having reference to 
these longer term cycles of industrial development as they provide the 
broader context within which the markets operate and government policy 
objectives and instruments are formulated.
The Context of Deindustrialisation
A period of industrial decline was affecting the UK economy (and others) 
before, during and after the period being studied. If this change within the 
structure of the UK economy, often described as deindustrialisation, is taken 
to be represented by the decline in importance of manufacturing in terms of 
relative employment levels, it can be identified within the UK economy as far 
back as the 1950's (Massey, 1988). According to Massey a more extreme 
period of deindustrialisation within the UK economy was signalled by the 
combined effects of absolute decline in manufacturing employment levels 
which began in 1966 and organisational problems surrounding Fordism as 
the main system of capital accumulation in the UK's manufacturing sector.
Marshall (1987) attributes this economic decline partially to changes in the 
international economy. He cites: the emergence of Japan as a major exporter 
with a relatively protected import market, the decline in the importance of the 
USA manufacturing sector within the world market, the rise in the price of oil
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and the increasing instability of international banking systems, as examples 
of major international economic changes which had repercussions within the 
UK economy as well as most other industrialised economies.
In addition to these international factors, however, British industry had 
suffered from little capital investment over the 1950's and 1960's (see 
Harvey, 1985, for a discussion of the capitalist tendency to under-invest), and 
from sterling remaining strong enough to discourage the development of 
international export markets for manufactured goods.
"The combination of these factors meant that during the 
1950's and 1960's British industry suffered relatively low 
rates of investment, a falling share of world trade in 
manufactured goods, declining rates of profit and a 
relatively high share of wages costs in the value of 
manufacturing output." (Marshall, 1987:203)
A substantial restructuring of the manufacturing sector was inevitable if the 
progress of the UK economy away from being dominated by secondary 
industries towards becoming an economy dominated by tertiary industries 
was to continue. Martin describes this shift as moving into a new "phase of 
socio-economic development" (Martin, 1988:202). He makes the point that 
economic development is continuous, we have simply been experiencing a 
more fundamental change and an accelerating change. The areas which 
formerly generated growth and capital accumulation no longer do so. New 
technologies, industries and processes have lead to traditional industrial 
regions falling into decline as their roles are taken over by other areas.
Fothergill, et al. (1988) consider, specifically, the impact of the policies of the 
Thatcher government on the economic developments which were taking 
place. The abandonment of the objectives of full employment, the struggle to 
reduce the strength of organised labour, the commitment to a reduction in the 
role of the state within the life of the individual and to a change in the role of 
the state in terms of the maintenance of aggregate demand went a long way 
in accelerating the process of deindustrialisation and the shift to service
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sector industries as the dominant employment sector. Without abandoning 
the commitment to full employment it would have been more difficult to 
deflate the economy in the early 1980's allowing manufacturing decline with 
little or no substantial government intervention to alleviate the unemployment 
problem this created.
Deindustrialisation in the UK therefore took the form of a shift away from a 
labour and land intensive system of capital accumulation based on the 
specialised production processes of the manufacturing sector, towards skill 
and capital intensive industries. This naturally led to a shedding of workforce 
numbers within the industrial sector and a reduction, in the short term, in 
demand for existing industrial land and buildings, as work forces and plant 
sizes became smaller and increases in efficiency within the industrial sector 
were sought. Martin, (1986), refers to this as the 'slim down' and 'shake out' 
in British manufacturing over the early part of the Thatcher government;
"The reality of 'slim down' and 'shake out' has consisted 
mainly in the reduction of labour costs by cutting jobs and 
closing down productive capacity. For many firms, 
extensive cost cutting has not been possible or has 
proved insufficient to prevent bankruptcy, with the result 
that the numbers of company liquidations in 
manufacturing has reached an all-time high..." (p.31)
Once manufacturing declined, alternative avenues for the productive 
employment of surplus capital and labour were required and were found in 
the service sector industries. The pace of the restructuring process was 
increased by both the monetary and fiscal policy adopted by the Thatcher 
Government between 1979 and 1990 which will be explored in Chapter 
Three. The government saw no reason to prolong the existence through 
government subsidy of a manufacturing sector which could not realistically 
compete with expanding manufacturing sectors in newly industrialising 
countries. By allowing this sector to wind down quickly with little regard for 
the cost in human terms through long term mass unemployment, investment
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capital could be more quickly transferred to the more profitable, expanding 
tertiary sectors of the economy.
The changing status of the UK economy from secondary to tertiary 
necessitated structural changes in the organisation of labour as part of the 
cycles of technological and economic change through which industrialised 
economies progress. The patterns of demand for capital, labour and land 
were radically altered. The move away from large workforces centred in one 
industrial plant which can be identified as deindustrialisation progressed is 
symptomatic of a more wide ranging trend within the economy identified by 
Lash and Urry (1987) as 'disorganised capitalism'. Many of the 
characteristics of this phenomenon as described by Lash and Urry can be 
identified within the accelerated deindustrialisation process effected by the 
Thatcher administration. Some of the most easily recognisable 
characteristics include:
♦Decline in the absolute and relative size of the core working class, 
that is of manual workers in manufacturing industry, as economies are 
deindustrialised;
♦Decline in the importance and effectiveness of national-level collec­
tive bargaining procedures in industrial relations and the growth of 
company and plant level bargaining.
♦Decline in the absolute and relative numbers employed in 
extractive/manufacturing industry and in the significance of those sec­
tors for the organisation of modern capitalist societies.
♦ Increased importance of service industries for the restructuring of so­
cial relations (smaller plant sizes, a more flexible labour process, in­
creased feminization, a higher 'mental' component etc.;
♦Decline in average plant size because of shifts in industrial structure 
substantial labour saving capital investment, the hiving off of various 
sub-contracted activities, the export of labour intensive activities to
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'world market factories' in the third world and to rural sites in the first 
world, etc.
♦the decline of industrial cities both in terms of size and in their domi­
nation of regions. This is reflected in the industrial and population col­
lapse of the so-called 'inner cities', the increase in population of 
smaller towns and more generally of semi-rural areas, the movement 
away from older industrial areas etc. The cities also become less cen­
trally implicated in the circuits of capital and become progressively re­
duced to the status of alternative pools of labour.
These are only some of the points highlighted by Lash and Urry but they are 
easily identifiable as long term trends which were affecting UK 
manufacturing industry between 1979 and 1990. Linked to this change has 
been the shift in the labour markets brought about by the cheaper labour 
being offered by newly industrialised countries as well as by the changes in 
domestic labour relations policies. As multinational companies were attracted 
to cheaper international labour markets the traditional industrial areas of the 
UK declined, not simply in a response to a recession but to a loss of their 
position within a more competitive world market. The implications these 
changes hold for demand and supply within the commercial property markets 
are explored in Chapters Three and Four.
The commercial property markets can not be considered in isolation from 
both long term and short term trends within the economy. The continual 
development of industrialised economies through technological advances 
provides the long term context within which all other cycles and trends exist. 
These technical advances change the operation of the economy and the 
activities of operators within that economy. Such developments are 
transmitted to the commercial property markets through changes in the 
characteristics of occupier, developer and investor demand.
Chapter Three draws on the background provided here in an analysis of 
commercial property market data. The short term building, demand and
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investment cycles are used to identify changes within the commercial 
property markets in response to changes within the macroeconomy brought 
about by changing government policy. Through this analysis government 
supply side policies are identified which affect the commercial property 
markets but are more microeconomic in nature being focused more 
specifically on the land, capital and labour markets. The impact of these 
policies on the commercial property markets is explored in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER THREE
MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKETS
Introduction
The approach described in Chapter One identified the requirement within this 
work for an economic analysis of the land and property markets over the 
period under study. This chapter undertakes to provide such an analysis.
The industrial, office and retail sectors are studied individually and the 
distinctive characteristics of each market in terms of their responses to 
macroeconomic policy are discussed. Within this discussion distinctive 
microeconomic trends are identified which are explored in greater depth in 
Chapter Four.
Although this work is concerned specifically with the period 1979 -1990, the 
discussion of policy begins as far back as 1977. The intention is to clarify the 
extent to which changes in the macroeconomy, as distinct from 
macroeconomic policy, occurred following the Conservative general election 
victory in 1979.
The Macroeconomy 1977 -1990
Government macroeconomic policy over the period 1979 - 1990 did not 
change significantly from that which was being followed by the previous 
Labour Government in the last three years of office (see Vane, 1992, 
Thompson, 1993, Thompson 1986, Maynard, 1988, Riddell, 1989 for 
discussion of this point). Concern with inflation and the decline of 
manufacturing industry within the UK had been identified long before the 
1979 General Election. The presentation of policy may have changed and 
the rhetoric and stance of the policy decision makers was, undoubtedly, 
different post 1979. However, the overall macroeconomic policy themes 
remained predictable responses to what have come to be the dominant 
concerns of macroeconomic policy within the post war period: unemployment,
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the balance of payments and the exchange rate, the price level and the rate 
of growth of the economy (Tomlinson, 1985).
ii 1977- 1979
The level of inflation and the debate surrounding the imposition of high 
interest rates to combat inflation were the dominant themes within the 
macroeconomic policy of the Labour Government over the 1977 - 1979 
period. The annual change in the retail price index (RPI) peaked at 17.7% in 
1977 (see fig. 3.1) but began to respond to the relatively restrictive monetary 
policy being adopted and fell to below 8% in 1978. Interest rates were 
reduced in response, reaching a low point of 5.5% in 1977 but were raised 
again in 1978 as higher inflation began to show signs of re-emerging towards 
the end of the year.
RPI - Annual % Change Base Lending Rate %
1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979
16.6 9.9 9.3 14.5 7 12.5
16.2 9.5 9.6 13 7 13.5
16.7 9.1 9.8 11.5 7 13
17.5 7.9 10.1 9.5 7.5 12
17.1 7.7 10.3 8.5 8.5 12
17.7 7.4 11.4 8 10 13
17.6 7.8 15.6 8 10.5 14
16.5 8 15.8 7.5 10 14.5
15.6 7.8 16.5 6.5 9.5 14.5
14.1 7.8 17.2 6 10 14.5
13 8.1 17.4 5.5 1.5 14.5
12.1 8.4 17.2 6.5 12.5 14.5
Source: Economic Trends 
Fig. 3.1
What is important to recognise is the anti-inflationary stance which had been 
adopted by this Labour Government in its macroeconomic policy. The 
success of the policy was so far limited, unsurprisingly given the strength of 
wage bargaining at the time and the fact that although nominal interest rates 
had been increased, real interest rates remained negative for the greater part 
of this period because inflation was so high. Nonetheless, monetary tools had 
been adopted to fight the battle with inflation.
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Other economic indicators for 1977 - 1979 illustrate a generally healthy 
economy which was recovering from the recessionary period of the early 
1970's. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was rising, unemployment was 
stable, gross trading profits of UK commercial and industrial companies were 
steady and any fall in profits, such as would have been expected as a result 
of industrial unrest during the Winter of 1978/1979, was followed by strong 
and rapid recovery (see fig. 3.2). The fall in inflation and the easing of the 
terms upon which credit was available as interest rates fell in response, 
encouraged a rise in real consumer expenditure.
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The adoption of more restrictive monetary policy as an anti-inflationary 
stance by the 1974 - 1979 government did not impact adversely on the other 
economic indicators. The recovery from the early seventies recession 
continued, but the problem of inflation, although recognised, had clearly not 
been entirely solved.
iil 1979 - 1984/5
A change can be identified in all the indicators in 1979. The new 
Conservative Government formed in the spring also adopted anti-inflationary 
economic policies but were much more vocal about them. Inflation was 
itemised again and again as the main source of the problems of the UK 
economy. The monetary policy adopted was, to begin with, more restrictive
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than that of the previous government. Interest rates were raised by 2 
percentage points to 14% within a month of the incoming government taking 
office.
Control of the money supply became the policy through which inflation would 
be reduced. This monetarist stance became the cornerstone of government 
economic policy for the first half of the 1980's. Although the economic policy 
followed was not truly monetarist in nature and was criticised in some 
respects by Friedman, (Tomlinson, 1985:192), monetary aggregate targets 
were, nonetheless, set for maximum growth in the monetary base. These 
targets were reinforced in the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) that 
was introduced in the 1980 Budget (see fig. 3.3).
Sterling M3 Target Growth Rates %
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
W 8 1  7-11
'81782 6-10 6-10
5-9 5-9 8-12
,83/'84 4-8 4-8 7-11 7-11
,84/,85 6-10 6-10 6-10
,85/'86 5-9 5-9 5-9
Fig. 3.3 MTFS Targets 1980 -1984
Source: Vane, 1992:29
Adherence to these money supply targets proved to be an elusive objective 
during most of the period over which they were operated. Given the new 
government's commitments to reducing the level of taxation while maintaining 
law and order, social services, defence and education, control of the money 
supply could not be engineered through fiscal policies. The only traditional, 
monetary tool which remained available was the interest rate. Thus we 
entered a period of government during which the level of the interest rate 
dominated macroeconomic policy decision making and became quite volatile. 
It was during this period that the government came to be accused of having 
just 'one club' through which to effect their macroeconomic policy.
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Following the initial increase in the interest rate in the spring of 1979 it 
remained at or above 14% until the second quarter of 1981, peaking at a high 
point of 17% during the first two quarters of 1980 in response to rapidly rising 
inflation. In spite of the high interest rate, growth in sterling M3 averaged 
4.451% and 4.25% per quarter in 1980 and 1981 respectively, exceeding the 
7-11% growth target set in the MTFS. The monetary growth figures remained 
similarly disappointing right up until the point at which the targets were all but 
abandoned in 1984.
The prescience of trying to enforce such targets on money supply is not 
under consideration here. The more relevant discussion is of the response of 
the rest of the economy to the high interest rates being imposed to try to 
achieve the targets and the government's response to the economy 
breaching those money supply targets. The setting of a new target each 
year, 'rebased1 to the new level of money supply resulted in the cornerstone 
of the Thatcher Government's 'restrictive' monetary policy being less 
restrictive than the government's rhetoric suggested.
The use of high interest rates as the instrument for achieving these targets 
had more immediate and obvious effects on other areas of the economy. 
Sterling, which was already trading strongly on the foreign exchange markets, 
increased in strength. This had a short term deflationary effect as imports 
became cheaper but UK exports simultaneously became less competitive in 
the world market. The manufacturing sector was badly affected, both in terms 
of operating costs and export market share, by exercising anti-inflationary 
policy through interest rates in this way. Gross trading profits fell and bank 
lending to industrial and commercial companies rose as companies tried to 
remain in business (see figs. 3.2 and 3.4). This increase in what can be 
termed 'distress borrowing' was relatively short lived. By the beginning of 
1981 the indicator dips and levels out, not showing any further signs of 
increase until the end of 1984. Very little expansionary investment was being
1
Bank of England Quarterly Review: various dates
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undertaken over the 1981 - 1984 period within these sectors.
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The point to establish here is that whatever the intended outcome of the 
imposition of high interest rates on the UK economy at this time, this policy 
pushed the manufacturing sector into an accelerated decline. The fall in 
bank lending is commented upon by the Bank of England (BoE) as being 
"...concentrated in lending to industrial and commercial companies: the rate 
of lending to financial companies picked up slightly..." (BoE, 1982:345). This 
comment takes the implications of manufacturing decline one stage further by 
highlighting growth in the financial services sector, pre-empting the 
importance this sector was to have within the economy over the middle and 
latter part of the decade.
As would be expected given the restrictive interest rates and high exchange 
rate under which the economy was operating, GDP embarked on a sharply 
downward trend in 1979 which continued until 1981 (see fig. 3.2). This was 
mirrored by steadily rising unemployment. Inflation, which would have been 
expected to be controlled to some extent by the high interest rates and falling 
real disposable income, showed no sign of falling and in fact peaked at 
21.9% in May 1980, having risen steadily since December 1978 (see fig. 3.5).
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Finance House Base Lending Rate (%) and Retail Price Index - Annual % Change 1979 - 1984
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 IS M
Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real
Rate IntRte Rate Int Rte Rate Int Rt Rate lot Rate IntRte Rate IntrRte
12.5 9.3 3.2 17 18.4 -1.4 15.5 13 2.5 15.5 12 3.5 10.5 4.9 5.6 9.5 5.1 4.4
12.5 9.6 2.9 17 19.1 -2.1 15 12.5 2.5 15.5 11 4.5 11 5.3 5.7 9.5 5.1 4.4
13.5 9.8 3.7 17 19.8 -2.8 14 12.6 1.4 15 10.4 4.6 11.5 4.6 6.9 9.5 5.2 4.3
13 10.1 2.9 18 21.8 -3.8 13 12 1 14.5 9.4 5.1 11.5 4 7.5 9.5 5.2 4.3
12 10.3 1.7 18 21.9 -3.9 13 11.7 1.3 14 9.5 4.5 11 3.7 7.3 9 5.1 3.9
12 11.4 0.6 17.5 21 -3.5 12.5 11.3 1.2 14 9.2 4.8 10.5 3.7 6.8 9.5 5.1 4.4
13 15.6 -2.6 17 16.9 0.1 13 10.9 2.1 14 8.7 5.3 10.5 4.2 6.3 9.5 4.5 5
14 15.8 -1.8 16.5 16.3 0.2 13.5 11.5 2 13 8 5 10.5 4.6 5.9 10.5 5 5.5
14.5 16.5 o 16.5 15.9 0.6 14.5 11.4 3.1 12 7.3 4.7 10 5.1 4.9 11.5 4.7 6.8
14.5 17.2 -2.7 16.5 15.4 1.1 14.5 11.7 2.8 11.5 6.8 4.7 10 5 5 11 5 6
14.5 17.4 -2.9 16.5 15.3 1.2 16 12 4 10.5 6.3 4.2 10 4.8 5.2 10.5 4.9 5.6
14.5 17.2 -2.7 16 15.1 0.9 16 12 4 10 5.4 4.6 9.5 5.3 4.2 10.5 4.6 5.9
Fig. 3.5 Retail Price Index 
Source: Economic Trends
Inflation's resistance to the deflationary effects of the policies being imposed 
can be linked to other policies introduced by the government at this time.
The blanket increase in VATand the high wage settlements made in 1979 
and 1980, could not help but promote this increase in inflation in the short 
term. This highlights the existence of contradictions between government 
policy objectives and policy effects which was touched on in Chapter One. 
The government was vocal in its determination to reduce inflation but was 
simultaneously introducing polices which were not restrictive in themselves 
and would fuel inflation in the short term at least.
Figure 3.5 shows RPI, the interest rate and the real interest rate with the rate 
of inflation subtracted. This gives a much clearer indication of the times at 
which interest rate policy was most restrictive in real terms. It is difficult to 
impose the most restrictive interest rate policy whilst inflation is at a peak 
simply because the level of inflation automatically undermines the 
restrictiveness of the interest rate. The more important point arising from this 
is the fact that interest rates remained restrictive during times of relatively low 
inflation. This implies that high interest rates were effectively achieving an
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objective other than lower inflation, such as accelerating the decline in the 
manufacturing sector.
Inflation at last began to fall quite steadily from 1980 onwards, reaching a low 
point of 3.7% in 1983. This resulted in monetary policy, as far as it can be 
represented by interest rate policy, being more restrictive at this point than it 
had been when inflation was at its highest. The real interest rate remained 
as high as 7.5% and 8%. This is commented upon by the Bank of England;
"This general reduction in nominal interest rates followed a fall 
in the rate of inflation and did not imply a corresponding 
reduction in real interest rates or in the anti-inflationary stance 
of monetary policy. Indeed, real interest rates at mid-August 
though lower than for about a year, were nevertheless probably 
higher than in late 1980 and early 1981." (BoE, 1982:343)
Two points can be made here. The first is that an interest rate policy which 
was becoming more restrictive as time progressed would have a detrimental 
effect on the recovery in any sector of the economy at this time. The 
combination of high interest rates and sterling being so strong would be 
particularly harmful to any sector which relied upon export markets, such as 
the manufacturing sector. The second point to note is the distinct lack of long 
term success this policy had in restraining inflation. A low point of 3.7% was 
achieved in May and June of 1983 but from this point onwards the overall 
trend is upwards again until 1986.
The clearest illustration of the recessionary conditions of the economy at this 
time was the rise in unemployment (see fig. 3.2). A low point of 1.025m 
unemployed was reached in December 1979 marking the turning point in a 
period of falling unemployment which had begun at the end of 1977. The rate 
of increase from December 1979 onwards is rapid, reaching 3 million 
unemployed by June 1985. This level of unemployment would be expected 
to coincide with a reduction in inflation as real disposable income dropped 
and demand within the economy fell. This view is supported by the figures
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from 1980 until 1983. It is not supported by the figures from 1983 - 1987. 
For the greater part of this period unemployment and inflation were rising 
simultaneously.
7 5 0 0
7 0 0 0
6 5 0 0
6 0 0 0
5 5 0 0
5 0 0 0
1979 1981 1982 1983 19851980 1984
Fig. 3.6  
Source: Economic Trends
i M a n u fa c tu r ln g  e m p lo y m e n t (0 0 0 's )
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. The decline of the 
manufacturing sector left a high level of semi-skilled or unskilled labour 
unemployed (see fig. 3.6). Only recovery driven from a sector which would 
make intensive use of this type of labour would reverse these unemployment 
figures in the short term. Given that GDP began to rise in 1981 
simultaneously with the sharp rise in unemployment, it would seem clear that 
whichever sector economic recovery was being generated from it was not one 
which made intensive use of unskilled or semi-skilled manufacturing labour. 
Couched in the simplest terms, in order for inflation (as measured by the 
retail price index) to rise whilst unemployment is rising the remaining work 
force must generate demand for goods and services in excess of that which 
existing production can satisfy. This suggests that from 1983 onwards those 
in work were earning enough money and had enough confidence in this flow 
of funds continuing, to counteract the deflationary impact of an 
unemployment level of 3 million and rising.
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The level of employment within the economy had changed. Labour intensive 
manufacturing industries were being replaced by more skills orientated 
industries. Skilled labour was not in such excess supply as unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour so the price of skilled labour was not depressed to the 
same extent. This buoyant sector within the labour market helped sustain 
demand within the economy whilst the general level of unemployment 
continued to climb.
iih 1984/5 - 1990
A change within the priority and emphasis of macro-economic policy themes 
and objectives occurred in the second half of the 1980's. This was a much 
more reflationary period characterised by reductions in taxation and an 
expansion in the availability of credit.
The expansion of credit was fundamental to the changes which took place 
within the macroeconomy over this period. The deregulation of the financial 
services sector in 1985 encouraged competition between the various 
suppliers of credit and fostered the development of new ways of creating 
debt. This credit expansion financed much of the growth of the service 
industries within the UK economy, having a double impact on the financial 
services sector.
The increase in bank lending to commercial and industrial companies which 
began towards the end of 1984 (see fig. 3.4) can be differentiated from the 
distress borrowing identified in the 1979 - 1984 period by the expansion in 
the economy which accompanied it and the lower nominal interest rates. In 
addition to this, the economy had moved out of the period of very high 
inflation it experienced in the early 1980's. Although this may have restored 
some confidence into the economy generally, the level of inflation was still 
difficult to control and real interest rates remained relatively high during 1984 
and 1985 as the government continued with its restrictive monetary policy.
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The real interest rate fell to 3.9% in 1984 at which time inflation was falling 
consistently. Nominal interest rates began to rise again in February 1985 as 
soon as inflation started to increase and the overall lower level of inflation 
makes the real interest rate at this time relatively restrictive. Any relaxation of 
interest rate policy initiated an increase in inflation again. Concern was such 
that the government felt it necessary to reinforce their anti-inflationary stance 
in the 1985 Budget. This still failed to bring inflation under control and, 
although the rate of price increases was much slower than it had at the 
beginning of the 1980's the overall trend was upwards for most of the 
remainder of the 1980's (see fig. 3.7).
Finance H<?g$e Ba$e Lending Rate (%) and Retail Price index - Annue!.% Change 1979 - 1994
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Int RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int. BP! Real Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int. RPI Real Int
Rate Int Rte Rate IntRte Rate IntRte Rate IntRte Rate IntRt Rate Rte
10 5 5 12.5 5.5 7 11.5 3.9 7.6 9.5 3.3 6.2 13 7.5 5.5 15.5 7.7 7.8
10.5 5.4 5.1 12.5 5.1 7.4 11.5 3.9 7.6 9 3.3 5.7 13.5 7.8 5.7 15.5 7.5 8
12.5 6.1 6.4 13 4.2 8.8 11 4 7 9.5 3.5 6 13.5 7.9 5.6 15.5 8.1 7.4
14 6.9 7.1 12.5 3 9.5 11 4.2 6.8 9.5 3.9 5.6 13.5 8 5.5 15.5 9.4 6.1
13.5 7 6.5 11.5 2.8 8.7 10 4.1 5.9 9 4.2 4.8 13.5 8.3 5.2 15.5 9.7 5.8
13.5 7 6.5 10.5 2.5 8 9.5 4.2 5.3 8.5 4.6 3.9 13.5 8.3 5.2 15.5 9.8 5.7
13 6.9 6.1 10 2.4 7.6 9 4.4 4.6 8.5 4.8 3.7 14 8.2 5.8 15.5 9.8 5.7
12.5 6.2 6.3 10 2.4 7.6 9.5 4.4 5.1 10 5.7 4.3 14.5 7.3 7.2 15.5 10.6 4.9
12 5.9 6.1 10 3 7 10 4.2 5.8 11 5.9 5.1 14 7.6 6.4 15.5 10.9 4.6
12 5.4 6.6 10 3 7 10.5 4.5 6 12 6.4 5.6 14 7.3 6.7 15 10.9 4.1
12 5.5 6.5 11 3.5 7.5 10.5 4.1 6.4 12.5 6.4 6.1 15 7.7 7.3
12 5.7 6.3 11 3.7 7.3 9.5 3.7 5.8 12.5 6.8 5.7 15.5 7.7 7.8
Fig. 3.7
Source: Economic Trends
There are two points to make here. The first is that inflation was proving very 
hard to control to the extent that the government wished, i.e. to the point of 
extinction. The second point is that although inflation was rising overall, the 
annual rate fluctuated around 5% from 1984 until the last two quarters of 
1989. This was considerably lower than the levels experienced in the 
previous period and was more conducive to encouraging both consumer 
spending and business expansion. Furthermore, in spite of these 
inflationary pressures, nominal interest rates fell from 1985 onwards.
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Combined with the lower inflation rate this brought about a reduction in real 
interest rates to the lowest level since the beginning of the decade by 1987. 
This directly contradicts, in practice, the reinforcement of the government's 
anti-inflationary stance witnessed in the budget speech in 1985. The terms 
under which credit was available became more attractive and the response to 
this can be seen in the expansion of credit which took place over this period.
Monetary aggregate targets were officially abandoned in the 1985 Budget as 
an effective method of controlling inflation. They were replaced by the 
adoption of a trading range for sterling linked to the value of the German 
Mark (DM). This represented a complete reversal of the macroeconomic 
policy instruments adopted between 1979 and 1984 and restricted the use of 
interest rates as a monetary tool.
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Figure 3.8 gives an overall view of changes in some of the economic 
indicators over the period 1984 - 1990. The more expansionary 
macroeconomic policy gave rise to a sharp increase in GDP in 1985. GDP 
had started to rise again in 1981 (see fig. 3.2) but growth becomes more 
consistent and faster from 1985 onward. The recovery in the GDP figures 
was not reflected in the unemployment figures; there was no significant fall in 
unemployment until the end of 1986. Growth was clearly occurring in capital, 
rather than labour intensive industries, confirming a decline in the
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manufacturing sector and a rise in the service and electronics industries.
This was a response to the expansion in the availability of credit and the 
restructuring of the labour market, as manufacturing failed to recover from the 
damage done by high inflation, high interest rates and the strength of sterling 
in the early 1980's. This accelerated restructuring of the UK economy was a 
direct result of the macroeconomic policies which had been adopted by the 
Thatcher Government.
The Stock Market crash of October 1987 lead the government to be 
concerned that a 1930's style depression would follow and severe 
deflationary effects would be felt. Supply side policies and the deregulation 
of the City had encouraged greater share ownership amongst the population 
at large. However, the main impact of these policies had been to increase 
the number of shares owned by existing share owners rather than the number 
of share owners. In the 1988 Budget measures were taken to counteract any 
deflationary effect the crash might have had on the economy. The 
substantial reductions made in the incidence of personal taxation, particularly 
amongst the higher income brackets, would expand demand within the 
economy although less effectively than if it had been concentrated amongst 
lower income groups who have a higher marginal propensity to consume.
The Economist describes the Budget in uncompromising terms as "...quite 
deliberately, a Budget for the rich and high earners" (The Economist, 
1988:13). Nevertheless, inflation started to rise sharply from March 1988 
onwards as existing capacity within the economy failed to satisfy the sudden 
rise in demand.
The traditional tool of interest rates was not used to counteract this increase 
in inflation as this would have increased the value of sterling, pushing it 
through the ceiling of the trading range which had been adopted with the DM. 
Interest rates continued to fall in 1988 after the Budget. No increase in the 
nominal rate was made until August 1988 when it was increased to 10%. 
Rising inflation meant that the real rate was falling and had fallen to 4% by
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the summer of 1988 (see fig. 3.7). Although the over expansion and 
'overheating' of the economy had begun to cause the government some 
concern, a reduction in GDP was expected in 1989. This did not materialise 
and the economy experienced a growth rate of over 4% (see fig. 3.8).
The increases in the nominal rate from this point onwards were quite sharp, 
reaching a peak of 15.5% in December 1989. No reduction was seen for the 
following 9 months. Inflation did not fall immediately but the expansion of 
credit within the economy over the 1980's resulted in the impact of increased 
interest rates on demand eventually being strong and lasting.
iv) 1990 Onwards
The main period under discussion in this work ends in 1990 but it is useful to 
give some indication of the situation within the macroeconomy in that year. 
With the abandonment of the trading range between sterling and the DM and 
the increase in interest rates the government's policies once again changed. 
The expansionary monetary policy of the latter half of the 1980's was 
exchanged for a more restrictive policy and the recession of the early 1990's 
emerged quickly. Inflation continued to rise, reaching 10.6% in August 1990 
and rising further. Interest rates remained restrictively high to combat this 
problem and output declined in response.
The service industries which had generated the boom of the 1980's as they 
replaced manufacturing as the dominant source of growth within the 
economy, began to contract. Having experienced an accelerated transition 
away from the secondary sector towards tertiary industries the UK economy 
was for the first time experiencing a recession that affected the tertiary sector 
and created widescale job losses in white collar service sector employment. 
The Thatcher Government's macroeconomic policy succeeded in deflating 
the economy in the early 1980's sufficiently to accelerate the process of 
deindustrialisation. This process formed part of a long term cyclical pattern 
of economic development which the government did not orchestrate or
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control but responded to. The following section explores the commercial 
property markets' behaviour within the context of this accelerated decline and 
the reflation of the economy which followed.
Commercial Property Market Trends and Cycles 1977 -1990
What follows is a discussion of movements and trends within the industrial, 
office and retail property markets over the 1977 - 1990 period. The 
discussion adopts a sector by sector approach, i.e. industrial, office and 
retail, in order to highlight the important differences in the reactions of each 
sector to changes in the economy. The discussion is based mainly on data 
for the UK as a whole and is not consistently disaggregated either in terms of 
region or occupier activity beyond the broad categories already provided.
This is in part determined by the availability of rigorous and consistent data 
but also by the fact that the argument being made relates to the UK 
commercial property markets as a whole and not to just one particular sector. 
Some disaggregation of the markets has been used, both on a regional level 
and in terms of occupier type and activity, where it is felt to illustrate the 
more spatial aspects of the argument and where data has been available, but 
the overriding discussion remains UK wide.
The Industrial Property Market
\) 1977-1979
Barras identifies 1979 as the peak of a nine year development cycle after 
which excess supply begins to emerge as the economy moves into the 
recession of the early 1980's. This is supported by the industrial floorspace 
figures (see fig. 3.9) which show falling supply from 1977 until the last half of 
1979, with the exception of one large increase in floorspace during the winter 
of 1977/78. This falling supply indicates growth in user demand and
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encouraged further new construction.
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The construction order figures for private industrial buildings increased from 
1977 - 1979 in response (see fig. 3.10) but the time lag between initiation and 
completion resulted in these developments being completed to meet a market 
with falling user demand. The rent index (see fig. 3.11) provides evidence of 
the decline in user demand from 1979 onwards and the supply data indicates 
rising excess supply within the industrial market in the beginning of the 
1980's (see fig. 3.9). This situation is typical of the nine year development 
cycle.
\ \ ) 1979 - 1984
In his model, Barras (1983) found a clearly identifiable relationship between 
demand for industrial space and manufacturing output. He identified, through 
cross-correlation;
"a significant and positive simultaneous relationship 
between industrial building new orders and 
manufacturing output, which reflects the dominant 
influence of user demand on levels of new building in the 
industrial sector." (Barras and Ferguson, 1987:508)
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The fall in construction orders coincides with the high interest rate policy and 
high exchange rates of the early 1980's, both of which served to undermine 
UK manufacturing industry.
Manufacturing output continued to decline within the UK for the whole of this 
period. The decline reached a trough in 1984 but remained at that level for 
the rest of the decade thus reducing the importance of the manufacturing 
sector as a source of user demand for industrial buildings. Private industrial 
construction orders fell from 1979 until 1983/4, after which a period of growth 
emerges. This produces an apparent contradiction in the data. Construction 
orders began to rise whilst supply was still rising and prime rents still falling. 
This contradiction can only be reconciled if a change in the nature of 
demand within the industrial sector is identified.
In their discussion of the US industrial market Wheaton and Torto (1990) 
highlight the importance of scrappage within the supply of industrial property. 
The three main sources of scrappage of industrial property are physical 
decay, transfer of land to more profitable uses and the functional and 
locational obsolescence of buildings. Initially the impact of the recession on 
UK manufacturing resulted in the release of many large manufacturing and 
industrial buildings on to the market. This depressed rents in the sector and 
discouraged private construction orders in the short term as illustrated by
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figures 3.10 & 3.11.
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By 1982, the previous 3 years of falling construction manifested itself in the 
market place as a shortage of new industrial buildings. Although supply was 
still rising as the manufacturing sector continued to shrink, the buildings this 
released onto the market were effectively functionally and locationally 
obsolete. Their design and location simply did not satisfy new user demand.
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The importance of this is the change it pinpoints in the types of industry 
beginning to emerge as the source of growth within the UK economy. It 
illustrates quite clearly the acceleration of the move away from manufacturing
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and towards the service sector as the driving force behind economic growth. 
This is further supported by the rise in GDP which emerges in 1981, 
coinciding with a sharp decline in manufacturing output. The new growth 
areas of the economy: technology, consumer and producer services, 
research and development, required smaller, more flexible space located 
close to their customers or, at least, close to fast communication networks. 
This type of space was in short supply and the upturn in construction orders 
seen in 1983 and 1984 would not begin to supply the market until 1984 at the 
earliest (see fig. 3.10).
By 1984 available industrial floorspace began to decline. The large, 
manufacturing and industrial buildings that had been depressing the market 
had clearly not been taken up by manufacturing industry; manufacturing 
output was still declining at this time. The cause of the drop in the flow of 
supply had to lie elsewhere. Physical decay may have been affecting some 
of the older available industrial buildings and a certain amount of demolition 
took place. According to the total rateable value figures the stock of 
factories and mills is the only industrial property type to suffer a decline over 
this period2. In some areas alternative, more profitable uses were found for 
some buildings and land. The three elements of scrappage discussed by 
Wheaton and Torto were all affecting the industrial sector by 1984 and the 
supply of industrial floorspace was falling.
User demand for industrial buildings within the emerging growth sector was 
not being met by existing supply, and the decline in new private industrial 
construction orders between 1979 and 1983 exacerbated this problem by 
restricting the amount of new supply coming on to the market between 1983 
and 1985. An article in The Director (December 1984) identifies this 
situation;
Source: Inland Revenue Statistics. The figures are all based on the 1973 rating list, eliminating the affects of 
inflation from the values.
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"Since last April, the amount of industrial building 
available for letting or sale declined by more than 10m 
square feet...The amount of new buildings under 
construction has continued to fall and the current total of 
8.995m sq.ft is just over half the amount recorded in 
September 1980." (The Director. 1984:30)
The cycle of redevelopment, which would have been expected to emerge 
from approximately 1982 onwards, did not occur within this sector. Falling 
demand within the manufacturing industry kept rents low across the sector as 
a whole as high interest rates, high inflation and the strong sterling exchange 
rate forced the sector to contract, discouraging new construction orders.
The Conservative Government's macroeconomic policy extended the period 
of recession in the industrial property market until 1983/84. This 
exaggeration of the expected cyclical pattern led to an extreme shortage of 
new industrial buildings in the mid 1980's. The accelerated decline in the 
manufacturing sector simultaneously led to a change in the type of buildings 
being demanded by industrial occupiers. Thus the shortage became most 
significant in the emerging service and technology sectors for which the 
existing industrial buildings were particularly locationally and functionally 
unsuitable.
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The shift away from manufacturing towards services undermines the 
relationship which Barras identified between manufacturing output and 
industrial construction orders. Even though manufacturing as an industrial 
sector continues to decline throughout the remainder of the 1980's, user 
demand for industrial space re-emerged. Manufacturing output can not be 
used as a reliable indicator of user demand for industrial space after the early 
1980's.
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During the latter half of the 1980's the emergence of the service sector 
industries, particularly the technology based industries, dominated user 
demand for industrial buildings. Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show falling available 
industrial floorspace and rising real, national industrial rents in the mid to late 
1980's. Manufacturing output did not stop falling until 1985 so demand was 
clearly emerging from a different sector of the economy. The government's 
response to the resulting change in the type of buildings which were in 
demand, was to introduce greater flexibility into the industrial market by 
making changes to the Use Classes Order. The introduction of Use Class B1 
in 1987 allowed buildings classified as light industrial to be used as offices.
It was envisaged that this would cater for, and encourage, companies within 
the growing service sectors which required an element of light industrial 
space but also required an increasingly high proportion of office space.
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I Addendum
1. To be inserted on page 80 after paragraph 1
A further factor undermining the effectiveness of manufacturing output as an 
indicator of industrial demand for rented property is the high proportion of owner 
occupation within the sector. Many of the large industrial buildings had been 
designed and built to the specification of occupiers to house particular 
manufacturing processes and functions. These buildings fell vacant as the 
manufacturing sector contracted thereby increasing the supply of functionally and 
locationally obsolete buildings within the industrial market.
Expansion within the manufacturing sector would not have directly affected the 
industrial rental indicator. Demand would have emerged again within the owner 
occupier market for specifically designed buildings, again undermining the validity of 
industrial rents as an indicator of demand. Private sector construction orders are a 
more accurate reflection of rising demand for new industrial buildings from this point 
onwards given that they reflect both rented and owner occupied demand for new 
industrial buildings. The increase in this indicator could be attributed to an increase 
in demand from the manufacturing sector however, the continuous decline in 
manufacturing output from 1979 until 1987 clearly illustrates that the source of the 
increase in industrial construction orders between 1982 and 1985 lay elsewhere.
2. to be inserted on page 136 after paragraph 2
The increased competition between providers of short term development funding 
heightened the pressure to increase market share within this sector (which was 
enjoying high returns) in order to retain profitability. This forced market operators to 
reconsider the level of risk they were prepared to accept within a project and 
encouraged innovation (and the uncertainty which accompanies it) to be applied to 
financing tools. This led to the development of the very complex financing packages 
referred to by Key, et al., (1990) and, in combination with the deregulation of the 
stock market, also led to development companies financing their own new 
developments on the basis of the value of completed developments they retained. 
This gave them maximum exposure to both the investment and development sector 
with little or no diversification.
The long term funding markets had similarly changed, through the deregulation of 
the capital markets in the UK and the removal of overseas trading restrictions. The 
increase in overseas investment within the commercial property sector which sprang 
from these changes is illustrated in figure 4.13. The development market reacted to 
this increase in the supply of capital by initiating developments to a value exceeding 
even the increased level of long term funding.
Although the nature of short term and long term funding within the UK commercial 
property markets had changed the response of the developers and short term 
lenders indicates a misconception of the nature of the changes that had taken place. 
The markets supplying short term and long term funding had expanded and become 
more efficient but the commercial property market itself remained relatively 
inefficient particularly in terms of its response to reductions in occupier and investor 
demand.
3. To be inserted on page 149 after paragraph 1
The three parameters identified by Barras (1983) and discussed in chapters two and 
three also provide the transmission mechanism between the Thatcher government's 
supply side policies and the commercial property markets. Neither the development 
lag nor the depreciation rate of buildings changed significantly over the period in 
question. The major conductor for change within the commercial property markets 
in response to government policy was Barras' adjustment rate. The deregulation of 
the land and capital markets had the most significant impact on the adjustment rate 
by increasing the efficiency with which the development sector could react to 
increased demand from occupiers and investors.
The deregulation of the land markets increased the supply of land with planning 
permission. The length of delay between order and completion (the development 
lag) will be little affected by this change but a perceived obstacle or uncertainty 
within the development process is removed, making the process of responding to an 
increase in demand for new development more efficient. This equates to an 
increase in Barras' adjustment rate.
The supply side policies affecting the operation of the capital markets had a similar 
impact upon the development process. The deregulation of the long term funding 
markets to allow greater overseas investment expanded the market by increasing 
the number of sources from which this type of funding was available. The falling 
yields experienced in the office retail and industrial markets from 1986 until 1989 
can be attributed, in part, to rising demand from the investment market. This rising 
investor demand led to an increase in capital values. The higher capital values 
increased the level of residual profit generated within development schemes thereby 
encouraging further new development activity.
Given that the initiation of a speculative development scheme will depend upon 
evidence of the availability of long term finance the expansion of the supply of such 
funds eased another area of uncertainty within the development process, leading to 
an increase in the number of development schemes initiated. This again equated to 
an increase in Barras' adjustment rate. The supply of new development would be 
able to expand more quickly in response to increased demand.
In the long term funding market evidence of increased investment funds and rising 
investor demand may be enough to trigger an increase in development activity. In 
the short term funding market, funds have to be readily available before a 
development project can begin. The deregulation of the short term funding market 
increased competition by increasing the number of market operators. This 
increased the availability of such short term funds as lenders competed for short 
term lending business. The resulting expansion in the supply of funds equated to 
another increase in the speed with which developers could respond to expanding 
demand for new development by increasing the availability of a vital component of 
the development process. Barras' adjustment rate was once again increased.
Whilst the Thatcher government's policies generally increased the supply of capital 
and development land available within the economy, the operation of the 
commercial property market changed very little. The rate at which the supply of new 
buildings could increase in response to rising occupier and/or investor demand 
accelerated as scarce resources were made more readily available. This increased
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rate of expansion in supply formed a stark contrast to the inherently slow supply side 
response to any fall in demand which is so characteristic of the commercial property 
markets. The time lag within the development process did not shrink and the 
markets inability to 'disinvest' once an oversupply of buildings has been reached 
remained unchanged. These market characteristics were not changed by the 
Thatcher government's supply side policies.
4. Typographical errors
page 29 - paragraph 3 line 5 "seem" should read "seen"
page 42 - paragraph 3 line 4 "an critical" should read "and critical"
page 85 - paragraph 1 line 2 "assett" should read "asset"
page 128 - paragraph 2 lines - 5 should read "Efficiency and profit margins could
not be increased through generating economies of scale and price cutting
alternatives were limited..."
page 130 - paragraph 1 line 3 "finds" should read "funds"
page 151 - paragraph 1 line 7 "occupier demand" should read "developer demand".
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Figure 3.14 shows cautious growth in prime industrial and B1 rents between 
1985 and 1987 as the economy moved into an upswing, consistent with the 
nine year development cycle and the effects of rising user demand within a 
market experiencing restricted supply. Construction orders rose in 1983 and 
1984 (see fig. 3.10). These developments would have added to market 
supply in 1985 and 1986, reducing the restriction on supply and allowing 
rental growth to remain quite conservative. This discouraged further 
increases in development activity and construction orders fell again until 
developers responded to the opportunities made available to them following 
the change to the Use Classes Order in 1987.
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The sustained increase in private construction orders between 1986 and 
1988 was a response to more than the steady fall in available floorspace. 
Developers were encouraged into the market by increased capital values and 
strong rental growth emanating from economic recovery as the Thatcher 
Government's economic policy became more expansionary. The opportunity 
to develop light industrial space which had a major office component granted 
by the change to the UCO in 1987 increased the capital value of light 
industrial space and maintained the high level of construction orders until 
1989. These new developments would add to available space towards the 
end of the 1980's. By 1990 falling occupier demand and excess supply in the
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industrial markets discouraged development as the building cycle reached it's 
peak.
It is important to differentiate between the effect of the change in the UCO on 
the industrial market and the effect on the office market. Industrial 
construction orders rose as the incorporation of more flexibility within the use 
class definitions increased the capital value of industrial buildings making 
them available to a wider variety of users. The extreme rise in B1 rents from 
early 1987 to late 1988 is a response to rising office demand in excess of 
supply. Land which had been classified as light industrial could now be 
valued as being suitable for office development. This increased the value of 
light industrial land and forced traditional light industrial users into direct 
competition with office users who, traditionally, can pay higher rents. Whilst 
demand in the office market remained in excess of supply some office users 
would be willing to occupy B1 space and could outbid traditional light 
industrial users. This encouraged development of B1 space that was often 
inappropriately designed for light industrial users but in areas traditionally 
dominated by this type of occupier. Once office demand declined, an excess 
supply of B1 space quickly emerged.
Summary
Two points are being made here. The policies of the Thatcher Government 
exaggerated the cycles within the property market over the 1980's, resulting 
alternately in periods of prolonged under-supply and extreme over-supply. 
Secondly, the industrial property market underwent fundamental changes 
over this period as a direct result of government policies aimed at 
restructuring the economy by accelerating the decline in the manufacturing 
sector and encouraging the expansion of the service sector. This led to the 
requirements of the market changing, making existing buildings obsolete.
The extreme rental growth which emerged in response to expansionary 
economic policies and prolonged under-supply of space combined with the
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Thatcher Government's supply side policies to encourage widescale 
development of new space. The resulting over-supply of industrial space 
which emerged in 1989 and 1990 gave way to declining real rental values 
and capital values in the 1990's and little new development activity. The 
significance of the supply side policies to these exaggerated supply and 
demand cycles will be explored specifically in Chapter Four.
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The Office Property Market
The office sector is complicated by the different roles played within the 
economy by occupiers of the same type of building. Office occupiers can be 
broadly divided into two categories; dependent and independent. The 
dependent occupiers are those which serve a company or institution whose 
primary function is based within another sector, such as a manufacturing 
company or a public service. Independent occupiers are those whose primary 
function is carried on within the offices they occupy. This sector is dominated 
by the service industries particularly finance, insurance and professional 
services. The importance of this lies in the differing reactions of each type of 
occupier to changing economic and market factors.
i) 1977- 1979
During the latter half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's investor 
demand for property (predominantly prime office buildings) had been 
sustained as the institutions followed a policy of increasing the proportion of 
property within their portfolios (Fraser, 1993). This had a self fulfilling effect 
on the returns obtained from property held as an investment as investor 
demand kept yields low and capital values remained high (see fig. 3.15).
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Institutional policy was not the only reason for continuing investor demand for 
property over this period. The high level of inflation and negative real
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interest rates in the 1970's had increased the attraction of property as an 
assett, particularly when compared to gilts and equities. Capital values in the 
office sector experienced real growth from 1977 until 1979 and the 1979 level 
was sustained until 1982 in spite of recessionary conditions. The attraction 
of property as an asset class to institutional investors is understandable even 
if an element of the returns were generated by their own demand.
Over the 1977 - 1979 period the office sector experienced real rental growth 
(see fig. 3.16). This occurs simultaneously with the fall in interest rates and 
inflation but is not sustained as the economy moves into recession in 1979.
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iil 1979-1984
GDP entered a period of decline in 1979 which lasted until 1981. Although 
Barras (1983) describes the link between GDP and office occupier demand 
as relatively weak, this nonetheless indicates that occupier demand could be 
expected to fall in the office sector over this period. As the manufacturing 
sector declined office buildings previously required for the administrative and 
managerial functions relating to the manufacturing sector became vacant. 
Even where companies did not close, any spare capacity within the office 
accommodation they used was cut back as the sector responded to high 
interest rates and to the strength of sterling reducing their international
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competitiveness. The expansion of the service sector as an alternative 
engine of growth was not advanced enough at this time to counteract the 
contraction of the manufacturing sector.
In direct contrast to this weak demand, investment yields in the office sector 
remained stable at approximately 5% from 1979 until 1982 (see fig. 3.15). 
This resulted in high capital values in the sector in spite of the lack of real 
rental growth as has been discussed above. Capital values have been 
identified as having the strongest influence on construction starts and 
construction orders increased from 1977 - 1981/2 in response (see fig. 3.17). 
The sharpest increase in 1980/81 coincides with the fall in interest rates and 
would have been further encouraged by the expectation of economic 
expansion as the business cycle reached its peak.
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The supply of office accommodation thus increased. Some of this 
accommodation was new and built to the specifications of speculative office 
developers and institutional investors but an increasingly large proportion of 
supply was the direct result of manufacturing decline as companies closed 
and cut back. Both types of accommodation quickly became locationally and 
functionally obsolete, although the second hand space was clearly the worst 
and most quickly affected by this. Without any recovery expected in the 
manufacturing sector or even in the regions which had been dominated by
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this sector, demand for the excess supply coming into the market from this 
source was unlikely to emerge.
The requirements of office occupiers changed at the beginning of the 1980's. 
New technology had to be accommodated within building design as did more 
efficient building services and occupiers were making greater use of the 
improved transport infrastructure. This resulted in even the newer 
speculatively developed office buildings being unable to fulfil the 
requirements of demand that began to emerge from the new growth sectors 
of the economy. Locational and functional obsolescence was affecting the 
office building stock by the mid 1980's just as it had affected the industrial 
sector.
The recovery of GDP in 1981 may have been expected to herald some 
recovery in occupier demand for office space. According to the cycle 
identified by Barras an upswing was expected in the beginning of the 1980's 
which should have been encouraged by a simultaneous peak in the business 
cycle. The drop in interest rates, from the high point of 17% in 1980 to 12% 
in 1981, combined with the steady fall in the retail price index from 1980 
onwards, encouraged the economy to expand. Evidence of this expansion 
can be seen in the increase in bank lending to industrial and commercial 
companies (see fig. 3.4). The recovery was short lived. Interest rates were 
increased again in 1981 as money supply failed to meet MTFS targets and 
RPI remained high. This had a more lasting impact on the economy than the 
interest rate rises of 1979 -1980. A sharp reduction in short term demand for 
office space can clearly be seen in figure 3.16 as capacity was further 
reduced.
The point to identify here is that government policy served to extend the 
period of the recession which had begun in 1979. The restrictive monetary 
policy imposed accelerated the decline in manufacturing. This exaggerated 
the early 1980's recession to the extent that Barras identifies the upswing in
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1983/4 as the only one which was not accompanied by a real increase in 
rents (Barras, 1983:1390). This he links to the severity of that particular 
recession.
Between 1981 and 1984, office sector rents declined in real terms and falling 
investment demand allowed yields to rise and capital values to fall. 
Construction orders fell from 1980 until 1984 as the development sector 
responded to falling profit levels (see fig. 3.17). The patterns of the nine year 
development cycle are identifiable in this fall in construction and ultimately a 
rent rise would be expected to trigger new construction when demand began 
to expand again. A complicating factor however, was the type of buildings 
which were in excess supply. As has been discussed above, these were not 
buildings which would conform to the requirements of the new service sector 
which was beginning to take over from manufacturing.
This lead to the market experiencing very restricted supply of the type of 
buildings for which demand emerged over the latter half of the 1980's but 
excess supply within the office sector as a whole. Locationally and 
functionally obsolete space began to be reclassified as secondary, illustrated 
by the secondary office rent index taking longer than the prime index to 
experience any real rental growth (see fig. 3.18). In the short term new 
construction activity was discouraged and office construction orders did not 
rise until 1984.
The government responded with a policy of encouraging development of new 
types of space, increasing the supply of land to be developed for service 
related uses and encouraging flexibility within the use of commercial 
buildings through the development control system. This is the sort of public 
policy which Barras (1983) identifies as having a counter-cyclical effect on 
the property markets, encouraging development during upturns in the market 
which then adds to excess supply during the period of downturn exacerbating 
the market conditions created by the development cycle rather than relieving
88
them.
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iii) 1984/5 - 1990
The latter half of the 1980's was a period of rapid economic expansion driven 
mainly by the service sector. The supply side policies of the government 
encouraged expansion through the extensive programme of deregulation 
which was in progress at this time and the expansion of the availability of 
credit. The resulting rise in demand for new office space exceeded supply, 
the level of construction orders having fallen between 1981 and 1984. The 
market continued to experience an over-supply of second hand and 
speculatively built office space from the beginning of the decade but this 
space did not meet the requirements of new demand. Tollast and Damesick 
(1990) point out the shortage of certain types of building;
"A low level of construction in the first half of the 1980's meant 
that there was a limited supply of new space, particularly 
buildings with large floor plates suitable for the new financial 
conglomerates" (Tollast and Damesick, 1990:6)
As figure 3.18 shows, this shortage of supply of particular types of office 
building lead to real growth in prime office rents from 1985 onwards. The 
new demand for office space was generated in part by the deregulation of the
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financial services sector in 1985 and the expansion of professional services 
which this encouraged. The impact this element of the government's 
deregulation policy had on the property market was felt in two ways;
i) the deregulation of the capital markets lead to an explosion in the 
availability of debt financing. This made new funds available for the 
development of property and lenders were now under much greater pressure 
to compete with each other for business;
ii) the increase in both the creation of credit and in the range of financial 
services which could be offered by financial services companies, boosted the 
profits being made by existing companies and encouraged new participants 
into the market. This would clearly increase occupier demand for office 
space, particularly in areas dominated by financial service organisations 
such as the City of London.
Leyshon, et al. (1987) provides a full account of the impact of financial 
deregulation on the City of London. Between 1968 and 1986 foreign banks 
and securities houses represented in London increased from 135 to 447 with 
related employment in the area rising by almost 500%. This gives some 
indication of the increase in demand for office space from the finance sector.
The increase in the availability of credit and the reduction in interest rates 
which was taking place over this period encouraged development. Barras 
(1983) in establishing his theoretical model of the office development cycle 
identified circumstances under which an 'explosive' nine year cycle could be 
produced. Capital values are established as the most important factor in 
encouraging development starts, but interest rates and construction costs are 
also important and serve to affect the adjustment rate established in the 
model. Barras uses the Barber boom to illustrate the effects which can be 
produced;
"The ready supply of low interest, short-term credit was one 
of the main reasons why the property sector overreacted so 
strongly to shortages of space during that property boom"
(Barras, 1983:1393)
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A similar set of circumstances arose in the 1985 - 1990 period. Rising 
demand from the expanding service sector industries was encountering 
restricted supply. Real rents began to increase in 1985 and, although 
investment yields did not begin to fall until 1987, capital values rose 
throughout the period, encouraging development. These circumstances were 
exacerbated in areas such as the City of London by increases in user 
demand stemming from the deregulation of the stock market and by the 
increase in the supply of land for office development through the 
government's relaxation of development control. The resulting increase in 
private office construction orders is clearly illustrated in figure 3.19.
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The value of construction orders rises most dramatically simultaneously with 
the lowest level of interest rates. It must be emphasised though, that the new 
construction this represents would not be adding to supply within the market 
until, on average, two years later. Thus the highest level of new orders in 
1988 would increase supply in the market in 1990.
This increase in supply was not confined to the prime office sector. Rental 
values were rising in both the prime and secondary office sectors and the 
supply of sites for secondary office development was particularly affected by 
the government's introduction of greater flexibility into the Use Class Order. 
This flexibility, discussed above in relation to the industrial sector, allowed
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light industrial buildings to be used as office space and vice versa. The 
distinction between office and light industrial however, became more and 
more blurred as the demand for office accommodation increased and 
developer demand for land continued to rise.
In the short term, high office occupier demand maintained high rental levels 
for B1 space. Once this began to contract, the B1 space that had been 
conceived at office rents, was found to have been developed in the wrong 
locations and to the wrong specifications for the office tenants that remained 
in the market. By the end of the decade the over-supply of secondary office 
space in the market was even more dramatic than the over-supply in the 
primary sector.
Between 1987 and 1989, the office market experienced rapid real rental 
growth as the economy expanded. The expansionary Budget of 1988, further 
encouraged office occupier demand. Take-up of space in the City, West End 
and Holborn fell slightly from nearly 14 million square feet in 1987 to a little 
over 12 million square feet in 1988.1 This still represented demand healthy 
enough to set new record rents in these areas. Although the rental figures 
are lower, the other metropolitan areas of the UK also seemed to be 
sustaining office rental growth during 1988.
This situation continued into 1989 and figure 3.16 shows the office rent peak 
as occurring in the first half of 1989 in spite of interest rates rising quite 
rapidly from 1988 onwards. Office yields were not performing so well and 
also began to rise in 1989 as investors began to expect a reduced level of 
rental growth from the sector. Capital values fell as a result and the value of 
private office construction orders fell slightly although it still represented a 
large level of construction. Any new construction begun in 1989 would not 
enter the market until approximately 1991, by which time the situation within 
the economy as a whole had changed quite dramatically.
1 Source: DTZ Debenham Thorpe
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The nine year development cycle is identifiable in these market trends. 
However the cycle was exaggerated by the government's expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies in the latter half of the 1980's. The overreaction 
this stimulated within the development sector lead to an exaggeration of the 
down swing of the cycle in the early 1990's.
Summary
One argument being made here is that existing cycles within the property 
markets were exaggerated by government policy over the period of the 
1980's. The office market displays characteristic four year demand cycles 
and nine year development cycles, patterns to which the extreme rental 
growth and increased development activity over this time period, conform. 
However, the government's policies served to bring about the circumstances 
which, according to Barras' model (Barras, 1983), would cause an 'explosive' 
cycle.
In the early part of the decade, the extreme recessionary conditions reduced 
development activity to such an extent that new supply failed to satisfy rising 
occupier demand until 1989 and 1990. This problem was exacerbated by the 
lag inherent within the development process delaying new supply from 
reaching the market. Short term finance became readily available at low 
interest rates and the government's relaxation of development control policies 
increased the supply of land suitable for office development. These factors 
combined to increase development activity at a rate above and beyond that 
which was necessary to alleviate the pressure on demand. This overreaction 
lead to enormous over-supply within all sectors of the office market, making 
the downswing that followed as exaggerated as the upswing which preceded 
it.
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The Retail Property Market
The supply cycle within the retail sector is affected by the lag within the 
development process and conforms to the nine year pattern identified by 
Barras. Similarly the four year demand cycle is related to the business cycle 
and affected by retailing profits. The importance of the relationship between 
profits and retailing user demand is stressed by Schiller;
"There is a close relationship between the movement of
shop rents and the volume of retail sales, and an even
closer relationship between rent and retailers' profits."
(Schiller, 1982:86)
Any government policy which affects consumers' propensity to spend will 
affect retail profits and, therefore, user demand for retail space. In 
establishing the argument here, it is proposed that the macroeconomic 
policies of the Thatcher Government over the early 1980's served to reduce 
consumer expenditure dramatically. This exaggerated the trough of the retail 
occupier demand cycle. Similarly, the macroeconomic policies of the 
Thatcher Government over the late 1980's, served to increase consumer 
expenditure to such a high level that retailing profits were massively 
increased during a period when the supply of retail property was still 
restricted by lack of construction in the early 1980's. This gave rise to an 
exaggeration in the peak of the demand cycle which transformed the peak of 
the supply cycle into the over-supply of retail space experienced in the early 
1990's.
\) 1977-1979
The demand cycle, having peaked in 1973/74 peaked again in 1977/78 and a 
downswing followed. Retail rents rose between 1977 and 1979, user demand 
being encouraged by rising consumer expenditure as consumers reacted to 
falling inflation and interest rates (see fig. 3.20). A natural response to this 
was steadily increasing private construction orders. The supply these 
construction orders would create came onto the market between 1979 and
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1982, at which time the economy had moved into recession.
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ii) 1979 - 1985
Private retail construction orders peaked in 1979 and fell sharply as capital 
values were reduced by falling user demand (see figs. 3.20 & 3.21). 
Consumer expenditure was immediately affected by the more restrictive 
monetary policy adopted by the new Conservative Government in 1979. The 
increase in interest rates worsened the terms upon which credit was 
available and the high inflation in 1979 and 1980 discouraged purchasers.
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According to the four year business cycle, expansion should have taken 
place in 1980 and 1981. The reduction in prime retail yields which occurred 
in 1981 may have been the response of investors to an expected upturn in 
the market (see fig. 3.21). Nonetheless, user demand continued to be so low 
in the retail sector that this reduction in yields had a negligible effect on 
capital values which continued to fall sharply until 1983, discouraging new 
construction orders from 1979 until 1984.
An important factor in the drop in consumer expenditure in the early 1980's 
was the massive increase in unemployment. Although the government's 
macroeconomic policies were not aimed at restructuring the retail sector in 
the same way that the industrial sector had been restructured, the 
restructuring of the labour market, which clearly was a government objective, 
had an enormous impact on the demand for retail space. The mass 
unemployment it created reduced real personal disposable income which as 
was established earlier would reduce retail occupier demand.
An apparent contradiction in the data occurs in the latter half of 1982 when 
real consumer expenditure began to recover whilst unemployment continued 
to increase. The economy was expanding whilst sustaining an unemployment 
level of 3 million. Interest rates fell in 1982 but this did not make government 
policy any less restrictive at this time. Real interest rates remained high, but 
the economic expansion did signal the expectation of some level of recovery 
and a more confident tone was heard in the property press;
"On the generally accepted basis that the UK is going to 
see the beginning of an economic recovery towards the 
end of 1982, this should produce an increase in sales 
volume and hence retailers' profits, and cause shop rents 
to rise ahead of inflation in 1983" (Schiller, 1982:86).
The retail sector was cautious in its response to this increase in consumer 
expenditure. Demand for retail space, as indicated by the retail rent index, 
(see fig. 3.20) experienced no real rental growth until the beginning of 1985.
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Any increase in user demand for retail space prior to this would have been 
catered for by existing supply.
Supply within the retail sector did not suffer from functional obsolescence in 
the early to mid 1980's in the same way as the industrial and office sectors 
did. An increase in demand for retail space could be fulfilled by existing 
supply. This capability within the market was reinforced by the high level of 
construction orders reached in 1978, incorporating both town centre and 
out-of-town shopping centres, which would have been completed in 1981 
and 1982, increasing the supply of relatively new retail space available within 
the market. The first retail warehouse park also opened in 1981, according to 
Hillier Parker Research, (1994) adding a further 108,000 sq.ft to supply, 
although this type of accommodation is by no means suitable for all 
occupiers.
The major change in the nature of demand within the retail sector sprang 
from the shift towards out-of-town shopping2. The average size of town 
centre developments fell from 233,741 sq.ft in 1976 to 136,500 sq.ft in 1980. 
Simultaneously out-of-town centres began to increase in number, rising from 
zero in 1975 to 18 in 1980 (Hillier Parker Research, 1993). Out-of-town 
centres are on average (excluding the large regional centres) 25% smaller 
than town centre developments so this increase in supply of out of town 
shopping centres would not replace the declining size and number of town 
centre developments. It would however, satisfy any increase in demand for 
retail space encouraged by an emerging, consumer led recovery in the early 
1980's.
The expansion in demand was not strong enough to bring about any real 
increase in retail rents until 1984 and 1985. This extended delay to any
The factors behind this shift have been discussed at length elswehere and are not particularly vital to the 
argument being made here.
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upswing in the retail rental cycle discouraged the initiation of new retail 
developments. 1984 and 1985 experienced unusually low shopping centre 
development completions across all three types, town centre, out of town and 
retail warehousing. No new retail warehouse parks were opened in 1984, no 
new out-of-town centres were opened in 1985 and town centre development 
produced the lowest level of additional floorspace since 1966 (see fig. 3.22).
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High interest rates increased construction costs and risk. Low consumer 
expenditure reduced demand and rental values thus keeping capital values 
low. Pressure on supply in 1984 began to improve capital values and at this 
point, a sharp increase in private retail construction orders occurs (see fig. 
3.21). These initial developments would not be completed until 
approximately two years later by which time the government's 
macroeconomic policy had brought about a sharp expansion of the economy 
and more intense pressure on retail supply.
iii) 1985- 1990
The deregulation of the financial services sector in 1985, substantially 
increased the availability of consumer credit. Consumer expenditure 
expanded in response from 1985 until the end of the decade (see fig. 3.23). 
Figure 3.24 shows the increase in demand for retail property which sprang 
from this. The increase in demand created by the small economic recovery
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which had begun to take place between 1983 and 1985 had been enough 
only to stem the real decline of retail rents. The expansion of the economy 
between 1985 and 1990 was strong enough to bring about record increases 
in retail rents as existing supply finally failed to fulfil the pressure of new 
demand.
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Figure 3.24 charts some of the responses of the retail sector to the restricted 
level of supply coming into the market in the face of rising demand. Retail 
investment yields continued to rise from 1985 until 1987. Investors clearly 
expected little significant rental growth in the retail sector. Given the slow 
pace of the recovery in this sector and the continuing high real interest rates 
being imposed by the government the position was a logical one. This had 
the effect of maintaining low capital values in the retail sector throughout 
1985 and 1986 in spite of real rental growth being experienced from 1985 
onwards. Consequently private construction orders in the retail sector did not
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experience any major increase until 1986.
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This lengthening of the trough of the supply cycle lead to an overreaction in 
the market once the level of retail demand became clear. Real rental growth 
combined with falling yields to increase the capital value of completed retail 
developments. Falling real interest rates and the expansion of the availability 
of credit combined with these market factors to generate a sharp increase in 
the level of construction orders in 1986 (see fig 3.24). The relaxation of 
development control policy since 1984 would have further contributed to this 
massive expansion of supply in the late 1980's and early 1990's had it not 
been for the reluctance of many local authorities to allow massive retail 
developments (Rydin et al. 1990), particularly in out of town locations. The 
trend towards developing this type of scheme, although not the only type of 
retail development being undertaken, nonetheless created an explosion in 
the amount of retail space due to come onto the market from 1986 onwards;
"The amount of out-of-town retail space, either under 
construction by March this year or with planning consent, 
was up by over 300 per cent on the same period last 
year" (CSW, 1986:15)
The extent of the increase in development which took place over this short 
period of time is indicated in a Hillier Parker report;
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"A reduction in the number of developments being 
proposed at this time would not bring about any decline 
in the level of supply until the end of the decade. Many 
of the proposed shopping centres failed to receive 
planning permission but this did not alter the fact that 
some 107.8 million square feet of retail space was in the 
pipeline in June 1987." (Hillier Parker, 1987:8)
The important point to note here is that this massive level of new retail 
development was encouraged by the ready availability of relatively cheap 
development finance, combined with the sustained increase in consumer 
expenditure. These factors were reinforced by the government's more 
expansionary macroeconomic and fiscal policies introduced in the latter half 
of the 1980's.
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The extent to which this increase in consumer expenditure was supported by 
the expansion of credit is made clear in figure 3.25. Real personal 
disposable income fluctuates quite dramatically over this period but the 
overall trend is clearly downwards from 1986. The increase in consumer 
expenditure was therefore not being financed by an increase in disposable 
income. The level of the savings ratio also fell sharply from 1985 until 1989. 
Clearly much of the expansion in consumer credit was occurring at the 
expense of savings. In the absence of any growth in real personal 
disposable income, the expansion in the retail sector was thus dependent
101
upon increasing the availability and attractiveness of credit and discouraging 
the propensity to save. Both of these contributory factors are very sensitive 
to increases in interest rates.
Real interest rates peaked at 9.5 % in April 1986. Overall for the next two 
years nominal interest rates fell and inflation rose, effectively producing a 
consistent drop in real interest rates. These factors clearly discourage any 
form of saving and encourage consumer expenditure. The increase in 
nominal interest rates in 1988 had little impact on the level of real interest 
rates because inflation was still rising. This situation changed in 1989 by 
which time the increases nominal interest rates were large enough to 
outweigh rising inflation and create an increase in real interest rates. This 
coincided with an increase in the savings ratio as saving became more 
attractive. Real personal disposable income declined sharply between 1989 
and 1990 and a reduction in the level of demand for retail property can be 
seen in the falling prime real retail rent indicator.
Just as the trough in the retail supply cycle was exaggerated by the economic 
policies of the early 1980's so the peak of the same supply cycle was 
exaggerated by economic policies of the late 1980's. This subsequently led 
to the retail property recession of the early 1990's being exaggerated by the 
over-supply of property within the market and the reduction in consumer 
expenditure generated by the high level of personal debt and unemployment.
Summary
The retail market was not the primary subject of any major restructuring 
engineered through economic policy over the 1980's. Demand for retail 
property is linked to the economic welfare of consumers within the economy 
rather than producers. In furthering the argument being made here, the retail 
market provides evidence to show that all sectors of the economy were 
affected by the policies of the Thatcher Government, not just those sectors 
highlighted for restructuring and accelerated change.
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The retail sector responded more slowly than the industrial and office sectors 
to increases in user demand in the mid 1980's. The fundamental changes in 
the types of property demanded by the other two sectors created functional 
and locational obsolescence which did not affect the retail sector, allowing 
increasing demand to be catered for by existing supply. This did not 
however, prevent the retail market from experiencing record rental growth 
levels once existing supply had been taken up. As it became clear that 
pipeline supply was low the level of retail construction starts increased. The 
development lag, a lower level of depreciation than that experienced by the 
other two sectors and a high adjustment rate encouraged a higher level of 
new development than was required to fulfil demand and brought about 
explosive cyclical conditions as identified by Barras (1983). These conditions 
were further encouraged by the expansion of the availability of credit and low 
interest rates until over-supply and worsening economic conditions created 
the exaggerated retail property market recession of the early 1990's.
The deflation of the economy in the early 1980's extended the trough in the 
building cycle reducing the level of new supply in the market for all three 
sectors. The reflation of the economy in the latter half of the decade placed 
pressure on supply encouraging new development as would be expected 
within the nine year building cycle. The exaggeration of the upswing in the 
building cycle was not simply a response to reflation through more 
expansionary macroeconomic policy but to supply side policies aimed at 
encouraging growth in specific sectors of the economy. Some of these 
supply side policies have been identified through the discussion in Chapter 
Three. Chapter Four develops this argument concentrating specifically on 
the supply side policies of the Thatcher Government and their impact on the 
commercial property markets.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUPPLY SIDE POLICY AND THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKETS
Introduction
The previous chapters have explored the political and macroeconomic setting 
within which the commercial property markets operated during the 1980's and 
their response to it. Through that process the supply side policies which 
formed part of the Thatcher Government's political strategy have emerged as 
a significant factor in the behaviour of the commercial property markets. 
Chapter Four therefore focuses on the impact of this government's supply 
side policies as part of the overall investigation of the commercial property 
markets in the context of Thatcherism.
The importance accorded to supply side policies by the Thatcher Government 
in the achievement of its objectives is perhaps the most fundamental change 
to have taken place within UK government policy at this time. The 
significance of this as a clear indicator of the move away from Keynesian 
demand management policies following the 1979 election, is explored in 
Chapter One. This change in policy emphasis is central to any discussion of 
the impact of supply side policies during this period.
Before continuing, two points must be reiterated; this work contends that:
i) macroeconomic policy post 1979 was not as ground-breaking as the 
government suggested but, importantly, this did not detract from or mute the 
impact it had on the commercial property markets;
ii) supply side policies did change after 1979, both in terms of the importance 
accorded to them and in their objectives. The impact that these new policies 
had on the commercial property markets is just as important as the impact of 
macroeconomic policy.
A major, stated objective of the Thatcher Government was the provision of 
economic conditions within which private enterprise could flourish fostering
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economic growth. Chisholm (1987) characterises the importance of supply 
side policies to the new government in establishing these conditions:
"In practice, supply-side economists are interested in the 
whole range of supply constraints and what might be 
done to ease bottlenecks - by deregulation in labour 
markets, land markets etc." (Chisholm, 1987:211)
To ensure a plentiful supply of land, capital and labour allocation of which 
would be governed by market forces the government implemented a 
programme of deregulation within the land, capital and labour markets.
Being directly linked to these markets the commercial property markets were 
affected by the supply side policies through which the deregulation 
programme was implemented. This chapter studies the response within the 
commercial property markets to these supply side policies. The discussion is 
divided into the three sub-sections land, capital and labour for clarity and to 
allow the complexity of the relationship between these resources and the 
commercial property markets to be explored.
One of the arguments being presented here focuses on the supply side 
policies of the Thatcher Government encouraging the over accumulation and 
consequent over investment in the built environment which is inherent within 
developed capitalist systems (Harvey, 1985). By the 1970's the 
obsolescence of Fordism once maximum productive capacity had been 
reached, closed an area within which capital could be productively employed. 
The supply side policies of the government provided new avenues of 
employment for capital by expanding the financial services sector and 
increasing the efficiency of the mechanism by which capital could be 
transferred from the primary circuit of capital to the secondary circuit, as 
identified by Harvey (1985) and discussed in Chapter Two.
This resulted in a shift in investment away from the production of goods and 
services towards the production of fixed capital assets. It also allowed 
investment to flow more freely between different countries and brought a 
strong influx of investment from overseas into the UK at different times within
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the cycle. These structural changes in the capital markets, wrought through 
the supply side policies of the Thatcher Government, reinforced the 
exaggeration of demand and supply cycles within the commercial property 
markets.
Land
The supply side measures introduced to deregulate the land markets will be 
discussed below but it is important to establish here the argument being 
made with respect to this particular resource. The land related supply side 
measures introduced by the Thatcher Government were intended to increase 
the supply of development land and the supply of built space. The policies 
had a variety of effects the combined impact of them being to increase the 
rate of adjustment of supply both of development land and commercial 
buildings, to rising demand. (Barras1 discussion of this (Barras, 1983) is 
explored in Chapter Two).
If the rate of adjustment increases to the extent that it exceeds the rate of 
depreciation by more than unity, an "explosive cycle" (Barras, 1983:1388) 
will result. It is the contention of this work that the Thatcher Government's 
supply side policies relating to land contributed to the creation of such 
circumstances.
In 1979 the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors identified restrictions to 
the supply of development land (see Chapter One) and the government 
implemented measures to remove these restrictions. The obligation for local 
authorities to take development land into public ownership under the 
Community Land Act was removed shortly after the 1979 general election 
and changes which would lead to the eventual removal of Development Land 
Tax were being considered by the Summer of 1980. In August 1980 IDC's 
were made generally available for the development of rented factories of up 
to 50,000 sq.ft. on industrial estates. IDC's were suspended altogether by
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the end of 1981 removing another perceived restriction on this type of 
development.
A smaller initiative which took place in 1980 was the setting up of Land 
Registers. These were aimed at bringing under-used and vacant, publicly 
owned land to the attention of private developers in order to attract private 
investment. All local authorities were required to provide registers. Some of 
the land was in the inner cities but the nature of the sites was such that only 
4% of land registered was disposed of in the first 2 years of the scheme. 
Developers showed a reluctance to take on inner city sites, many of which 
were contaminated and costly to develop. The scheme continued throughout 
the 1980's and when pressure was being placed on the supply of 
development land by remarkably strong demand in 1986, the DoE instructed 
16 local authorities to dispose of any unused public land they held thus 
increasing supply further.
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As Figure 4.1 shows, the construction industry failed to respond to these 
policies in the short term. Increased development within the office sector 
between 1979 and 1981 was encouraged by investor demand as the 
investing institutions increased the proportion of property within portfolios. 
This demand was not sustained beyond 1981. The retail and industrial
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sectors displayed little evidence of a response to the government's attempts 
to encourage supply. Further supply side measures were implemented.
The maximum levy for rates on empty commercial property was reduced from 
100% to 50% in April 1981 and was further reduced to 0% in April 1984. The 
government's intention was to encourage development activity thereby 
increasing the supply of built space suitable for occupation by expanding 
sectors of the economy. The effect was to reduce the risk involved in 
speculative development of commercial buildings with little regard for 
occupiers' requirements. The reduction to 0% levy for empty rates in 1984 
coincided with a shortage of new commercial space and the building cycle 
moving into a period of upswing. (See Fig. 4.1).
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Figure 4.2 shows the amount of newly developed office floorspace available 
in the market rising quite sharply to exceed the level of existing floorspace for 
the first time in this decade in 1984. Similar evidence is shown for the retail 
sector in figure 4.3. Town centre, out-of-town and retail warehousing all 
experience increases in the number of centre openings from 1985 onwards 
as the rise in construction orders which began in 1984, started to come onto 
the market. This demonstrates both the low level of development activity in 
the first quarter of the 1980s and the rapid response of the development
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industry once demand began to improve in the mid 1980's.
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The reduction in empty rates liability was not the only tax subsidy offered in 
return for investment in land and buildings. Limited levels of private 
investment in the property sector were able to benefit from a tax relief 
instrument with the introduction of the Business Expansion Scheme in 1983. 
The scheme was introduced to encourage investment by individuals in 
unquoted UK trading companies by offering tax relief at the highest rate of 
income tax paid by the individual on investment of up to £40,000 in any one 
year. Although this was intended to increase investment in UK industry 
generally, up to 50% of a company's net assets could be in the form of land 
and buildings before any restriction on relief applied. Companies dealing in 
land were excluded from the scheme but property development companies 
were included during the first year of the scheme's operation.
With a top marginal tax rate of 60%, private investment in land and buildings 
was receiving government subsidy at the beginning of an upturn in the 
building cycle. Restrictions were placed on the eligibility of property 
development companies in 1986, and the level of tax relief obtainable was 
eventually restricted to the basic tax rate but not until after the period being 
studied here. This represented a significant government incentive to
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investment, up to half of which could be in built space, at a time of rising 
occupier demand and falling supply.
In terms of development control, the most influential measure to be 
introduced by the government in its first term of office was Department of 
Environment (DoE) Circular 22/80. This aimed to speed up the planning 
process and to make it more responsive to the market. It highlighted the 
importance of market factors within the decision making process, particularly 
in relation to aesthetic control. That the developer would have to sell the 
development was seen as the most suitable control for the acceptability of 
design1. This Circular and DoE Circular 14/85 "Development and 
Employment" established "a presumption in favour of planning permission 
being granted unless planning objections could be sustained." (Rydin. 
1993:62). This was supplemented by Circular 16/84, "Industrial 
Development" giving priority to industrial development which should always 
be allowed unless demonstrable harm would be done to a valuable feature of 
the locality.
Although the local authority was not forced to follow the advice of these 
circulars, it was emphasised that it would be taken into account by the 
Secretary of State in the appeal process. This had a number of effects on the 
development control process which were explored by Rydin et al, (1990) in a 
report to the Association of District Councils. In their analysis of national 
level data they noted that "The number of planning decisions rose to a peak 
of over half a million in 1988/9"(p.6). The material provided shows that the 
number of decisions began to rise in 1986/87 which would coincide with a 
response to Circular 14/85, allowing a period for site identification and 
preliminary preparations prior to planning applications being submitted.
This increase in applications would also have been encouraged by the 
increased availability of capital funding and short term credit, the tax
This was reiterated in Circular 31/85.
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incentives applied to the development of buildings, the removal of 
development land tax and the perception by the market that development 
control policy had been relaxed. The increase in the number of applications 
is indicative of the increased activity of property traders creating surplus 
value by obtaining planning permission for sites and then selling them on.
The value of land would be so enhanced by obtaining planning permission for 
a commercial development on it that enough profit could be made from 
selling the land on, not to have to embark upon the actual development.
Thus the risk and high costs involved in actual development work could be 
avoided by the party obtaining planning permission, and the risk of not 
obtaining the required planning permission and incurring delays in the 
development process could be avoided by the developer.
Obtaining planning permissions and trading in land required lower levels of 
capital investment than development and a shorter time span. The absence 
of any obligation to act upon a successful planning application and the high 
profit levels involved in this trading process effectively encouraged land 
traders to make far more planning applications than developers would be 
likely to act upon within the lifetime of this upturn in the building cycle. This 
effect was reinforced by the relaxation of development control policy and the 
elevated importance of the role of the market within the development control 
system. The profits to be made from obtaining planning permissions and 
trading in land increased demand for sites with development potential once 
the low level of supply became evident in the mid 1980's. This pushed up 
land values, a price increase that would ultimately be passed on to the 
occupier, from the mid 1980's onwards.
Rydin et al.'s analysis of the data goes on to identify a fall in the success rate 
of applications;
"the percentage of applications approved has fallen from
peak figures of 87.6% in 1983/4 to just over 80% in
1988/9"(Rydin et al., 1990:6).
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This has implications for the success of the Thatcher Government's 
development control policies. In spite of the government's efforts to relax 
planning control policy and the positive presumption within Circular 14/85, the 
decline in the proportion of successful applications indicates a tightening of 
development control policy at local planning authority level. Whilst the 
increase in the number of applications made led to an increase in the number 
of permissions granted, in spite of the application success rate falling, the 
evidence suggests that the government was unsuccessful in relaxing local 
authority development control policy.
An equally significant finding within this report concerned the number of 
planning permissions granted on appeal.
"Major industrial, major retail, and all office development
stand the highest chance of winning planning permission
on appeal, with percentages allowed of over 50%."
(Rydin et al., 1990:7).
Part of the increase in planning permissions granted thus clearly stems from 
action by central government and is evidence of greater central government 
participation in the development control process. This is an example of the 
effects of a policy directly contradicting other stated government policy 
objectives. The development control powers of the local authority were 
clearly undermined whilst central government involvement in the system 
increased in an effort to reinforce the policy of expanding supply. One of the 
government's frequently stated policy objectives was the reduction of the role 
of the state, but such centralisation of power forms a common theme within 
many of the urban policy initiatives adopted by the Thatcher Government 
(see Coulson, 1993, Lawless, 1991, Healey ,1990).
The government's intention was to boost activity within the development 
industry simultaneously providing an ample supply of suitable space for 
economic expansion. The effect was rather different:
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i) the removal of DLT allowed profits to be made from trading in land for 
which planning permission had been obtained, an activity which increased 
the supply of land with planning permission without necessarily increasing 
the supply of built commercial space. The activity also had the tendency to 
inflate the price of development land.
ii) Development activity did increase but developers were often unaware of 
occupiers requirements resulting in the development of space which was not 
necessarily suitable for economic expansion.
The important point to note is the impact the increase in supply of 
development land would have as the building cycle moved into an upwards 
trend again. Expressed in the terms used by Barras (1983) as discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three, the adjustment rate, the rate at which supply 
responded to demand, would increase giving rise to the possibility of an 
"explosive" market cycle. The building cycle has been identified as reaching 
a peak in 1979 which was followed by a decline in development as the 
economy moved into recession (see Fig. 4.1). Any increase in supply of 
development land in the early 1980's would have contributed to a market 
already in a state of oversupply, with the effect of further reducing the price 
(value) of the asset at that particular time. The recession of the early 1980's 
was long but the recovery from 1983 onwards made use of a plentiful supply 
of relatively cheap development land and what was perceived to be an
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increasingly relaxed development control policy.
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Pressure on supply is evident in figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. The level of private 
industrial construction orders rose from 1984 onwards (see Fig. 4.1). 
According to figure 4.4 total available prime industrial floorspace fell from 
1985 until 1988 indicating a take-up rate exceeding the rate of increase in 
supply. Similarly by the end of 1986 take up of office space through lettings 
virtually equates to supply coming on to the market for second hand buildings 
and new developments.
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Private office construction orders had been rising since 1983, prime rental 
values rose from 1984 until 1989 but secondary office rents did not rise until 
1986. This suggests that:
i) new supply of both industrial and office space entering the market between 
1984 and 1988 was immediately being taken up through strong occupier 
demand;
ii) some second hand supply was being taken up and
iii) some second hand office space was being reclassified as secondary and 
therefore no longer featuring in the prime data figures but preventing 
secondary rents from rising in the short term.
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The strength of this demand encouraged widescale development activity, 
facilitated by the increase in availability of development land and the changes 
in development control policy discussed above. Nonetheless, the 
government became concerned that local authorities were using planning 
conditions to restrict development. This was dealt with swiftly by the 
government in Circular 1/85, "The Use of Conditions in Planning 
Permissions", which established that such conditions must be "precise, 
relevant to planning and to the particular development proposed" (HMSO, 
1985). They could only be used to turn a proposal which would be turned 
down into one which could be granted permission, not for improving already
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adequate proposals. Furthermore, they should not be too onerous, i.e. to the 
detriment of the sale of the building or the operation of the business.
Similar attention was paid to the system of planning gain whereby local 
authorities sought agreements with developers to incorporate some form of 
community benefit or 'gain' within a development. The government felt that 
this system might be being used as an alternative to planning conditions. 
Circular 22/83 therefore established guidelines to ensure that the demands of 
the local authority were reasonable and pertained to the development in 
question.
The use of the planning gain system, or Section 106 Agreements under the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990, (formerly section 52 agreements), 
gives greater opportunity for the consideration of proposals in areas where 
demand for space is high and building already dense. Simmie, 1993, makes 
this point in relation to urban regeneration;
"...local authorities can usually only acquire [planning 
gain] in circumstances where economic development and 
growth are already taking place. It is very difficult to 
negotiate any planning gains in places where economic 
decline has set in." (Simmie, 1993:136)
Where the surplus value created by development is high, i.e. where occupier 
and investor demand is strong, the developer can often afford to provide 
some infrastructure or other improvement which would make an otherwise 
untenable application more acceptable. This has the effect of encouraging 
further development in already over-developed urban areas, these generally 
having the highest values. Such increases in development activity in already 
highly developed areas, particularly the City of London simply added to the 
unevenness of the distribution of development opportunities and investment 
which became so apparent in the increased regional divides of the 1980's.
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The changes made are important because they once again establish the 
overriding importance of the private sector, particularly the developer, in the 
eyes of the government. The private sector was encouraged wherever 
possible and if an opportunity was being used to control the activities of the 
developer against their wishes it would be removed. Thus the government's 
efforts in striving to achieve the objective of increasing the resources 
available for economic growth, had the effect of again expanding the 
opportunities available for the development of land. The path for continued 
development activity and the creation of more built space was once again 
smoothed.
The publication of the White Paper "Lifting the Burden", in 1985 recognised 
the new space requirements of the expanding group of high-tech occupiers. 
The paper recommended flexibility in the approach of planners and 
acceptance of the view that offices, warehousing, manufacturing and 
research and development space may all be needed by the same company in 
the same building. This rapid change in space requirements ultimately led to 
the review of the Use Classes Order (UCO) and the General Development 
Order (GDO). The GDO was relaxed in an effort to give business greater 
freedom to expand, literally. The size of an extension to an industrial or 
warehouse building, for which specific planning not was not required, was 
increased.
The review of the UCO sought to extend the deregulation begun with the 
GDO, by introducing more flexible Use Class definitions. Permission no 
longer had to be sought to switch to and from certain types of office use, light 
industrial use and research and development. The objective was to allow the 
growing high-tech manufacturing sector the flexibility it required in occupying 
commercial space, and to allow the different specialisms within this industry 
to congregate close to one another. The improvements made to the national 
transport infrastructure and the technological advances being made in terms 
of data storage and retrieval, encouraged decentralisation within the office 
sector. The incorporation of office and light industrial uses into one Use
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Class allowed the development of business parks which would cater for either 
type of occupier. (See Henneberry, 1988 for a discussion of the reality of 
high-tech and office user space requirements).
The intention with this policy was to increase the supply of space available for 
a growing sector of occupiers within the economy. The effect was to create 
the opportunity for developers to build new office space in previously light 
industrial locations. This policy also prevented local authorities implementing 
their own industrial policies through planning. It was no longer possible for 
them to encourage light industry as an employment generating sector by 
providing light industrial space at the expense of office space. This complied 
with the government's view that the high-tech and professional service 
industries, predominantly office users who required flexible commercial 
space, were employment-generating uses.
The review of the UCO resulted in the conversion of light industrial buildings 
to a higher value office use, particularly on the outskirts of densely populated 
central business districts such as the City of London. It also increased the 
value of what had been industrial property within investment portfolios. Low 
development activity in the early 1980's had given rise to a shortage of quality 
prime office space in popular office districts and rising office rents. This 
further encouraged this type of development by increasing the capital gains to 
be made by developers. Henneberry comments that;
"The amalgamation of classes II and III in the new 
Business Use Class has, therefore, primarily benefited 
the property development and investment industry"
(Henneberry, 1988:259).
The changes made to the development control system led to an increase in 
the adjustment rate of commercial property development. As demand for 
space from occupiers and investors began to grow in the mid to late 1980's, 
supply increased at a pace which exceeded the rise in demand. As 
established by Barras, 1983, and noted earlier, if the rate of increase in
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supply exceeded the depreciation rate by more than unity, the conditions 
required for an 'explosive' nine year cycle would exist.
This increase in development activity and land values was unevenly 
distributed and the Thatcher Government found it necessary to introduce 
specific policies to tackle the problems surrounding the decline of the inner 
city areas. The traditional view of inner city decline saw private disinvestment 
as the root cause and public sector led regeneration as the solution. The 
Thatcher Government saw the public sector as the root cause of the problem, 
through profligate expenditure, land ownership and burdensome planning, 
and the private sector as the remedy (Parkinson, 1989). This led to the 
adoption of a system of leverage planning which used the investment of 
public funds as an incentive to encourage or 'lever' private investment into an 
area (Brindley, et al., 1989).
The Thatcher Government's leverage planning policies were property led 
regeneration initiatives. They took the form of Urban Development 
Corporations (UDC's) and Enterprise Zones (EZ's) introduced in the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act, 1980. UDC's were initially set up in 
Merseyside and London's Docklands. These single body organisations, 
potentially covering more than one local authority area, were equipped with 
the powers and resources required to bring about regeneration within each 
location. They could buy and sell land, prepare sites for development, 
provide infrastructure, give loans and grants for building work and 
environmental improvements and they provided all development control 
functions for the area. (See Imrie and Thomas, 1993, for a full discussion of 
the powers and implications of UDC's.)
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The emphasis placed upon property development was an important aspect of 
these regeneration policies. Parkinson, 1989, comments;
"The UDC's adopted a different redevelopment strategy 
from local government, emphasising a property-led form 
of urban regeneration which diluted wider social goals of 
urban policy" (Parkinson, 1989:436)
"In keeping with the property led model of regeneration, 
heavy emphasis was placed upon immediate action and 
visible results, often prestige 'flagship' development 
projects, which were intended to improve the 
environment and image of an area and generate the 
confidence needed to attract private sector investment"
(Parkinson, 1989:436)
By the end of the decade some 11 UDC's had been designated in the UK and 
their principle objective was the regeneration of an area through the 
development of land, buildings, industry and commerce. This increased the 
adjustment rate of supply in particular areas, in response to rising occupier 
demand.
The UDC's were supplemented by the introduction of Enterprise Zones 
(EZ's). The emphasis within both initiatives was on freedom for different 
types of development to take place through the removal of the constraint of 
local authority development control. The philosophy behind this was that 
reducing government intervention (rolling back the state) "would facilitate the 
growth of companies" (Livesey 1989, p192).
In addition to the automatic granting of permission for specified types of 
development within the area, the EZ's had further incentives to offer. Capital 
allowances of 100% on new commercial and industrial property developed in 
an EZ were offered, 100% relief from rates was granted on all industrial and 
commercial buildings for 10 years and relief from DLT was granted. This 
clearly reduced the cost of developing and occupying property within EZ's 
and made it very difficult for surrounding areas to compete for developer 
interest, investment and occupier demand. Private investment was drawn
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away from inner city areas which were not part of a UDC but were located 
close to one. The combination of EZ and UDC in London's Docklands led to 
a high level of development activity in the area and concerns that demand 
from prestige office occupiers would be drawn away from the City by 
incentives with which the City could not compete. This eventually led to 
badly timed counter measures which had further repercussions for the supply 
of buildings.
These policies formed a stark contradiction to the government's restrictive 
monetary policy and anti-subsidy stance and are another example of one 
policy initiative contradicting another. The government expenditure was 
justified as it formed an incentive for a proportionately larger quantity of 
private investment. Ambrose (1994), in his discussion of development for 
investment, also points out the contradiction this formed to Conservative 
Government policy at that time. The government was opposed to 
government subsidy and in favour of market forces in its rhetoric but this 
particular piece of extensive subsidy had far reaching affects precisely 
because it distorted the market.
The LDDC was by far the most successful UDC/EZ combination, but was 
sustained and encouraged by the buoyancy of the local property market. The 
LDDC also received the largest amount of public funding of all the UDC's; 
£400m up to 1988. By 1988 the LDDC area had 4.9m sq. ft of available office 
space. This had risen to 6.2m sq.ft. by June 1989 in spite of over 1m sq.ft. 
being taken up in the year to June 1989 (Healey and Baker Research, 1989 
and 1990) but in 1989 42% of office space in the LDDC area was unlet 
(Brownill, 1993). This level of development activity was not matched by the 
other UDC's but provides a vivid illustration of the scale of development 
activity which was being encouraged by the range of land related supply side 
policies.
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A range of urban related grants were introduced in the 1980's to tackle 
specific regeneration issues. Derelict Land Grants (DLG's), Urban 
Development Grants (UDG's), Urban Regeneration Grants and City Grants 
were all introduced during this period with the objective of strengthening the 
local economy and bringing land and buildings back into use. The 
government expenditure was again justified in terms of the amount of private 
investment levered into the area.
UDG's were introduced in 1982 to encourage private investment to fund the 
economic and physical regeneration of run-down urban areas. Between 
1983 and 1988 £120m of pubic money was approved for spending on 239 
UDG projects. This was expected to generate £489m of private investment in 
both commercial and residential property development representing a 
leverage ratio of a little over 4:1.
A report by the Department of Environment in 1988 suggests that some of 
the schemes which won assistance under the UDG scheme could have been 
funded without government assistance. These tended to be schemes which 
had 'levered in' a high proportion of private investment and hence lifted the 
private/public investment ratio. If these schemes are taken out of the 
analysis the ratio falls to 3.4:1 (DoE, 1988). This weakens the government's 
justification for this area of expenditure but also draws attention to the 
importance placed upon development related regeneration initiatives all of 
which were increasing the rate at which supply could rise in response to 
demand.
Urban Regeneration Grants (URG's) were introduced in 1987 to combat the 
problems created in urban areas by industrial change. They sought to 
encourage private investment specifically for large sites and buildings which 
had formerly housed complex manufacturing processes and machinery. 
UDG'S, URG's and DLG's were replaced by City Grant in 1988. The grant in 
this case made up any shortfall between the cost of a project and its ultimate
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value, allowing the developer a reasonable profit. The completed value of 
the project had to be over £200 000 for it to be eligible and it had to provide 
either new jobs or private housing. The re-use of empty buildings and 
derelict land was particularly encouraged with this grant. City Grant was the 
only initiative with a specific provision for job creation and this was in addition 
to a strong property development provision. The combination of government 
subsidy and almost automatic granting of planning permission naturally 
encouraged the development of new space.
The regional response of the development sector to these measures 
illustrates the difficulty the government had in achieving urban regeneration 
objectives. The stated objective had been to liberate the markets in order to 
encourage economic growth, particularly in areas of urban decline. The 
effect was to increase the rate at which supply increased in response to rising 
demand, Barras1 adjustment rate, particularly in those areas which were 
already popular business locations i.e. not in areas of urban decline. The 
government was clearly failing in its stated objective of encouraging 
redevelopment in the declining regions, in the industrial sector at least.
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In the South East, particularly London, the supply side policies were 
encouraging wide scale development. This development activity was justified 
in the mid 1980's by strong demand. According to Hillier Parker Research
"Over 10m sq.ft. of floorspace was placed on the market 
during 1986 - the first time that level has been passed - 
... This was almost matched by the record 9.9m sq. ft.
(up 39% in 1985) let." (Hillier Parker Research, 1986:5)
Nowhere were the effects more obvious than in the City of London. Figure 
4.7 illustrates the consistently above average rental values in this area 
between 1982 and 1989 and the extent of the exaggeration in rental levels 
over this period. Concern amongst the City planners relating to the unfair 
competition formed by the LDDC has been discussed above. The response 
to this problem was contained within the new draft plan for the City of London 
published in March 1986. Michael Cassidy, City of London Planning 
Committee Chairman, commented on the positive attitude the City's planners 
were going to take regarding the development of offices. He was keen to 
promote the familiarity of the City planners with the effects of the deregulation 
of the London stock exchange on the City office market. There could be no 
doubting the presumption in favour of planning permission for the 
development of offices within the City of London and development activity 
demonstrated a net increase in response with office supply rising accordingly.
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The sharp increase in the adjustment rate experienced in the City of London 
and the South East was not a nation-wide phenomena. The government's 
supply side policies impacted on other regions of the UK by reducing the level 
of investment as capital sought greater returns in the more economically 
attractive areas. Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show the sharp contrast in the 
experiences of the office and industrial markets of the South East of England 
and the North of England. The government's supply side policies were 
remarkably unsuccessful in encouraging growth in the areas which had been 
affected most severely by the industrial decline and least by service sector 
growth. In the North of England limited industrial development took place and 
rental levels in both the industrial and office sectors declined whilst boom 
conditions were experienced in the South East. The recovery, once it 
reached the North was very short.
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If one considers that with respect to the office market in 1986 "Central 
London accounted for nearly 50% of the turnover (placings and lettings) in 
Great Britain" (Hillier Parker Research, 1987:9), the impact on the whole 
market of an increase in the adjustment rate of supply to demand in this area 
is clear. Furthermore, the impact of any increase in the adjustment rate 
would have a much more fundamental effect on supply in the office market in 
the south east of the UK than any other region.
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The land related supply side policies formed only one area within the wider 
deregulation programme. The supply side policies implemented by the 
Thatcher Government to deregulate the capital markets will be explored 
below using aspects of Harvey's Marxist framework of circuits of capital and 
capital switching mechanisms, as discussed in Chapter Two. This highlights 
the importance of the deregulation of the capital markets both in terms of the 
increase in the volume of capital funding available and the increased 
efficiency with which capital can be switched from the primary to the 
secondary circuit. The impact of these policies on the supply of commercial 
property will, again, be the focus of the discussion.
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Capital
Any restriction on capital or change in the terms under which financing is 
available will affect the supply of new buildings. The influence of capital 
funding arrangements takes two forms within the commercial property 
markets:
i) the availability of short term funding significantly influences development 
activity; Barras identifies the availability of cheap short term funding as one 
of the key factors in the office boom of the early 1970's (Barras, 1983);
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ii) the availability of long term investment funding for the purchase of 
completed developments. Unless capital funds are available to purchase 
completed developments there is no incentive for developer activity.
Deregulation of the capital markets increased the supply of capital for 
investment in commercial property and the supply of finance for developers. 
Not only was the quantity of supply increased but the range of instruments 
through which finance could be arranged expanded and competition between 
market operators for customers (borrowers) seeking short term loan finance 
increased.
The argument being made here with respect to capital draws from the 
frameworks of both Barras (1983) and Harvey (1985) as discussed at the 
beginning of Chapter Two. The increase in the supply of both essential forms 
of funding increased the adjustment rate of the supply of built space to rising 
demand. The sources from which funding was available were expanded and 
the efficiency of the system for switching an over accumulation of capital from 
the primary to the secondary circuit of capital, improved. According to 
Harvey's framework such an increase in the efficiency of the capital switching 
system would lead to an increase in the supply of buildings as they form the 
dominant capital asset produced within the secondary circuit of capital.
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The increased availability of short term development finance sprang largely 
from the banking sector which was forced into more open competition with 
other high street lenders by deregulation of the financial services sector. 
Figure 4.11 shows the rapid increase in bank lending to property companies 
as the measures contained within the Financial Services Act, 1985 and the 
Building Societies Act, 1986 were felt within a market which was experiencing 
a shortage in the supply of new commercial property and rising occupier 
demand. This increased competition between building societies and banks 
for private sector business conformed to the government's deregulation policy 
objectives and effectively changed the terms under which short term finance 
was available. Combined with the lowering of real interest rates in 1983 and 
1984 this served to increase the supply of relatively cheap short term finance 
for development activity.
Ball (1994) points out the inevitable reactions of market operators to the 
increased competition introduced into the lending market. Being unable to 
increase efficiency and profit margins could not be increased through 
generating economies of scale and price cutting alternatives were limited 
through the setting of the base rate by the Bank of England and the Treasury. 
Operators within the lending market could only increase their competitive 
advantage by increasing their market share. In order to increase market 
share substantially, much greater levels of risk had to be endured in terms of 
the credit-worthiness of customers, both in the long term mortgage market 
and in the short term commercial finance market;
"In temporarily relaxing lending criteria, retail financial 
institutions may have been aiming to protect their market 
position (and their longer term profitability) in the face of 
greatly expanded financial services capacity and 
technical change. But they did so at the expense of 
higher risk (and by implication lower actual short-term 
profits)." (Ball, 1994:688)
Such removal of restrictions to the supply of capital increased the level of 
aggregate demand within the economy by increasing both consumer
128
spending power and the level of business investment. Both factors would 
increase occupier demand for built space. The lower short term interest rates 
and more freely available financing reduced construction costs and opened 
opportunities for new operators to enter both the commercial and residential 
development markets thereby increasing the supply of built space. This 
coincided with the low level of supply resulting from little development 
between 1979 and 1984. The rising commercial rental levels this produced 
formed a further incentive for operators to enter the market.
Investor demand for commercial property has been described as rising over 
the period of the 1980's but the sources of this long term funding changed 
during this period. The UK investment institutions remained a dominant 
investment force within UK commercial property but were not seeking to 
increase their property investment holdings. UK investor demand became 
more at liberty to seek overseas investment opportunities following the 
removal of exchange controls in the first year of the Thatcher Government. 
This policy also granted overseas investors greater freedom to invest in the 
UK.
This freeing of the capital markets created an exodus of capital from the UK 
in the early 1980's as overseas investment opportunities were more attractive 
to domestic investment capital. According to Maynard (1988) capital outflows 
aggregated to over £8bn between 1979 and 1981 whilst inflows aggregated 
to approximately £3bn. This initial reduction in the availability of long term 
funding reduced capital values and the returns to be made by developers. 
Only the most traditional property investments, such as City offices, retained 
investor demand in the early 1980's.
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The quantity of investment capital was no longer restricted to UK based 
investment institutions and banks. Overseas investors became a significant 
source of investment finds, particularly for the commercial property sector. 
Nabarro comments upon the importance of both overseas investment and the 
expanded banking sector;
"...much of the increase in bank debt to property has 
come from new entrants to the UK market, primarily UK 
and Japanese banks" (Nabarro, 1990:53)
Figure 4.12 shows a net disinvestment in UK commercial property by UK 
institutions from 1982 until the investment sector responded to the high level 
of rental growth experienced in 1987 and 1988. In spite of increasing the 
supply of long term funding the deregulation of the capital markets did not 
increase UK institutional investor demand for commercial property until the 
market became much more attractive. Figure 4.13 shows the increase in 
other sources of investment funding in UK commercial property in the 1980's
UK Institutions Net  Property Investment
£m
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which supported developer activity.
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In spite of the trend being towards disinvestment within property for UK 
investing institutions during much of the decade, the proportion of investment 
expenditure spent on development increased consistently within all three 
commercial property types over the 1980's (see fig. 4.14). This illustrates the 
increasing involvement of investment institutions in the development process 
over this period rather than simply in long term funding of developments. By 
becoming developers these investment institutions increase the speed and 
efficiency of the switching process for transferring funds from the primary 
circuit of capital to the secondary circuit of capital thereby increasing the 
speed with which the development process can respond to market demand by 
expanding supply.
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The increase in institutional investor demand has implications for the physical 
characteristics of commercial buildings. The market led objectives of the 
investors produce a requirement for commercial buildings which conform to 
specific established characteristics. Henneberry, 1988, describes these 
characteristics in relation to industrial buildings;
"Developers and funders design buildings which 
minimise initial cost and are appropriate to as wide a 
market as possible: both warehousing and 
manufacturing. Low first cost maximises initial rates of 
return on the investment. Designing for a wide market 
increased the likelihood of a quick letting and minimises 
the chances of voids occurring...units are not necessarily 
designed to minimum standards but are built to a 
perceived average... an 'institutional specification' has 
evolved in the market which covers most of the detailed 
aspects of building construction..." (Henneberry,
1988:243-244)
This uniformity of development is described as providing predominantly 
warehouse type accommodation which does not easily accommodate 
manufacturing occupiers.
The strong influence of investor demand also results in only specific sectors 
such as modern office buildings, in specific locations, such as central
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business districts, benefiting from increases in the availability of long term 
capital financing. Thus new buildings will be developed in areas which are 
already economically active and for which investor and occupier demand is 
perceived by investors and developers as being strong. This leads ultimately 
to an increase in the unevenness of economic growth between regions.
Such uneven development is also affected by the increased globalisation of 
capital. This deregulation of the markets increased the mobility of capital 
allowing rapid withdrawals of funds from regions of the country and sectors of 
the economy which failed to provide sufficient returns. The government's 
objective was to increase the supply of capital for investment wherever the 
best returns could be realised. It was their intention that through the 
expansion of all forms of supply, economic recovery would ensure that the 
best returns were to be found within the UK. By expanding the availability of 
both long term and short term funding the commercial property market would 
provide space within which growth in the emerging sectors of the economy 
could take place.
Demand for office space and related commercial service accommodation 
increased in certain areas of the country. The City of London and the South 
East of England experienced steadily rising rental levels over the latter half of 
the 1980's in response to this increase in demand. Other regions did not 
benefit from the deregulation of this sector to quite the same extent. Figures 
4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show the disparity between the responses of the 
developers and occupiers of the south east of England and the north of 
England to these deregulation policies.
The deregulation of the stock exchange, marked by 'Big Bang' which took 
place on 27 October 1986 also formed a major part of the government's 
overall policy of deregulation. Incentives to increase share ownership were 
brought in for the first time, Personal Equity Plans with tax incentives were 
introduced, stamp duty on share dealing was reduced, fixed charges on
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share dealing were abolished and restrictive practices within the operation of 
the London Stock Exchange were removed.
These measures increased the supply of funds flowing into investment 
institutions in the UK thus increasing investor demand for ail investment 
media. The commercial property markets did not benefit from increased UK 
investor demand until 1987 and 1988. At this point a period of strong, 
demand led rental growth coupled with the uncertain interest rates and rising 
inflation which characterises the latter half of the 1980's, increased the 
popularity of property as an investment, particularly City office buildings. The 
result is a startling increase in net investment in commercial property by UK 
investment institutions between 1987 and 1988 (see Fig. 4.12).
The deregulation of the stock market encouraged property companies to 
raise finance through share issues (see Fig. 4.15).
Property 
Companies 
Capital Issues
Year £m
1986 1,490
1987 2,455
1988 796
1989 1,573
1990 322
Fig. 4.15
Source: IPD
This clearly opened a new avenue of development funding, both short and 
long term, for property companies, and represented an increase in the 
efficiency with which primary circuit capital could be turned into secondary 
circuit capital. It also illustrates the extent to which development companies 
were taking on the role of the investor in the development process and 
retaining completed developments. This affected supply in the same way as
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investors becoming more heavily involved in development affected supply.
By expanding their role the property companies increased their own ability to 
respond to increases in occupier demand thus increasing the adjustment rate 
of supply to demand.
By 1985 real interest rates were rising again but this factor was clearly 
outweighed by others in determining demand for short term funding. The 
changes made to the financial services sector and the capital markets 
increased the availability of both long term and short term funding 
arrangements and created greater flexibility within the roles of the different 
operators within the commercial development sector. Barras' adjustment rate 
was increased as the increasing involvement of investors in the development 
process increased the number of buildings being developed in response to 
rising occupier demand. Harvey's capital switching mechanism became more 
efficient as competition between lenders of short term finance increased and 
the capital markets reaped the operational benefits of deregulation. The 
importance of the increased availability of funding is remarked upon by Key 
et al., (1990);
"The development boom has been floated on a tide of 
loan financing, important elements of it from overseas 
banks, and much of it based on instruments of financial 
complexity defying classification as simple loan or equity 
funding. In real terms, the level of lending to the property 
industry now stands massively above that of the 1970's 
property boom. The second leg of development finance 
has been the stock market, as property companies took 
quick advantage of the rise in the market to issue new 
stock or to float new firms." (Key, et al., 1990:29)
The increased speed with which supply could be expanded led to high levels 
of development activity in the mid 1980's (see Fig. 4.1). However, investor 
demand did not increase at the same pace as development and the value of 
development in progress ultimately exceeded the amount of institutional 
money available to purchase completed projects;
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"Furthermore, the recent scale of institutional investment 
is nothing like sufficient to buy out present development 
projects, leaving the intriguing prospect of where the 
longer-term finance for these schemes is to come from."
(Nabarro, 1990:59)
The role of the supply side policies combined with expansionary monetary 
policy in the late 1980's encouraged this over expansion of development 
activity within the commercial property in this period and the resulting 
exaggeration of the commercial property market cycles. The easing of 
'bottlenecks' and supply constraints within the development finance process 
encouraged the exaggeration of the upswing in building and investment 
cycles within the commercial property markets and in the process 
fundamentally changed the nature of both short term and long term 
development funding in the UK.
The inadequacy of the commercial property markets in responding to a 
reduction in occupier demand for space due to the restricted availability of 
information, the unevenness or 'lumpiness' of capital investment in projects 
and the time lag inherent within the development process, was not changed. 
All the factors affecting supply contributed only to an increase in the efficiency 
with which supply could be increased leading to an inevitable exaggeration of 
the downswing in development activity in the early 1990's as the market 
mechanism responds to the excess supply.
The final section of this chapter looks at the third basic resource, labour. 
Theimpact on the commercial property markets of the government's 
restructuring of the labour market through supply side policies is discussed.
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Labour
The Thatcher Government undertook to restructure the labour market just as 
the land and capital markets were restructured. It was felt that labour 
legislation, the strength of the trade unions and the high level of personal 
direct taxation were restricting the supply of labour within the market, and 
increasing labour costs. Some of the restructuring which took place within 
this market was a direct result of the removal of supply constraints but by far 
the most significant factor within this particular area of deregulation, from the 
point of view of the property market, was the decline of the manufacturing 
sector as a mass employer. The impact this had on the commercial property 
market cycles was twofold:
i) a reduction in space requirements of all types in the early 1980's and
ii) significant changes in space requirements that emerged once the service 
sector began to generate economic growth in the mid 1980's.
The argument being advanced here is that the move away from 
manufacturing towards the service sector led to important changes in the 
specification and location of space required by the commercial sector.
Supply side policies aimed at increasing flexibility within the labour force, both 
in terms of location and skills, inevitably led to changes in the pattern of 
occupier demand. Existing buildings did not cater for the new occupier 
requirements and speculative commercial development proved to be 
insensitive to newly emerging occupier needs in the first half of the decade. 
New development would often fail to provide suitable buildings particularly in 
terms of the accommodation of new technology and building services.
In accelerating decline in the manufacturing sector the Thatcher Government 
reduced the level of demand for commercial floorspace in the early 1980's. 
Industrial space that had accommodated large manufacturing plants and 
office space that had housed the administrative functions of the 
manufacturing industry were no longer required. In the short term this 
increased the available supply of office and industrial space as companies 
within the manufacturing sector were closed. Martin refers to this as the 'slim
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down1 and 'shake out' in British manufacturing over the early part of the 
Thatcher Government;
"The reality of 'slim down' and 'shake out' has consisted 
mainly in the reduction of labour costs by cutting jobs and 
closing down productive capacity. For many firms, 
extensive cost cutting has not been possible or has 
proved insufficient to prevent bankruptcy, with the result 
that the numbers of company liquidations in 
manufacturing has reached an all-time high..." (Martin, 
1986:31)
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The natural progress of the UK economy led to changes in the pattern of 
employment. Employment in manufacturing fell from 7,129,000 in March 
1979 to 5,169,000 in March 1989 (see fig. 4.16). The restructuring of the 
labour market allowed the economy to move relatively quickly from 
manufacturing to services. The reduction of trade union power and collective 
bargaining encouraged short term contracts, contracting out of work and the 
widespread use of casual labour. This increased flexibility was reflected in 
changes in the location and form of buildings required by occupiers. Large 
buildings designed to house a specific production process were no longer 
appropriate as workforces became smaller but, equally as importantly, very 
flexible both in size and in their functions. The expansion of service sector 
companies increased demand for office space but also increased demand for
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more flexible space which could accommodate office, research and 
development, storage and distribution functions.
A shortage existed in the supply of appropriate space and the rental value of 
specific types of buildings began to rise encouraging new construction orders 
to be placed. This change in the type of space demanded highlighted a 
shortfall in the availability of suitable accommodation. The resulting pressure 
of demand increased rents and encouraged new development in new 
locations.
In exploring the implications of this increase in demand from the service 
sector in terms of space requirements, it is useful to establish a definition of 
the term 'services'. If Marshall and Wood's (1992) working definition of 
services as "activities relatively detached from material production" (Marshall 
and Wood, 1992:1255) is adopted it is possible to identify some 
characteristics which would apply to the locational requirements of space 
required by this sector. Services are more closely tied to markets than to 
raw materials; they display agglomeration tendencies which lead to locational 
shifts resulting in changes to the patterns of development within regions. 
Flexible accommodation for small, skilled and semi-skilled labour forces was 
now required in locations close to transport networks and developing 
markets. The shortage in the supply of this type of space in such areas in 
the mid 1980's, following the paucity of development activity during the
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recessionary early 1980's, gave rise to upwards pressure on rental values.
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Figures 4 .17 and 4.18 illustrate such regional differences in demand for both 
office and industrial space. The East Midlands and the North W est could not 
compete with the W est Midlands and the South East in terms of occupier 
demand as expressed by rental growth, following the decline in the 
manufacturing sector.
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Marshall and Wood (1992) emphasise the importance of the impact of 
contracting out on space requirements and its impact in terms of 
agglomeration economies. Service sector firms, particularly financial and 
producer service firms, tend to form spatial clusters by locating in proximity to
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the head quarters or divisional head quarters of firms from all sectors. This 
clearly encourages producer services, (the sector seen to be filling the void 
left by the manufacturing sector in the mid to late 1980's), to locate close to 
metropolitan centres. A region which attracts an expanding sector will also 
be attractive as a location to the companies providing contracted out services 
thereby exacerbating the unequal spread of economic growth, particularly 
through employment opportunities, between regions.
The factors discussed above relate to the location of space demanded by 
occupiers following the restructuring of the labour markets. It is equally as 
important to consider the impact of these changes in terms of the type of 
accommodation for which demand would be rising as the service sector 
sought suitable space within which to expand.
Marshall, et al. (1987) utilise the minimum list headings of the various 
categories of service sector employment in their efforts to establish a 
definition for the service sector. They accept that a core group emerges 
from the wide ranging classifications, which seem to feature regularly in work 
in this area. These include: market research, professional and scientific 
services, advertising and research and development.
Although this is by no means suggested as a definitive list, it provides some 
guidance as to the type of occupier demand which would have risen over the 
mid to late 1980's. The rise in available industrial floorspace which resulted 
from the decline of the manufacturing sector would not provide suitable 
accommodation for these expanding areas of employment. The requirement 
was for space that could accommodate some level of research and 
development, storage facilities, office facilities and, often, studio space. A 
great deal of this flexibility could have been accommodated within the existing 
use class definitions and GDO but it was felt that the introduction of a new 
business use class B1 would more effectively expand supply of this type of 
space. (The introduction of Use Class B1 has already been discussed in 
relation to its impact on the supply of developed space.)
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In their discussion of the location of producer services Marshall et al. (1987) 
find, unsurprisingly, that the south eastern region of the UK has a larger than 
average share of service related employment, compared to other UK regions. 
What is perhaps more interesting here, is that they find the distribution of 
'independent' producer service industry employment largely responsible for 
the uneven spread. The contracted out producer services were accounting 
for a significant proportion of employment and, therefore, a significant level of 
demand.
Both these factors point to an increase in demand for business space to 
accommodate the labour force of the new expanding sectors of the economy. 
The inner city locations of the traditional industries were vacated by business 
occupiers as improved technology and transport links allowed a level of 
decentralisation by these types of occupier. Demand for business space in 
rural locations within the south east and west of London expanded ahead of 
supply as the service sector expanded from the mid 1980's onwards. The 
shortfall in supply of this type of space gave rise to real rental growth 
occurring almost simultaneously with relaxations in development control and 
an increase in the supply of capital funding. Thus the changes in occupier 
demand arising from economic restructuring provided the increased demand 
which triggered the exaggerated levels of rental growth in the late 1980's in 
response to low levels of supply. The increased rate of adjustment of supply 
in response to an increase in demand, led to the development industry's 
reaction also becoming exaggerated and construction far in excess of that 
required to fulfil demand being initiated.
The mass unemployment which accompanied the decline of the 
manufacturing sector reduced the level of real disposable income within the 
economy and in doing so reduced demand for retail accommodation. 
Recovery in this sector was rather more cautious than recovery in the 
industrial and office sectors but reflects the changes in occupier requirements 
in the office and industrial sectors which did not affect the retail market in the 
same way. Development activity in the retail sector was equally as low as in 
the office and industrial sector in the early 1980's but existing supply was able
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to satisfy initial rising demand levels in the mid 1980's. It is not until the late 
1980's that the restricted supply of retail property leads to strong upwards 
pressure on rents and a sharp rise in retail development activity.
Slow development during the deep recession of the early 1980's restricted 
the level of supply within all commercial property sectors by the mid to late 
1980's. The expansion in the supply of development land and capital funding 
identified in the previous two sections encouraged an exaggerated response 
from the development industry to this pressure on supply. These factors 
culminated in the 'explosive' peak to the development cycle which can be 
seen in 1988 and 1989, leading to the over supply of all types of commercial 
space which created such a deep recession within the property industry in the 
early 1990's.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This work concentrates quite specifically on a particular period of time and is 
concerned primarily with the government policies and issues of that period. 
This final chapter begins by summarising the main arguments of the thesis 
before drawing conclusions.
The argument presented throughout this thesis has been twofold:
i) That the macroeconomic and supply side policies introduced by the 
Thatcher Government served to exaggerate existing cycles and trends within 
the UK commercial property markets. The influence of these policies was felt 
through changes in the demand for buildings, both in terms of volume and 
type, and through changes in the supply of buildings.
ii) That the macroeceonomic policies implemented by the Thatcher 
Government represent a response to the inevitable long term restructuring 
taking place within the economy and that the supply side policies were aimed 
at capitalising on the accelerated restructuring brought about by the 
macroeconomic policies.
This final section clarifies the many strands contained within the argument 
and identifies some of the questions the work raises.
Conclusions
The existence of cycles within the commercial property markets is well 
established and provides some common ground for the exploration of 
relationships between these markets and the economy. The timing of these 
cycles is predictable to a limited extent and should therefore be 
acknowledged in the formulation of government policy. The cycles studied in 
this (and other) work display characteristics that are regularly identifiable and 
which can be listed as follows:
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♦the building cycle is relatively autonomous from the economy. This is 
born out by the evidence provided by the market and supported by it's 
nine year duration.
♦the building cycle tends to either amplify or mute periods of economic 
recession and expansion. This is also born out by the evidence.
♦The demand cycle within the commercial property markets is less 
autonomous and will be initiated by the four year (or eighteen quarter) 
business cycle.
♦The amplification of the demand cycle will be dependent upon the 
position of the building cycle as demand rises or falls.
♦Both the building and demand cycles are affected by the investment 
cycle which is linked to longer term trends of economic development. 
The increasing efficiency of the economy and technological progress 
allow the investment cycle to retain an upwards trajectory around 
which the investment cycle fluctuates and which triggers both building 
activity and occupier demand.
This work argues that these cycles are affected by the imperfections of the 
commercial property markets and by government policy. Some aspects of 
government policy during the 1979 - 1990 period were significantly different 
to policy followed over the preceding post-war period. The importance of 
supply side policies increased within this government's programme and, 
although the nature of macroeconomic policy did not change significantly, the 
order of priority within the major macroeconomic themes did change.
The Thatcher Government's deflationary policies were not tempered by a 
commitment to maintain full employment and so went much further than 
previous government initiatives of a similar nature had been able. The strong 
opposition these policies faced from both politicians and economists in 1981 
tends to support the argument that the strength of the government's 
commitment to these economic changes and the longevity of the deflationary
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policies was unexpected. These unusually strong deflationary measures 
extended the economic recession of the early 1980's and the concurrent 
trough in developer activity. This led to a shortage of in the supply of new 
buildings which provided the foundations for the exaggeration of the upswing, 
both in the economy and the commercial property markets in the late 1980's.
The extended recessionary period also saw technological developments 
being more widely adopted within the economy. This is a phenomenon 
commonly associated with periods of economic decline as firms seek to 
become more efficient and economise in order to retain a competitive 
advantage and a profit margin. This changed the nature of demand for 
buildings quite substantially, resulting in occupier demand in the mid 1980's 
being unsatisfied by the buildings designed and developed prior to this much 
wider utilisation of technological equipment and facilities.
The government's reflationary economic policies in the latter half of the 
decade actively encouraged economic growth through increasing the capacity 
and efficiency of the economy. In particular the service sector industries were 
provided with the resources for technological change and expansion through 
supply side initiatives. Thus in the latter half of the decade demand from 
occupiers and investors increased rapidly as capital and labour resources 
became increasingly accessible. The removal of restrictions to trading on 
the London stock market and the expansion of credit availability through the 
removal of restrictions on the activities of building societies and banks 
substantially changed and extended the supply of capital as a resource. The 
increased developer activity these factors encouraged was facilitated by 
changes in planning policy and the development control system.
The building cycle reached a peak in 1990. The volume of construction 
began to fall, coinciding with the beginning of an economic recession. The 
severity of the 1990's recession illustrates the building cycle exaggerating the 
impact of a recession rather than protecting an economy from it. The 
oversupply of built structures which became so evident from 1990 onwards
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significantly reduced the level of development activity, adding to the effects of 
the economic recession. In his assessment of building patterns in London 
Ball (1994) emphasises the importance of the autonomy of the building cycle 
within the economy. His suggestion is that;
"Building could be said to have protected London from 
the worst of the early 1980's recession but exaggerated 
the slump of the early 1990's." (Ball, 1994:15)
The evidence produced here conforms to this view.
The ease with which the commercial development market can be entered and 
exited must be taken into account in the study of any policy aimed at 
expanding development and increasing investment. In an economic climate 
of expanding capital funding sources and increased competition between 
lenders for customers few restrictions exist to entry into the development 
market. The imperfections of this market make supply slow to respond to the 
pressures of demand in the short term mainly because of the development 
lag. However, in the medium term the supply of new buildings can increase 
very suddenly when a bulge in the level of new building starts driven by an 
expansion of the number of operators in the market, becomes a bulge in the 
level of completions.
Encouraging developers into the market would have had less effect without 
the support of the simultaneous deregulation of the development control 
system. The government's determination to remove what it saw as restrictive 
practices within this system effectively increased the supply of land with 
planning permission. This increase in supply was also due in some part to 
the expansion of the entrepreneurial role of trading in land for which planning 
permission had been obtained, facilitated by the removal of DLT and the 
1975 Community Land Act.
These arguments focus on the impact the monetary and supply side policies 
of the Thatcher Government had on cycles which exist within the UK
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commercial property markets. However, it is important to draw conclusions 
which reflect the broader economic circumstances within which these 
government initiatives and policy implementations took place. The changes 
in the property markets which have been identified occurred within the 
context of major changes within the economy as a whole as identified in 
Chapter Two. Some of this economic upheaval arose from continuing cycles 
of technological change and development which particularly affect 
industrialised economies. The important point to establish here is that the 
government macroeconomic policy represented a response to the changing 
economic circumstances created by the longer term cyclical changes within 
the economy which by the 1970's and 1980's were affecting the UK 
manufacturing sector.
If one acknowledges that the economic and political environment which 
maintained Fordism as a system of capital accumulation underwent a period 
of change over the 1970's and effectively ended with the incoming 
Conservative Government in 1979, it is unsurprising that the economic 
indicators show signs of uncertainty and change over this period. What is 
more important in the context of this work is the extremity of the change in the 
indicators.
Two separate points need to be identified here. The Thatcher Government's 
macroeconomic policies served to accelerate the process of 
deindustrialisation which was restructuring the UK economy. These policies 
were causal, but it is important to be clear that they caused an acceleration of 
an inevitable process, not the restructuring itself. The second point which 
arises from this is that the Thatcher Government's supply side policies 
represent a set of reactions to the accelerated restructuring process.
Through these supply side policies the government sought to provide the 
correct environment for the excess capital and labour capacity brought about 
by the process of industrial restructuring, to be re-employed by the tertiary 
sector of the economy.
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The supply side policies were formed and implemented as a means of 
responding to and benefiting from some of the effects of accelerating this 
long term process of deindustrialisation within the UK economy. Without the 
introduction of quite substantial supply side incentives the service sector 
would have been unable to capitalise upon the decline of the manufacturing 
sector and flourish as is it did in the latter half of the 1980's. The removal of 
restrictions to the flow of capital, labour and land was crucial to the speedy 
transfer of the UK economy from the secondary to the tertiary sector.
The arguments made within this work have not sought to establish or identify 
any formal relationship between the markets under scrutiny and government 
policy. The definition of such a relationship would be fraught with difficulty 
and detract from the true objective of the task in hand. The difficulties which 
surround the identification or definition of a relationship between the property 
markets and the economy should not, however, preclude investigation of the 
evidence provided by the markets. By identifying the overriding economic 
developments of the period and studying the position of the property markets 
within the context of these developments it is possible to gain a clearer 
understanding of how the commercial property markets respond to the wider 
economy within which they exist. Through developing a greater 
understanding of this it should be possible to identify some of the implications 
economic changes have for the commercial property markets. This should 
allow more accurate anticipation of the effects building and investment cycles 
will have on the economy even if it is not possible, through this type of work, 
to quantify or measure those effects.
This work has tackled a relatively broad subject base in that it addresses 
three commercial property markets and a ten year time span. Its value lies 
within this broad base through the identification and interpretation of patterns 
and cycles within the markets being investigated. These can be explored 
within the context of the wider economy and a specific and identifiable 
political strategy without a specific or quantifiable relationship of cause and 
effect necessarily being defined. Arguments have been established which
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draw on other more specific areas of research in an effort to identify 
characteristics within the commercial property markets which might have a 
predictable response to government policy.
The overall process of deindustrialisation forms a stage in the development of 
the UK economy. It was a period of transference from domination by 
secondary industries to domination by tertiary industries which was 
independent of the policies of any government. Similar processes were 
affecting many industrialised economies at around the same time. The new 
policies brought in by the Conservative Government in 1979 did not bring 
about these changes but accelerated the overall process of 
deindustrialisation which had so clearly already begun to affect the UK 
economy.
The changes in demand for space which emerged from this restructuring 
process form part of the longer pattern of 'catch-up' described by Ball (1994). 
Ball relates the process of 'catch-up' to office development in the City of 
London. He uses the changes in the level of building activity in response to 
changes in the activities and requirements of City based occupiers as an 
example, but it also applies to the changes in the patterns of demand for 
industrial buildings and the changes in retail development patterns. As the 
electronics industry flourished through the developments made in 
micro-processor technology the requirements of industrial space changed.
UK industry sought to 'catch-up' with these developments and in the process 
changed the pattern of demand for industrial buildings in this country. 
Innovations were made in the design of shopping centres in the USA and 
were developed to take advantage of changes in shopping patterns. UK 
developers and retailers later sought to 'catch-up' with these advances and 
the pattern of retail development in the UK changed, particularly in the 1960's 
and 1970's (although the demand for retail space was not altered as radically 
as that for office and industrial space).
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If these changes are considered in the context of the effects of the building 
cycle described above, predictable responses within the economy can be 
identified. The changes in demand placed pressure on supply. Pipeline 
supply was low following the downswing in the building cycle which had been 
reinforced by the discouraging economic policies of the first half of the 
decade. The increase in occupier demand increased rental levels thereby 
increasing investor and occupier demand for land and buildings. The 
predictable response of a rise in price following rising demand and restricted 
supply coincided with the upswing in the building cycle and amplified the 
strength of the upswing by creating further encouragement for developer 
activity.
The changing space requirements also reflected the UK economy 'catching 
up' with the technological advancements that had been made. The short 
term increase in the demand for space which had been a response to the 
initial adoption of modern technologies by companies was gradually 
transforming into a longer term reduction in space requirements as functions 
were more efficiently automated. The amount of floorspace required per 
worker tended to increase through these advancements whilst the number of 
workers fell leading to an overall long term reduction in demand for space, 
and the characteristics of the space required also changed as has been 
discussed above.
The demand for semi-skilled and skilled labour increased as the economy 
became more and more dominated by the tertiary sector. A new set of 
locational priorities was becoming established as companies no longer 
sought economies of scale through maintaining a large workforce on a single 
inner city site, close to a supply of labour and raw materials. The new 
locational priorities were proximity to a market, a more skilled workforce, 
access to Europe and high quality transport and data communication links.
The evidence produced here, and elsewhere, highlights changes in the 
patterns of occupier and investor demand. The trend towards
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decentralisation and the resulting problems of inner city decline have been 
identified by governments but solutions have been implemented which pay 
little attention to the economic forces generating the trend. Policies which 
seek to regenerate inner city areas by supplying high quality space with 
introductory low prices fail to acknowledge the importance of the changing 
criteria upon which location decisions are being made. Physical and cultural 
infrastructure, communication facilities and proximity to markets are 
demanded by the producer and consumer services industries. Technological 
advances are making geographical factors less important in location criteria.
Economic development necessitates the regeneration of urban areas as their 
function within the economy changes. Public works are required in order to 
facilitate the physical and economic restructuring of regions which are 
experiencing radical change. The development of the motorway network in 
the 1970's and the regeneration of dockland areas in the 1980's are 
examples of such public works. The deindustrialisation process described 
above, fundamentally changed the function of many regions, particularly inner 
city areas, leading to a requirement for substantial economic regeneration. 
The efficacy of property led urban regeneration as the solution to these 
problems is becoming less certain in light of the changing locational criteria, 
particularly as the environmental and physical constraints of the regional 
inner cities are becoming increasingly problematic.
The availability of a pool of labour also moved down the list of criteria in 
making a locational decision. The restructuring of the labour market, the 
decline of traditional manufacturing industry and the improved transport 
infrastructure has removed the link between a company or industry and a 
resident local workforce. The proximity of similar companies or industries 
which will provide markets has increased in importance. This has further 
implications for property led urban regeneration. The cities most in need of 
regeneration are those worst affected by the manufacturing and industrial 
decline brought about by economic restructuring. These areas are 
characterised by high levels of unskilled unemployed and little existing
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industry. The development of flagship buildings does not change these 
characteristics and will therefore do little to create long term economic growth 
particularly if building completion coincides with the peak in the building 
cycles and an economic downswing.
The increased flexibility which has been introduced to the labour market, 
particularly in white collar sector employment, is simultaneously forcing 
changes in the perception of credit worthiness. It is also bringing about 
changes in the traditional concept of employment being based on the 
purchase of a workers time. The increasing use of services on a 
subcontracted or consultative basis is bringing increasing flexibility into 
working hours, working locations and working practices. This is being aided 
by rapid advances in communication and information technology which make 
the physical presence of a person in a particular location unnecessary. This 
has far reaching implications for the demand for commercial space.
Locational priorities in occupier demand are changing as it becomes less 
essential to be situated in city centres and central business districts and more 
important to locate in an acceptable social, cultural and physical environment. 
The volume of space demanded will fall as fewer people have to be 
accommodated in an office environment, particularly on a full time basis. As 
the economies of all industrialised and industrialising countries continue to 
progress it is important that the implications for the development, investment 
and occupation markets of the commercial property sector are specifically 
identified and catered for. This is particularly important given the large 
allocation of capital resources buildings demand and that they are becoming 
increasingly expensive to develop and maintain.
The impact of the restructuring of the capital markets over the 1980's was 
seen within the stock market crash much earlier than the property market 
crash. Certain similarities can be identified between the rising equities 
markets of 1985 - 1987 and rising rental values of 1986 - 1990. The 
increase in the level of stock market trading arose as a result of the 
deregulation of the stock exchange and the financial markets. The increase
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in developer activity and resulting over supply of development space was a 
result of the deregulation of the planning system and the funding markets.
Policies were implemented in the 1988 and 1989 Budgets in response to the 
stock market crash which failed to acknowledge the importance of the 
relationship between the commercial property markets and the level of 
aggregate demand within the economy. The government's fear of the crash 
producing a 1930's style economic depression led them to implement strong 
reflationary economic policies with little regard for the consequences in other 
areas of the economy particularly the short term commercial property cycles. 
The UK government was not alone in it's fears following the crash, nor in the 
policies implemented, a broadly similar response can be identified in the USA 
which also suffered over expansion in the commercial property development 
sector.
These policies also failed to acknowledge the existence of a relatively 
predictable and autonomous building cycle which was due to peak in or 
around 1990. The reflationary policies, particularly in combination with the 
freeing up of land, labour and capital markets through the deregulation 
programme, encouraged developer activity at an expansionary point in the 
cycle leading to the exaggeration of the peak of the building cycle in 1990. 
This apparent lack of understanding of certain characteristics of the 
commercial property markets encouraged an increase in development activity 
which has had more lasting effects in terms of infrastructure and investment 
than could have been expected.
The size of the projects which can be involved both in financial and physical 
terms, sets the commercial property sector apart from other sectors of the 
economy in terms of the impact over supply can have on the rest of the 
economy. This increases the importance of accurate forecasting of the level 
of pipeline supply and forthcoming demand particularly as oversupply will 
result in a devaluation of substantial capital assets, discouraging further
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investment. The evidence produced by this work suggests that too little 
attention has been paid to this aspect of the commercial property markets.
Improving knowledge and understanding of the commercial property markets 
requires consistent commercial property market data of a type which is not 
currently available. Consistent and rigorous rental data is provided by the 
industry on a relatively ad hoc but nonetheless useful basis but there exists a 
great paucity of information relating to supply, particularly of commercial 
buildings. This lack of information contributed to the extent of the 
overreaction of the markets to strong occupier demand in 1987, 1988 and 
1989.
The increasingly widespread recognition of this problem has led to it being 
addressed with great vigour in terms of rental data for investment buildings. 
Although this is clearly the market which has the most accessible data 
sources it is not necessarily the most important in increasing the efficiency 
with which the commercial property markets operate. The most damaging 
deficiency lies within market-wide data relating particularly to forthcoming 
supply and completion dates. More consistent data would enable more 
accurate forecasting of the level of forthcoming supply and would also enable 
clearer conclusions to be drawn regarding the transfer of space from primary 
to secondary markets and from one use class to another. Without a 
significant improvement in the availability and consistency of this type of data 
these markets will become less efficient in comparison to other markets.
This work has argued that government policy over the 1979 - 1990 period 
served to exaggerate existing trends within the building and demand cycles of 
the commercial property markets. Whereas Ball (1994) argues that the 
building cycle is independent of the economic cycle and can protect an 
economy from recession, this work argues that government policy can serve 
to exaggerate the building cycle itself. Four possible results will be produced. 
An upswing in the building cycle will either exaggerate an economic upswing 
or protect an economy from the worst effects of an economic downswing. A 
downswing in the building cycle will exaggerate any economic downswing it
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coincides with and mute an economic recovery. These patterns will be 
exacerbated by government policy which encourages or reduces the level of 
development activity at any point in the development cycle.
Evidence of these tendencies can be seen throughout the decade being 
studied here. The low level of building activity in the early 1980's contributed 
to the depth of that recession and slowed economic recovery. The upswing 
in the building cycle in the latter half of the decade reinforced the effects of 
other economic factors to contribute to the over expansion of supply of 
commercial space. The rapid increase in building activity between 1983 and 
1988 which has been identified and discussed in this work, has not been 
attributed simply to the building cycle. The building cycle, government policy 
and changes in the demand for space which have emerged from economic 
restructuring and technological change have all been identified as important 
factors.
Clearly links exist between conditions within the economy as a whole and the 
processes of development, investment and occupation of commercial 
buildings. Long term changes were occurring within the economy through the 
restructuring process but, importantly, more immediate changes were 
effected by the government's policies, aimed at hastening the restructuring 
process. The policies affected occupier, investor and developer demand for 
land in the short term thereby exaggerating short term cycles within these 
markets.
The long term changes in themselves can be attributed to economic 
development and progress. The speed with which the service sector 
expanded once it took over from manufacturing and the acceptance of the 
resulting mass unemployment of unskilled workers, particularly in the 
industrial regions of the country, can be attributed to the policies of the 
Thatcher Government. The two factors occurring simultaneously led to rapid 
growth in demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour in areas of the country 
which were becoming dominated by consumer and producer service
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industries and oversupply of unskilled labour in areas of the country 
traditionally dominated by industrial and manufacturing sectors.
In implementing the programme of deregulation the Thatcher Government 
paid little attention to the likely responses of market operators to increases in 
competition within the markets for the three major resources. The overriding 
objective of an expansion in the supply of these resources to encourage 
economic growth was achieved but the longer term implications of the ways 
in which participants within these markets were likely to react to increased 
competition seems to have been side stepped. The resulting changes in the 
operation of these markets through the removal of perceived restrictions to 
supply go much further than simply increasing the availability of capital 
funding, labour and land. In combination with changing technology they 
increased the speed with which the development market could respond to 
increased demand whilst also fundamentally changing the nature of demand.
No similar change was made to the limited scope the commercial property 
markets have to respond to a reduction in demand or to over supply. The 
most important imperfections within the commercial property markets in the 
context of these market changes are the time lag between increases in 
supply being initiated and supply within the market actually expanding and 
the lack of reliable and universally available data about the market. Both 
factors directly contributed to the over supply of built space these markets are 
still experiencing.
The imperfections of the property market which make the collation and 
publication of data difficult also render it slow to respond to increased 
pressures of demand encouraging rapid inflation of rental levels. The 
reduction in pipeline supply has already been identified as providing a 
foundation for the exaggeration of the upswing in the commercial property 
markets in the 1980's. Following the foregoing discussion of industrial 
restructuring, this assertion can be refined to the argument that the reduction 
in pipeline supply resulting from macroeconomic policies was a symptom of
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cyclical changes taking place within the wider economy. These changes and, 
importantly, the government's policy response to them formed a foundation 
for the exaggeration of the upswing in the short term commercial property 
cycles.
The scale of the commercial property boom of the 1980's was unusual in 
intensity for the UK. It is too simplistic to attribute responsibility for it solely to 
the policies of the Thatcher Government particularly as booms of similar 
intensity were experienced in other industrialised economies. Furthermore, 
given that the commercial property markets do not operate within a political 
and economic vacuum it would be illogical to suggest that they are not 
affected by the economic situation within which they are operating. Thus it 
seems that the most logical conclusion is that these markets are affected by 
economic changes brought about both by government policy and through the 
evolutionary process affecting the industrialised economy. Ball suggests 
that, "Systematic forces linking property markets to broader economic 
development can more convincingly explain what happened." (Ball,
1994:671). This work suggests that it is not simply the broader economic 
development but a combination of that and government policy which best 
explains the exaggeration of these cycles. Furthermore I would go on to 
clarify this further by suggesting that a differentiation can and should be made 
between the government's macroeconomic policy response to longer term 
economic development, and its supply side policy response to the 
accelerated changes within the economy which were brought about. The 
reactive supply side policy initiatives allowed the economy to capitalise in the 
short term upon the accelerated longer term changes brought about by the 
government's macroeconomic policy.
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Appendix A: Time Series Data
Money Supply
G D P @ F A C ‘ G D P ®  F A C T O R M O N E Y  G D P  @ M O N E Y  G D P  @
D a t e R P I I C H P C O S T ( S / A ) C O S T ( S / A ) M A R K E T  P R I C E S M A R K E T  P R I C E S P S B R
( ' 7 7 = 1 0 0 ) ’ 8 5 P R I C E S ( ’ 7 7 = 1 0 0 ) ( S / A ) ( S / A ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 ( £ B )
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 6 9 1 6 1 0 0 3 4 6 2 3 1 0 0 1 . 0 0 1
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 0 . 0 0
J u n e 6 6 6 1 6 9 9 . 5 5 1 6 7 6 7 2 9 3 5 8 8 9 1 0 3 . 6 5 6 5 2 8 8 9 7 2 . 0 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 6 9 5 8 1 0 0 . 0 6 2 7 6 5 2 6 3 7 0 2 6 1 0 6 . 9 4 0 4 7 3 0 9 6 0 . 9 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 3 . 1 3
D e c e m b e r 6 7 9 2 0 1 0 1 . 5 0 0 3 8 8 5 5 3 8 5 2 8 1 1 1 . 2 7 8 6 2 9 8 1 3 1 . 9 6
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 8 0 8 8 1 0 1 . 7 5 1 4 4 9 5 8 3 9 9 8 8 1 1 5 . 4 9 5 4 7 9 8 8 3 0 . 5 9 9
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 7 . 7 1
J u n e 6 8 8 4 2 1 0 2 . 8 7 8 2 3 5 4 4 1 6 5 5 1 2 0 . 3 1 0 1 9 8 4 2 3 2 . 2 1 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 9 3 2 9 1 0 3 . 6 0 6 0 1 3 5 1 4 2 7 7 7 1 2 3 . 5 5 0 8 1 8 8 2 2 . 2 9 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 1 1 . 4 4
D e c e m b e r 7 0 0 3 8 1 0 4 . 6 6 5 5 5 0 8 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 2 7 . 4 1 2 4 1 3 7 1 3 3 . 2 4 3
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 9 2 5 5 1 0 3 . 4 9 5 4 2 7 1 4 5 2 1 6 1 3 0 . 5 9 5 2 6 9 0 4 1 1 . 4 7 3
A p r i l
M a y 1 1 8 . 8 2
J u n e 7 2 0 2 3 1 0 7 . 6 3 1 9 5 6 4 8 4 8 6 0 1 1 4 0 . 3 7 2 0 0 7 0 4 7 3 . 3 8 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 1 1 8 4 1 0 6 . 3 7 8 1 4 5 7 3 5 1 0 2 9 1 4 7 . 3 8 4 6 8 6 4 8 3 . 7 9 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 3 0 . 8 1
D e c e m b e r 7 1 5 9 5 1 0 6 . 9 9 2 3 4 8 6 2 5 3 4 1 6 1 5 4 . 2 7 8 9 4 7 5 2 3 . 9 9 5
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 0 8 4 6 1 0 5 . 8 7 3 0 3 4 8 5 5 5 5 9 8 1 6 0 . 5 8 1 1 1 6 5 9 9 0 . 7 4 6
A p r i l
M a y 1 4 4 . 8 5
J u n e 7 0 0 4 4 1 0 4 . 6 7 4 5 1 7 3 1 5 7 0 7 9 1 6 4 . 8 5 8 6 1 9 9 9 2 3 . 8 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 9 2 0 8 1 0 3 . 4 2 5 1 8 9 7 9 5 8 8 9 6 1 7 0 . 1 0 6 5 7 6 5 5 3 4 . 1 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 5 0 . 8 5
D e c e m b e r 6 8 1 7 9 1 0 1 . 8 8 7 4 4 0 9 7 6 0 2 7 9 1 7 4 . 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 6 3 . 0 7
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 8 0 7 6 1 0 1 . 7 3 3 5 1 6 6 5 6 1 5 4 4 1 7 7 . 7 5 4 6 7 1 7 5 1 . 8 4
A p r i l
M a y 1 6 1 . 8 5
J u n e 6 8 5 5 4 1 0 2 . 4 4 7 8 4 5 0 6 6 2 6 9 3 1 8 1 . 0 7 3 2 7 4 9 9 1 6 . 2 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 9 1 1 9 1 0 3 . 2 9 2 1 8 7 2 2 6 4 5 0 7 1 8 6 . 3 1 2 5 6 6 7 9 1 3 . 0 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 6 8 . 8 9
D e c e m b e r 6 9 3 2 4 1 0 3 . 5 9 8 5 4 1 4 5 6 6 1 9 0 1 9 1 . 1 7 3 4 9 7 3 8 6 - 0 . 5 2 9
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G D P ®  F A C ' G D P © F A C T O R M O N E Y  G D P  @ M O N E Y  G D P  @
D a t e R P I I C H P C O S T ( S / A ) C O S T ( S / A ) M A R K E T  P R I C E S M A R K E T  P R I C E S P S B R
( ‘ 7 7 = 1 0 0 ) ' 8 5 P R I C E S ( ' 7 7 = 1 0 0 ) ( S / A ) ( S / A ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 ( £ B )
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 9 3 0 3 1 0 3 . 5 6 7 1 5 8 8 3 6 7 5 6 0 1 9 5 . 1 3 0 4 0 4 6 4 4 0 . 0 1 6
A p r i l
M a y 1 7 7 . 2 0
J u n e 7 0 0 8 7 1 0 4 . 7 3 8 7 7 6 9 7 6 9 0 2 8 1 9 9 . 3 7 0 3 6 0 7 4 3 1 . 6 4
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 0 0 7 2 1 0 4 . 7 1 6 3 6 0 8 1 7 0 3 1 3 2 0 3 . 0 8 1 7 6 6 4 5 6 1 . 7 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 7 9 . 4 6
D e c e m b e r 7 0 3 8 2 1 0 5 . 1 7 9 6 2 8 . 1 9 7 2 0 7 3 2 0 8 . 1 6 5 0 9 2 5 6 9 1 . 5 6
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 1 7 7 4 1 0 7 . 2 5 9 8 4 8 1 7 7 4 2 7 7 2 1 4 . 5 3 0 8 0 3 2 2 3 4 . 3 4
A p r i l
M a y 1 8 3 . 7 6
J u n e 7 2 3 1 6 1 0 8 . 0 6 9 8 1 8 8 8 7 4 8 5 2 2 1 6 . 1 9 1 5 4 8 9 7 1 . 7 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 2 8 3 3 1 0 8 . 8 4 2 4 2 9 3 1 7 6 6 5 1 2 2 1 . 3 8 7 5 1 6 9 6 8 2 . 7 8
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 8 8 . 1 7
D e c e m b e r 7 3 4 9 1 1 0 9 . 8 2 5 7 5 1 6 9 7 8 6 6 8 2 2 7 . 2 1 3 1 2 4 2 2 4 2 . 6 7
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 4 1 1 4 1 1 0 . 7 5 6 7 6 9 6 8 7 9 6 1 7 2 2 9 . 9 5 4 0 7 6 7 7 2 . 0 1
A p r i l
M a y 1 9 3 . 1 6
J u n e 7 3 4 0 8 1 0 9 . 7 0 1 7 1 5 5 8 8 0 6 6 2 2 3 2 . 9 7 2 3 0 1 6 4 9 3 . 3 1
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 3 6 1 4 1 1 0 . 0 0 9 5 6 4 2 3 8 1 4 2 6 2 3 5 . 1 7 8 9 2 7 3 0 3 2 . 8
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 . 4 6
D e c e m b e r 7 4 4 6 2 1 1 1 . 2 7 6 8 2 4 6 8 8 3 5 6 1 2 4 1 . 3 4 5 3 4 8 4 6 8 2 . 7
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 5 7 4 2 1 1 3 . 1 8 9 6 7 0 6 3 8 6 2 2 4 2 4 9 . 0 3 6 7 6 7 4 6 7 - 0 . 1
A p r i l
M a y 2 0 6 . 9 3
J u n e 7 6 9 7 2 1 1 5 . 0 2 7 7 9 6 0 4 8 8 6 1 4 2 5 5 . 9 3 9 6 9 3 2 6 7 2 . 6
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 6 8 8 4 1 1 4 . 8 9 6 2 8 7 8 8 8 9 8 8 0 2 5 9 . 5 9 6 2 2 2 1 6 4 2 . 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 0 8 . 2 5
D e c e m b e r 7 7 2 5 1 1 1 5 . 4 4 4 7 3 6 6 8 9 1 4 9 8 2 6 4 . 2 6 9 4 1 6 2 8 4 2
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 8 1 7 5 1 1 6 . 8 2 5 5 7 2 3 6 9 3 0 6 5 2 6 8 . 7 9 5 3 0 9 4 7 6 - 1 . 9
A p r i l
M a y 2 1 2 . 4 4
J u n e 7 9 1 5 4 1 1 8 . 2 8 8 6 0 0 6 3 9 4 8 4 6 2 7 3 . 9 3 9 2 8 8 9 1 2 2 . 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 9 9 1 4 1 1 9 . 4 2 4 3 5 2 9 2 9 6 4 1 0 2 7 8 . 4 5 6 5 1 7 3 4 4 3 . 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 1 5 . 5 7
D e c e m b e r 8 0 7 4 4 1 2 0 . 6 6 4 7 1 3 9 7 9 8 8 3 3 2 8 5 . 4 5 4 7 5 5 5 0 9 - 1 . 7
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G D P ® F A C G D P ®  F A C T O R M O N E Y  G D P  @ M O N E Y  G D P ®
D a t e R P I I C H P C O S T ( S / A ) C O S T ( S / A ) M A R K E T  P R I C E S M A R K E T  P R I C E S P S B R
( ' 7 7 = 1 0 0 ) ' 8 5 P R I C E S ( ' 7 7 = 1 0 0 ) ( S / A ) ( S / A ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 ( £ B )
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 8 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 . 3 6 2 6 0 3 8 6 1 0 0 7 1 8 2 9 0 . 8 9 9 1 1 3 3 0 6 - 0 . 8
A p r i l
M a y 2 2 1 . 2 3
J u n e 8 2 2 9 7 1 2 2 . 9 8 5 5 3 4 1 1 0 3 5 2 1 2 9 8 . 9 9 4 8 8 7 7 9 1 1 . 4
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 8 3 8 4 2 1 2 5 . 2 9 4 3 9 8 9 5 1 0 7 0 4 1 3 0 9 . 1 6 1 5 4 0 0 1 7 0 . 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 2 4 . 4 9
D e c e m b e r 8 4 6 8 3 1 2 6 . 5 5 1 1 9 8 5 2 1 0 9 8 8 0 3 1 7 . 3 6 1 2 9 1 6 2 7 - 2 . 5
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 8 5 9 8 0 1 2 8 . 4 8 9 4 4 9 4 6 1 1 2 4 4 0 3 2 4 . 7 5 5 2 2 0 5 1 8 - 2 . 9
A p r i l
M a y 2 3 0 . 5 7
J u n e 8 6 4 1 6 1 2 9 . 1 4 1 0 1 2 6 1 1 1 5 7 7 8 3 3 4 . 3 9 6 2 1 0 6 1 1 - 1 . 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 8 7 4 1 0 1 3 0 . 6 2 6 4 5 7 0 5 1 1 9 1 7 3 3 4 4 . 2 0 1 8 3 1 1 5 3 - 2 . 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 3 8 . 8 2
D e c e m b e r 8 7 8 8 9 1 3 1 . 3 4 2 2 7 9 8 7 1 2 2 7 2 6 3 5 4 . 4 6 3 7 9 5 7 4 3 - 5
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y  .
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 8 8 5 3 4 1 3 2 . 3 0 6 1 7 4 9 1 1 2 5 2 1 8 3 6 1 . 6 6 1 3 2 3 3 9 8 - 5 . 7
A p r i l
M a y 2 4 9 . 6 7
J u n e 8 8 2 8 7 1 3 1 . 9 3 7 0 5 5 4 1 1 2 7 5 4 5 3 6 8 . 3 8 2 2 8 9 2 3 0 . 1
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 8 8 8 6 6 1 3 2 . 8 0 2 3 1 9 3 3 1 2 8 7 2 0 3 7 1 . 7 7 5 9 8 7 0 6 1 - 0 . 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 5 7 . 2 7
D e c e m b e r 8 9 2 0 4 1 3 3 . 3 0 7 4 3 0 2 1 1 3 1 7 5 9 3 8 0 . 5 5 3 3 8 9 3 6 5
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 8 9 9 8 7 1 3 4 . 4 7 7 5 5 3 9 5 1 3 4 9 9 4 3 8 9 . 8 9 6 8 8 9 3 5 1
A p r i l
M a y 2 7 3 . 9 9
J u n e 9 0 2 9 0 1 3 4 . 9 3 0 3 6 0 4 5 1 3 7 1 2 7 3 9 6 . 0 5 7 5 3 4 0 0 9
J u l y
A u g u s t 2 7 8 . 1 2
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 8 2 . 2 4
D e c e m b e r
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B A L A N C E  O F B A L A N C E  0 M 3 : A M N T  £ M M 3 : A M N T M 3  A M N T  O / S M 3  A M N T  0 1
D a t e P A Y M E N T S  ( £ n P A Y M E N T S O U T S T A N D I N O U T S T A N D 1 I N D E X R E A L
( c r n t . a c c ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 Y E A R  E N D  (Si Q U A R T E R L \ 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 4 0 7 6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 4 1 7 5 0 1 0 2 . 4 2 8 8 5 2 1 0 2 . 4 2 8 8 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 4 2 8 3 0 1 0 5 . 0 7 8 5 0 8 1 0 1 . 8 9 2 9 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 4 4 6 5 0 1 0 9 . 5 4 3 6 7 1 0 6 . 2 2 2 7 7
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 4 6 8 8 0 1 1 5 . 0 1 4 7 2 1 0 6 . 7 8 4 4 8
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 4 8 2 0 0 1 1 8 . 2 5 3 1 8 9 1 0 9 . 7 9 1 2 1
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 4 9 4 0 0 1 2 1 . 1 9 7 2 5 2 1 0 8 . 7 5 4 0 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 5 0 1 3 7 5 1 4 4 0 1 2 6 . 2 0 2 1 5 9 1 1 3 . 2 4 5 1 1
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 5 2 3 9 0 1 2 8 . 5 3 2 8 7 5 1 0 8 . 1 7 1 4 6
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 5 4 3 1 0 1 3 3 . 2 4 3 3 7 6 1 1 2 . 1 3 5 7 6
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 5 5 9 5 0 1 3 7 . 2 6 6 9 2 8 1 0 4 . 9 3 8
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r - 4 5 3 - 4 0 . 3 3 8 3 8 5 6 6 5 8 5 8 0 3 0 1 4 2 . 3 6 9 9 7 1 1 0 8 . 8 3 9 1 8
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 5 9 5 7 0 1 4 6 . 1 4 8 1 8 4 1 0 0 . 8 9 3 0 7
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 6 2 8 6 0 1 5 4 . 2 1 9 8 2 3 1 0 6 . 4 6 5 3
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 5 7 9 0 1 6 1 . 4 0 8 2 4 3 1 0 7 . 0 0 1 4 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 8 4 3 2 5 3 . 1 6 1 1 8 6 7 2 0 2 6 9 1 0 0 1 6 9 . 5 2 8 9 5 1 1 2 . 3 8 4 9 1
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 0 2 5 0 1 7 2 . 3 5 0 3 4 3 1 0 6 . 4 8 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 7 3 3 1 0 1 7 9 . 8 5 7 7 0 4 1 1 1 . 1 2 3 3 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 7 6 6 0 0 1 8 7 . 9 2 9 3 4 2 1 1 1 . 2 7 4 2 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 6 7 4 8 6 0 0 . 8 9 0 4 7 8 4 0 1 4 8 6 3 3 2 2 1 1 . 8 0 5 6 9 2 1 2 5 . 4 1 1 6 2
163
Appendix A: Time Series Data
Money Supply
B A L A N C E  O F B A L A N C E  0 M 3 : A M N T  £ M M 3 : A M N T M 3  A M N T  O / S M 3  A M N T  0 /
D a t e P A Y M E N T S  ( £ r P A Y M E N T S O U T S T A N D I N O U T S T A N D I I N D E X R E A L
( c r n t . a c c ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 Y E A R  E N D  ( S Q U A R T E R L Y 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 8 5 9 4 8 2 1 0 . 8 6 3 5 9 2 1 1 8 . 9 9 5 0 6
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 8 9 1 5 3 2 1 8 . 7 2 6 6 9 3 1 2 3 . 4 3 2 3 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 9 0 5 5 0 2 2 2 . 1 5 4 0 7 3 1 2 3 . 7 8 9 2 2
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 4 6 4 9 4 1 3 . 9 8 0 4 1 9 1 4 9 1 9 4 3 1 2 2 3 1 . 3 8 3 7 1 1 2 8 . 9 3 2 1 8
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 9 6 0 6 2 2 3 5 . 6 7 7 1 3 4 1 2 8 . 2 5 2 4 7
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 9 8 0 2 5 2 4 0 . 4 9 3 1 3 1 1 3 0 . 8 7 3 2 7
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 9 9 1 2 4 2 4 3 . 1 8 9 4 0 1 1 2 9 . 2 4 0 8 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 7 8 7 3 3 7 . 2 2 1 7 3 1 0 1 6 5 9 1 0 2 2 9 1 2 5 0 . 9 5 9 2 7 4 1 3 3 . 3 7 0 0 7
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y  .
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 0 2 3 9 6 2 5 1 . 2 1 6 8 7 9 1 3 0 . 0 5 5 6 3
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 0 5 9 2 6 2 5 9 . 8 7 7 3 3 1 1 3 4 . 5 3 9 1 7
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 0 8 2 3 8 2 6 5 . 5 4 9 5 5 8 1 3 4 . 4 8 2 8 2
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 8 3 2 1 6 3 . 1 3 4 4 6 1 1 1 9 5 6 1 1 2 5 4 3 2 7 6 . 1 1 1 3 8 4 1 3 9 . 8 3 1 6 7
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 1 4 6 1 3 2 8 1 . 1 8 9 8 9 2 1 3 5 . 8 8 9 2 7
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 1 8 4 4 4 2 8 9 . 8 7 7 6 3 1 1 4 0 . 0 8 7 7 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 2 3 4 9 4 3 0 2 . 9 7 8 4 1 1 4 5 . 4 8 7 7 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 7 5 0 3 3 3 . 9 2 6 9 8 1 2 6 9 7 4 1 2 7 6 2 2 3 1 3 . 1 0 5 9 8 6 1 5 0 . 3 5 0 9 4
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 3 4 0 1 1 3 2 8 . 7 8 0 6 6 7 1 5 4 . 7 6 3 8
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 4 0 7 9 0 3 4 5 . 4 1 2 1 6 9 1 6 2 . 5 9 2 5 9
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 4 6 9 7 9 3 6 0 . 5 9 6 1 7 3 1 6 7 . 2 7 8 2 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r - 2 4 - 2 . 1 3 7 1 3 3 1 5 1 1 4 7 1 5 1 7 0 4 3 7 2 . 1 8 8 4 2 1 7 2 . 6 5 5 8 4
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B A L A N C E  O F B A L A N C E  0 M 3 : A M N T £ M M 3 : A M N T M 3  A M N T  O / S M 3  A M N T  0 1
D a t e P A Y M E N T S  ( £ n P A Y M E N T S O U T S T A N D I N O U T S T A N D I I N D E X R E A L
( c r n t . a c c ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 Y E A R  E N D  ( S Q U A R T E R L Y 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 6 0 0 8 2 3 9 2 . 7 4 2 8 8 5 1 7 7 . 5 2 4 4 1
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 6 8 3 7 4 4 1 3 . 0 8 6 3 5 9 1 8 6 . 7 1 9 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 7 6 4 7 3 4 3 2 . 9 5 6 3 3 1 9 2 . 8 6 2 3 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r - 4 1 8 2 - 3 7 2 . 3 9 5 4 1 8 5 6 2 3 1 8 6 1 1 1 4 5 6 . 6 0 2 0 6 1 2 0 3 . 3 9 5 4 6
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 9 3 1 2 7 4 7 3 . 8 1 5 0 1 5 2 0 5 . 4 9 8 3
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 0 2 2 0 5 4 9 6 . 0 8 6 8 5 2 1 5 . 1 5 7 8 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 1 5 8 1 7 5 2 9 . 4 8 2 3 3 6 2 2 1 . 7 0 8 6 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r - 1 5 1 5 1 - 1 3 4 9 . 1 5 4 2 2 3 6 7 4 2 2 3 4 4 9 5 4 8 . 2 0 6 5 7 5 2 2 9 . 5 4 9 0 4
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y  .
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
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5 M 3 : C H A N G E S  I R E A L  C O N S R E A L  C O N P E R S O N A L P E R S O N A L
M O N E Y  S T O C K E X P . ( £ M ) E X P E N D D I S P O S A B L I D I S P . I N C O M R P D I
D a t e Q U A R T E R L Y 1 9 8 5 P R  I C E 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 I N C O M E 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 5 6 4 4 0 1 3 1 0 0 4 8 2 5 5 1 0 0 1 0 0
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 0 9 7 4 3 8 0 2 9 9 . 5 2 0 6 4 7 6 4 0 9 8 . 7 2 5 5 2 1 9 8 . 7 2 5 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 8 0 7 4 4 3 0 9 1 0 0 . 6 7 2 5 4 8 5 6 4 1 0 0 . 6 4 0 3 5 9 7 . 5 8 9 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 6 4 5 3 5 9 1 0 3 . 0 5 8 2 5 0 8 7 4 1 0 5 . 4 2 7 4 2 1 0 2 . 2 3 1
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 0 5 9 4 6 4 0 7 1 0 5 . 4 3 9 3 5 0 5 9 1 1 0 4 . 8 4 0 9 5 9 7 . 3 3 8 7
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 3 2 2 4 6 4 5 4 1 0 5 . 5 4 6 1 5 2 0 7 9 1 0 7 . 9 2 4 5 7 1 0 0 . 2 0 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 2 4 5 4 7 3 9 7 1 0 7 . 6 8 8 6 5 3 4 0 7 1 1 0 . 6 7 6 6 1 9 9 . 3 1 3 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 1 3 8 4 7 2 5 2 1 0 7 . 3 5 9 2 5 3 7 6 7 1 1 1 . 4 2 2 6 5 9 9 . 9 8 3
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 4 7 1 0 8 . 4 8 3 9 5 4 2 3 9 1 1 2 . 4 0 0 7 9 9 4 . 5 9 4 9
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 0 1 3 5 0 4 2 3 1 1 4 . 5 6 3 9 5 4 7 2 3 1 1 3 . 4 0 3 7 9 9 5 . 4 3 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 8 9 1 4 8 3 9 8 1 0 9 . 9 6 3 5 5 0 8 5 1 1 4 . 1 5 3 9 7 8 7 . 2 6 8 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 7 0 9 4 9 0 9 6 1 1 1 . 5 4 8 9 5 7 9 7 4 1 2 0 . 1 4 0 9 2 9 1 . 8 4 5 5
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 5 3 7 4 9 7 0 8 1 1 2 . 9 3 9 4 5 5 9 0 0 1 1 5 . 8 4 2 9 2 7 9 . 9 7 1 9
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 3 5 0 4 8 5 7 6 1 1 0 . 3 6 7 4 5 5 9 4 4 1 1 5 . 9 3 4 1 8 0 . 0 3 4 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 8 0 0 4 9 1 6 3 1 1 1 . 7 0 1 1 5 6 9 1 6 1 1 7 . 9 4 8 4 7 8 . 1 9 0 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 2 1 0 4 8 3 7 8 1 0 9 . 9 1 7 5 5 6 6 9 9 1 1 7 . 4 9 8 7 7 7 . 8 9 2 8
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 1 3 1 4 8 9 1 9 1 1 1 . 1 4 6 7 5 6 9 1 8 1 1 7 . 9 5 2 5 4 7 2 . 8 7 5 8
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 0 5 5 4 9 0 5 3 1 1 1 . 4 5 1 2 5 5 7 9 2 1 1 5 . 6 1 9 1 1 7 1 . 4 3 4 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 3 2 9 6 4 9 0 6 2 1 1 1 . 4 7 1 6 5 5 4 4 3 1 1 4 . 8 9 5 8 7 6 8 . 0 3 0 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 7 4 8 4 8 9 7 7 1 1 1 . 2 7 8 5 5 5 8 3 5 1 1 5 . 7 0 8 2 2 6 8 . 5 1 1 6
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3 M 3 : C H A N G E S  I R E A L  C O N S R E A L  C O N T O T A L  P E R S T O T A L  P E R 5 > O N A L
D a t e M O N E Y  S T O C K E X P . ( £ M ) E X P E N D D I S P . I N C O M D I S P . I N C O M R P D I
Q U A R T E R L Y 1 9 8 5 P R  I C E 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 6 3 8 4 8 8 0 8 1 1 0 . 8 9 4 5 5 5 4 2 0 1 1 4 . 8 4 8 2 6 4 . 8 1 1 4
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 0 9 7 4 9 0 4 6 1 1 1 . 4 3 5 3 5 6 3 2 3 1 1 6 . 7 1 9 5 1 6 5 . 8 6 7 4
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 6 4 1 4 9 8 1 2 1 1 3 . 1 7 5 7 5 5 7 5 0 1 1 5 . 5 3 2 0 7 6 4 . 3 7 7 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 2 6 6 5 0 3 1 4 1 1 4 . 3 1 6 2 5 5 9 6 9 1 1 5 . 9 8 5 9 1 6 4 . 6 2 9 9
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 3 7 0 2 5 1 0 2 4 1 1 5 . 9 2 9 4 5 6 5 3 5 1 1 7 . 1 5 8 8 4 6 3 . 7 5 6 3
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 9 4 5 5 1 4 0 6 1 1 6 . 7 9 7 3 5 7 6 8 4 1 1 9 . 5 3 9 9 4 6 5 . 0 5 2 1
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 4 5 2 5 2 2 5 6 1 1 8 . 7 2 8 6 5 7 4 7 8 1 1 9 . 1 1 3 0 5 6 3 . 3 0 1 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 4 7 4 5 2 2 4 0 1 1 8 . 6 9 2 2 5 7 9 5 1 1 2 0 . 0 9 3 2 5 6 3 . 8 2 2 5
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 0 2 5 2 2 3 9 1 1 8 . 6 8 9 9 5 8 2 1 5 1 2 0 . 6 4 0 3 5 6 2 . 4 5 5 8
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 5 2 2 5 2 7 2 8 1 1 9 . 8 0 1 5 8 4 7 5 1 2 1 . 1 7 9 1 5 6 2 . 7 3 4 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 3 2 5 5 2 3 7 1 1 1 8 . 9 8 9 8 5 8 7 6 3 1 2 1 . 7 7 5 9 8 6 1 . 6 7 1 3
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 8 9 8 5 3 1 3 4 1 2 0 . 7 2 3 4 5 9 7 4 7 1 2 3 . 8 1 5 1 5 6 2 . 7 0 4
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 0 5 9 5 3 8 5 2 1 2 2 . 3 5 4 8 5 8 9 0 3 1 2 2 . 0 6 6 1 1 5 8 . 9 9 0 3
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 8 3 1 5 3 8 4 4 1 2 2 . 3 3 6 6 6 0 5 5 4 1 2 5 . 4 8 7 5 1 6 0 . 6 4 3 7
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 5 0 3 6 5 4 8 8 8 1 2 4 . 7 0 8 6 6 0 6 4 2 1 2 5 . 6 6 9 8 8 6 0 . 3 4 5 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 4 1 3 2 5 5 3 5 7 1 2 5 . 7 7 4 2 6 1 6 2 3 1 2 7 . 7 0 2 8 3 6 1 . 3 2 1 9
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 1 2 0 5 6 5 4 7 1 2 8 . 4 7 7 9 6 1 5 7 4 1 2 7 . 6 0 1 2 8 6 0 . 0 6 4 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 6 7 8 2 5 7 9 9 7 1 3 1 . 7 7 2 4 6 3 2 5 9 1 3 1 . 0 9 3 1 5 6 1 . 7 0 8 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 3 7 8 5 8 2 5 4 1 3 2 . 3 5 6 3 6 3 6 3 3 1 3 1 . 8 6 8 2 6 1 . 1 7 2 8
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 7 3 6 5 8 8 4 5 1 3 3 . 6 9 9 1 6 3 8 2 0 1 3 2 . 2 5 5 7 2 6 1 . 3 5 2 6
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3 M 3 : C H A N G E S  I R E A L  C O N S R E A L  C O N T O T A L  P E R I T O T A L  P E R I I O N A L
D a t e M O N E Y  S T O C K E X P . ( £ M ) E X P E N D D I S P . I N C O M D I S P . I N C O M R P D I
Q U A R T E R L Y 1 9 8 5 P R I C E 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 8 4 8 9 5 9 2 2 3 1 3 4 . 5 5 8 6 3 5 3 7 1 3 1 . 6 6 9 2 6 5 9 . 5 1 6 1
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 8 2 9 1 6 0 3 3 0 1 3 7 . 0 7 3 1 6 5 1 5 1 1 3 5 . 0 1 3 9 9 6 1 . 0 2 7 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 8 1 5 7 6 1 6 6 8 1 4 0 . 1 1 3 1 6 5 9 1 8 1 3 6 . 6 0 3 4 6 6 0 . 8 5 0 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 9 6 3 8 6 2 8 0 3 1 4 2 . 6 9 1 9 6 6 6 9 5 1 3 8 . 2 1 3 6 6 6 1 . 5 6 7 9
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 7 2 8 4 6 4 1 7 4 1 4 5 . 8 0 6 9 6 7 6 3 0 1 4 0 . 1 5 1 2 8 6 0 . 7 8 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 9 1 2 4 6 4 6 4 4 1 4 6 . 8 7 4 8 6 8 7 1 2 1 4 2 . 3 9 3 5 3 6 1 . 7 5 7 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 3 7 7 1 6 6 0 2 7 1 5 0 . 0 1 7 6 9 4 7 5 1 4 3 . 9 7 4 7 2 6 0 . 2 8 6 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 7 8 4 1 6 6 7 3 5 1 5 1 . 6 2 5 7 7 0 8 2 9 1 4 6 . 7 8 0 6 4 6 1 . 4 6 1 1
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 0 1 5 7 6 7 2 1 6 1 5 2 . 7 1 8 5 7 1 5 9 9 1 4 8 . 3 7 6 3 3 5 9 . 4 2 7 9
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 2 3 0 6 6 7 9 4 4 1 5 4 . 3 7 2 6 7 2 8 5 3 1 5 0 . 9 7 5 0 3 6 0 . 4 6 8 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 7 9 9 3 1 5 4 . 4 8 3 9 7 3 2 9 7 1 5 1 . 8 9 5 1 4 5 9 . 0 4 0 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 6 8 5 5 4 1 5 5 . 7 5 8 5 7 3 5 3 5 1 5 2 . 3 8 8 3 5 5 9 . 2 3 2 1
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 6 9 1 0 5 1 5 7 . 0 1 0 4 7 4 6 2 2 1 5 4 . 6 4 0 9 7 5 6 . 4 4 0 3
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 6 9 7 9 1 1 5 8 . 5 6 9 1 7 5 6 4 6 1 5 6 . 7 6 3 0 3 5 7 . 2 1 4 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
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S A V I N G S £ / $ R A T E £ / D M R A T E F I N A N C E  H O I
D a t e R A T I O ( % ) B A S E  R A T E
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 1 4 . 5
M a r c h 8 . 8 1 . 7 1 3 8 4 . 1 0 7 1 3
A p r i l 1 1 . 5
M a y 9 . 5
J u n e 8 1 . 7 1 9 4 . 0 5 9 8 . 5
J u l y 8
A u g u s t 8
S e p t e m b e r 8 . 7 1 . 7 3 5 4 4 . 0 0 5 7 . 5
O c t o b e r 6 . 5
N o v e m b e r 6
D e c e m b e r 1 0 . 8 1 . 8 1 3 4 4 . 0 3 3 5 . 5
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y 6 . 5
F e b r u a r y 7
M a r c h 8 . 2 1 . 9 2 7 6 4 7
A p r i l 7
M a y 7 . 5
J u n e 1 0 . 8 1 . 8 3 5 4 3 . 8 1 3 8 . 5
J u l y 1 0
A u g u s t 1 0 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 . 2 1 . 9 3 1 9 3 . 8 7 4 1 0
O c t o b e r 9 . 5
N o v e m b e r 1 0
D e c e m b e r 1 2 . 1 1 . 9 8 3 8 . 3 . 7 1 7 1 1 . 5
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y 1 2 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 2 . 5
M a r c h 1 1 . 9 2 . 0 1 6 3 . 7 4 1 3 . 5
A p r i l 1 3
M a y 1 2
J u n e 7 . 7 2 . 0 8 1 1 3 . 9 4 4 1 2
J u l y 1 3
A u g u s t 1 4
S e p t e m b e r 1 2 2 . 2 3 3 8 4 . 0 5 8 1 4 . 5
O c t o b e r 1 4 . 5
N o v e m b e r 1 4 . 5
D e c e m b e r 1 5 . 2 2 . 1 5 7 2 3 . 8 1 1 1 4 . 5
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y 1 7
F e b r u a r y 1 7
M a r c h 1 1 2 . 2 5 4 2 3 . 9 9 5 1 7
A p r i l 1 8
M a y 1 8
J u n e 1 3 . 1 2 . 2 8 6 2 4 . 1 3 2 1 7 . 5
J u l y 1 7
A u g u s t 1 6 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 3 . 6 2 . 3 8 2 4 . 2 2 7 1 6 . 5
O c t o b e r 1 6 . 5
N o v e m b e r 1 6 . 5
D e c e m b e r 1 4 . 7 2 . 3 8 7 2 4 . 5 5 1 6
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y 1 5 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 5
M a r c h 1 4 . 1 2 . 3 0 9 5 4 . 8 1 4 1 4
A p r i l 1 3
M a y 1 3
J u n e 1 2 . 1 2 . 0 7 7 1 4 . 7 2 8 1 2 . 5
J u l y 1 3
A u g u s t 1 3 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 . 5 1 . 8 3 8 7 4 . 4 6 8 1 4 . 5
O c t o b e r 1 4 . 5
N o v e m b e r 1 6
D e c e m b e r 1 2 . 3 1 . 8 8 3 3 4 . 2 2 6 1 6
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S A V I N G S £ / $ R A T E £ / D M R A T E F I N A N C E  H O I
D a t e R A T I O ( % ) B A S E  R A T E
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y 1 5 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 5 . 5
M a r c h 1 1 . 9 1 . 8 4 5 2 4 . 3 3 1 1 5
A p r i l 1 4 . 5
M a y 1 4
J u n e 1 2 . 9 1 . 7 7 9 2 4 . 2 3 2 1 4
J u l y 1 4
A u g u s t 1 3
S e p t e m b e r 1 0 . 7 1 . 7 2 5 2 4 . 2 8 1 1 2
O c t o b e r 1 1 . 5
N o v e m b e r 1 0 . 5
D e c e m b e r 1 0 . 1 1 . 6 4 9 5 4 . 1 3 1 0
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y 1 0 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 1
M a r c h 9 . 4 1 . 5 3 0 3 3 . 6 8 4 1 1 . 5
A p r i l 1 1 . 5
M a y 1 1
J u n e 1 0 . 9 1 . 5 5 4 6 3 . 8 6 7 1 0 . 5
J u l y 1 0 . 5
A u g u s t 1 0 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 9 . 1 1 . 5 0 9 1 3 . 9 8 9 1 0
O c t o b e r 1 0
N o v e m b e r 1 0
D e c e m b e r 9 . 9 1 . 4 7 0 8 3 . 9 3 6 9 . 5
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y  . . 9 . 5
F e b r u a r y 9 . 5
M a r c h 1 0 . 3 1 . 4 3 5 3 3 . 8 7 7 5 9 . 5
A p r i l 9 . 5
M a y 9
J u n e 9 . 8 1 . 3 9 6 3 . 7 8 4 9 . 5
J u l y 9 . 5
A u q u s t 1 0 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 0 . 9 1 . 2 9 9 3 3 . 7 8 6 1 1 . 5
O c t o b e r 1 1
N o v e m b e r 1 0 . 5
D e c e m b e r 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 1 7 8 3 . 7 1 6 1 0 . 5
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y 1 0
F e b r u a r y 1 0 . 5
M a r c h 8 . 6 1 . 1 1 5 5 3 . 6 2 8 1 2 . 5
A p r i l 1 4
M a y 1 3 . 5
J u n e 1 1 . 1 1 . 2 5 7 7 3 . 8 7 8 1 3 . 5
J u l y 1 3
A u g u s t 1 2 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 9 . 5 1 . 3 7 5 8 3 . 9 2 1 2
O c t o b e r 1 2
N o v e m b e r 1 2
D e c e m b e r 9 . 6 1 . 4 3 5 6 3 . 7 1 1 1 2
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y 1 2 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 2 . 5
M a r c h 8 . 1 1 . 4 3 9 1 3 . 3 8 2 1 3
A p r i l 1 2 . 5
M a y 1 1 . 5
J u n e 8 . 3 1 . 5 0 9 3 . 3 8 7 1 0 . 5
J u l y 1 0
A u g u s t 1 0
S e p t e m b e r 8 . 5 1 . 4 8 9 1 3 . 1 0 9 1 0
O c t o b e r 1 0
N o v e m b e r 1 1
D e c e m b e r 7 . 8 1 . 4 3 0 4 2 . 8 6 8 1 1
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S A V I N G S £ / $ R A T E E / D M R A T E F I N A N C E  H O I
D a t e R A T I O ( % ) B A S E  R A T E
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y 1 1 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 1 . 5
M a r c h 6 . 8 1 . 5 4 3 1 2 . 8 3 7 1 1
A p r i l 1 1
M a y 1 0
J u n e 7 . 4 1 . 6 4 1 2 . 9 6 4 9 . 5
J u l y 9
A u g u s t 9 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 6 . 5 1 . 6 1 8 4 2 . 9 7 4 1 0
O c t o b e r 1 0 . 5
N o v e m b e r 1 0 . 5
D e c e m b e r 5 . 8 1 . 7 5 3 5 2 . 9 8 9 9 . 5
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y 9 . 5
F e b r u a r y 9
M a r c h 5 . 1 1 . 7 9 7 2 3 . 0 1 3 9 . 5
A p r i l 9 . 5
M a y 9
J u n e 5 . 9 1 . 8 3 9 3 . 1 4 2 8 . 5
J u l y 8 . 5
A u g u s t 1 0
S e p t e m b e r 4 . 9 1 . 6 9 5 1 3 . 1 6 5 1 1
O c t o b e r 1 2
N o v e m b e r 1 2 . 5
D e c e m b e r 5 . 8 1 . 7 9 1 5 3 . 1 7 5 1 2 . 5
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y 1 3
F e b r u a r y 1 3 . 5
M a r c h 6 . 1 1 . 7 4 7 7 3 . 2 3 3 1 3 . 5
A p r i l 1 3 . 5
M a y 1 3 . 5
J u n e 6 . 7 1 . 6 2 5 9 3 . 1 4 1 3 . 5
J u l y 1 4
A u g u s t 1 4 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 7 . 2 1 . 5 9 7 1 3 . 0 7 1 1 4
O c t o b e r 1 4
N o v e m b e r 1 5
D e c e m b e r 6 . 8 1 . 5 8 4 9 2 . 8 7 6 1 5 . 5
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y 1 5 . 5
F e b r u a r y 1 5 . 5
M a r c h 7 . 4 1 . 6 5 6 5 2 . 8 1 5 . 5
A p r i l 1 5 . 5
M a y 1 5 . 5
J u n e 7 . 7 1 . 6 7 6 1 2 . 8 1 2 1 5 . 5
J u l y 1 5 . 5
A u q u s t 1 5 . 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 5 . 5
O c t o b e r 1 5
N o v e m b e r 1 4
D e c e m b e r 1 4
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C o n s t r u c t o n :  V a l u 3  o f  n e w  <s r d e r s
I S E o b t a i n e d  1> y  c o n t r a : t o r s :  P r i / a t e  S e c t Dr.
D a t e ( £ m i l l i o n ) ( J O M M E R i ; i a l
O f f i c e s r e a l s h o p s n o m r e a l I n d n o m r e a l
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y 5 2 4 1 0 0 2 7 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 8 7 1 0 0 1 0 0
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y 6 7 8 1 2 5 . 4 7 3 8 0 1 4 0 . 7 4 1 3 6 . 4 7 1 4 4 7 1 2 1 . 9 1 1 8 . 2 1
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y 8 2 1 1 4 0 . 5 9 4 1 4 1 5 3 . 3 3 1 3 7 . 5 9 1 8 6 4 1 5 7 . 0 3 1 4 0 . 9 1
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y 1 0 4 5 1 5 2 . 4 6 5 3 6 1 9 8 . 5 2 1 5 1 . 7 6 1 8 0 3 1 5 1 . 9 1 1 6 . 1 2
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y 1 4 5 1 1 8 3 . 5 7 5 3 1 1 9 6 . 6 7 1 3 0 . 3 8 1 5 5 4 1 3 0 . 9 2 8 6 . 7 8 9
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
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C o n s t r u c t i o n :  V a l u ;  o f  n e w > r d e r s
I S E o b t a i n e d i y  c o n t r a : t o r s :  P r i / a t e  S e c t a r '
D a t e ( £ m i l l i o n ) ( t O M M E R ; i a l
O f f i c e s r e a l s h o p s n o m r e a l I n d n o m r e a l
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y 1 4 1 4 1 5 9 . 7 8 5 2 1 1 9 2 . 9 6 1 1 4 . 2 5 1 3 2 7 1 1 1 . 7 9 6 6 . 1 9 4
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y 1 2 0 9 1 2 8 . 5 7 5 4 9 2 0 3 . 3 3 1 1 3 . 3 1 5 4 3 1 2 9 . 9 9 7 2 . 4 3 4
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y . 1 6 0 1 1 6 2 . 3 7 7 0 2 2 6 0 1 3 8 . 1 7 2 2 0 3 1 8 5 . 5 9 9 8 . 6 3 2
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y 1 7 7 5 1 7 1 . 5 5 1 0 2 2 3 7 8 . 5 2 1 9 1 . 6 9 2 1 4 9 1 8 1 . 0 4 9 1 . 6 8 7
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y 2 2 5 6 2 0 6 . 7 4 1 1 0 2 4 0 8 . 1 5 1 9 5 . 9 9 1 9 9 3 1 6 7 . 9 8 0 . 6 2 5
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
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C o n s t r u c t o n :  V a l u !  o f  n e w > r d e r s
I S E o b t a i n e d  1> y  c o n t r a : t o r s :  P r i r a t e  S e c t o r
D a t e ( £ m i l l i o n ) ( i O M M E R i : i a l
O f f i c e s r e a l s h o p s n o m r e a l I n d n o m r e a l
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y 3 1 1 0 2 7 5 . 3 3 1 6 1 6 5 9 8 . 5 2 2 7 7 . 6 5 3 6 6 0 3 0 8 . 3 4 1 4 3 . 0 4
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y 4 5 8 5 3 8 9 . 7 7 2 0 4 8 7 5 8 . 5 2 3 3 7 . 8 9 3 1 2 8 2 6 3 . 5 2 1 1 7 . 3 9
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y 5 2 7 1 4 2 1 . 2 2 0 8 6 7 7 2 . 5 9 3 2 3 . 5 1 3 3 7 7 2 8 4 . 5 1 1 9 . 1 3
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
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P r o f i t :  U K r e a l n o m i n a l B a n k  l e n d i n g r e a l L e n d i n g  t o r e a l
i n c o m e  t o t a l 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 t o  I n d  &  C o m m 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 1 P r o p e r t y  C o . ' s 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 0
D a t e £ M C o ' s  ( s t e r l i n g ) A m t . O / S
( £ m ) ( £ M )
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 5 2 7 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 8 4 3 1 1 0 0
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 5 2 7 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 9 3 1 2 1 0 4 . 7 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 5 4 7 7 1 0 0 . 7 8 1 0 3 . 9 3 1 9 6 4 3 1 0 3 . 3 4 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 5 2 4 9 6 . 9 6 8 4 2
D e c e m b e r 5 2 4 0 9 6 . 4 1 6 9 9 . 4 3 1 2 0 2 9 5 1 0 6 . 7 7 5
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 5 5 4 0 9 7 . 6 0 1 1 0 5 . 1 2 2 0 5 8 2 1 0 8 . 2 8 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 6 0 7 8 1 0 7 . 0 8 1 1 5 . 3 3 2 1 4 3 8 1 0 7 . 9 9 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 6 1 5 3 1 0 4 . 7 7 1 1 6 . 7 6 2 1 6 6 6 1 0 5 . 4 8 3
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 6 1 9 1 1 0 5 . 4 2 1 1 7 . 4 8 2 2 5 8 4 1 0 9 . 9 5 2
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 9993 7 9 . 0 3 1 9 7
M a r c h 5 9 6 5 9 5 . 2 5 7 1 1 3 . 1 9 2 4 1 8 0 1 1 0 . 4 0 9
A p r i l
M a y 2 2 3 4 7 4 . 4 8 9 0 3
J u n e 7 5 1 8 1 2 0 . 0 6 1 4 2 . 6 6 2 5 6 4 3 1 1 7 . 0 9
J u l y
A u g u s t 2 1 4 8 7 1 . 6 2 1 5
S e p t e m b e r 7 8 2 6 1 1 3 . 5 3 1 4 8 . 5 2 6 0 7 5 1 0 8 . 1 5 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 1 1 3 6 3 . 9 9 9 5 7
D e c e m b e r 8 1 4 7 1 1 8 . 1 8 1 5 4 . 5 9 2 6 5 5 6 1 1 0 . 1 4 9
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 2 1 7 0 6 5 . 7 2 6 0 1
M a r c h 8 0 9 1 1 0 5 . 9 9 1 5 3 . 5 3 2 8 2 9 2 1 0 5 . 9 7
A p r i l
M a y 2 2 5 3 6 1 . 6 2 2 5 6
J u n e 7 1 3 6 9 3 . 4 7 9 1 3 5 . 4 1 2 9 8 5 0 1 1 1 . 8 0 6
J u l y
A u g u s t 2 2 2 6 6 0 . 8 8 4 0 7
S e p t e m b e r 6 3 5 3 7 9 . 9 1 6 1 2 0 . 5 5 3 1 6 2 2 1 1 3 . 7 3 8
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 2 4 0 5 8 . 8 3 3 2 4
D e c e m b e r 6 5 4 9 8 2 . 3 8 1 1 2 4 . 2 7 3 2 2 6 5 1 1 6 . 0 5
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 2 3 7 0 6 2 . 2 4 7 6 7
M a r c h 6 8 8 6 8 0 . 7 3 1 3 0 . 6 6 3 0 8 2 0 1 0 3 . 3 1 4
A p r i l
M a y 2 4 2 5 5 9 . 3 6 0 6 5
J u n e 7 2 6 6 8 5 . 1 8 5 1 3 7 . 8 7 3 2 6 9 6 1 0 9 . 6 0 3
J u l y
A u g u s t 2 5 5 8 6 2 . 6 1 6 3 1
S e p t e m b e r 7 7 5 3 8 7 . 1 0 8 1 4 7 . 1 2 3 3 4 8 9 1 0 7 . 5 8 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 7 1 0 6 3 . 5 7 4 0 8
D e c e m b e r 9 5 7 4 1 0 7 . 5 7 1 8 1 . 6 7 3 1 8 8 9 1 0 2 . 4 4 5
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I n d  a n d  c o m m  c o ' s B a n k  l e n d i n g L e n d i n g  t o
G r o s s  T r a d i t 9 t o  I n d  &  C o m m P r o p e r t y  C o . ' s
D a t e P r o f  i t - U K  I n c r e a l n o m i n a l C o ' s  ( s t e r l i n g ) r e a l A m t . O / S r e a l
t o t a l ( £ m ] 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 ( £ m ) 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 ( ( £ M ) 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 0
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 3 0 0 9 7 0 . 5 8 8 3 4
M a r c h 7 3 0 0 7 8 . 1 7 1 3 8 . 5 2 3 1 0 7 2 9 5 . 1 3 6 6
A p r i l
M a y 3 2 4 3 7 2 . 5 0 7 8 4
J u n e 8 7 3 4 9 3 . 5 2 5 1 6 5 . 7 3 3 2 7 0 6 1 0 0 . 1 4
J u l y
A u g u s t 3 3 0 7 7 3 . 9 3 8 7 6
S e p t e m b e r 8 9 0 7 9 4 . 1 7 8 1 6 9 . 0 1 3 2 4 2 6 9 8 . 0 3 3 2
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 3 5 2 3 7 7 . 7 7 7 1 1
D e c e m b e r 9 9 5 4 1 0 5 . 2 5 1 8 8 . 8 8 3 3 0 0 6 9 9 . 7 8 6 7
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 3 6 8 3 8 1 . 3 0 9 4 3
M a r c h 9 7 5 1 1 0 0 . 6 9 1 8 5 . 0 3 3 4 6 3 7 1 0 2 . 2 6 8
A p r i l
M a y 3 8 5 6 8 3 . 1 3 7 3 1
J u n e 1 0 5 4 6 1 0 8 . 9 2 0 0 . 1 1 3 4 7 4 2 1 0 2 . 5 7 8
J u l y
A u g u s t 4 0 6 7 8 7 . 6 8 6 5 7
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 0 0 6 1 1 0 . 9 9 2 0 8 . 8 4 3 5 6 4 4 1 0 2 . 7 7 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 4 4 5 7 9 3 . 8 4 4 4 1
D e c e m b e r 1 2 2 4 8 1 2 3 . 5 1 2 3 2 . 4 1 3 3 9 0 9 9 7 . 7 7 3 5
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 4 6 5 0 9 7 . 9 0 8 1 3
M a r c h 1 2 5 3 9 1 2 3 . 1 8 2 3 7 . 9 3 3 4 9 9 0 9 8 . 2 8 2 3
A p r i l
M a y 4 8 9 4 1 0 0 . 3 8 1 8
J u n e 1 2 0 0 6 1 1 7 . 9 4 2 2 7 . 8 2 3 5 2 0 8 9 8 . 8 9 4 7
J u l y
A u q u s t 5 1 9 4 1 0 6 . 5 3 5 2
S e p t e m b e r 1 2 8 3 2 1 2 3 . 3 1 2 4 3 . 4 9 3 8 4 7 2 1 0 5 . 7 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 5 4 2 0 1 0 8 . 7 5 0 5
D e c e m b e r 1 3 5 5 6 1 3 0 . 2 7 2 5 7 . 2 3 4 4 5 4 7 1 2 2 . 4 0 3
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 5 8 5 0 1 1 7 . 3 7 8 3
M a r c h 1 5 5 2 7 1 4 2 . 3 8 2 9 4 . 6 3 4 8 8 6 7 1 2 8 . 1 3
A p r i l
M a y 5 9 3 8 1 1 3 . 6 9 3 7
J u n e 1 4 4 7 8 1 3 2 . 7 6 2 7 4 . 7 2 4 9 6 1 9 1 3 0 . 1 0 2
J u l y
A u q u s t 6 5 9 2 1 2 6 . 2 1 5 7
S e p t e m b e r 1 3 1 5 3 1 1 9 . 8 5 2 4 9 . 5 8 4 9 4 7 5 1 2 8 . 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 7 1 1 1 1 3 5 . 2 8 7
D e c e m b e r 1 4 0 4 7 1 2 7 . 9 9 2 6 6 . 5 5 4 8 6 0 9 1 2 6 . 6 4 3
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 7 6 7 6 1 4 6 . 0 3 6 2
M a r c h 1 2 7 2 5 1 1 3 . 6 6 2 4 1 . 4 6 5 2 8 7 6 1 3 5 . 0 4 3
A p r i l
M a y 7 7 5 1 1 4 4 . 5 5 4 5
J u n e 1 2 2 6 1 1 0 9 . 5 2 2 3 2 . 6 6 . 5 3 4 0 0 1 3 6 . 3 8 1
J u l y
A u q u s t 8 1 3 8 1 5 1 . 7 7 1 9
S e p t e m b e r 1 3 2 9 9 1 1 7 . 0 6 2 5 2 . 3 5 5 4 2 6 1 1 3 6 . 5 7 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 9 3 3 5 1 7 1 . 5 7 0 8
D e c e m b e r 1 4 2 0 7 1 2 5 . 0 6 2 6 9 . 5 8 5 6 8 4 5 1 4 3 . 0 7 4
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I n d  a n d  c o m i n  c o ' s B a n k  l e n d i n g L e n d i n g  t o
G r o s s  T r a d i i 9 t o  I n d  &  C o m m P r o p e r t y  C o . ' s
D a t e P r o f i t - U K  I n c r e a l n o m i n a l C o ' s  ( s t e r l i n g ) r e a l A m t . O / S r e a l
t o t a l ( £ m ] 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 ( £ m ) 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 1 ( £ M ) 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 0
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 9 9 8 3 1 8 3 . 4 8 0 6
M a r c h 1 5 2 7 7 1 3 1 . 0 3 2 8 9 . 8 9 6 0 0 6 0 1 4 7 . 2 9 4
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 8 6 5 1 9 4 . 5 7 6 4
J u n e 1 5 5 9 8 1 3 3 . 7 9 2 9 5 . 9 8 6 2 3 1 3 1 5 2 . 8 2
J u l y
A u g u s t 1 1 9 9 5 2 1 4 . 8 1 3
S e p t e m b e r 1 6 3 3 3 1 3 8 . 0 6 3 0 9 . 9 2 6 5 7 0 6 1 5 8 . 8 0 3
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 3 3 3 4 2 3 5 . 3 2 8 5
D e c e m b e r 1 6 7 1 3 1 4 1 . 2 7 3 1 7 . 1 3 6 9 2 2 4 1 6 7 . 3 0 6
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 1 5 1 4 4 2 6 7 . 2 7 2 7
M a r c h 1 7 4 0 9 1 4 3 . 2 7 3 3 0 . 3 4 7 5 8 1 6 1 7 8 . 4 0 7
A p r i l
M a y 1 6 6 6 5 2 8 6 . 3 6 2
J u n e 1 7 0 7 6 1 4 0 . 5 3 3 2 4 . 0 2 8 1 7 6 7 1 9 2 . 4 1
J u l y
A u g u s t 1 9 0 3 5 3 2 7 . 0 8 6 7
S e p t e m b e r 1 8 8 0 2 1 4 9 . 3 9 3 5 6 . 7 7 8 6 9 4 0 1 9 7 . 5 1 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 2 1 2 8 7 3 5 3 . 1 4 7 7
D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 4 6 1 5 6 . 8 9 3 7 4 . 6 9 9 2 2 2 4 2 0 9 . 5 2
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y  .
F e b r u a r y 2 3 6 0 1 3 9 1 . 5 3 6 5
M a r c h 2 0 5 0 1 1 5 5 . 8 1 3 8 9 . 0 1 1 0 1 0 7 8 2 1 9 . 6 5 1
A p r i l
M a y 2 6 8 6 7 4 2 6 . 3 3 9 8
J u n e 2 0 0 4 7 1 5 2 . 3 6 3 8 0 . 4 1 0 6 6 8 6 2 3 1 . 8 3 8
J u l y
A u g u s t 2 9 6 0 8 4 6 9 . 8 3 5 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 0 8 2 6 7 2 2 8 . 3 2 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 3 1 9 1 0 4 9 1 . 4 0 8 9
D e c e m b e r 1 1 9 0 0 6 2 5 0 . 9 7 2
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 3 4 1 5 5 5 2 5 . 9 8 1 6
M a r c h 1 2 1 9 8 5 2 4 1 . 5 5 8
A p r i l
M a y 3 5 7 6 0 5 1 7 . 0 9 7 9
J u n e 1 2 8 6 4 5 2 5 4 . 7 4 7
J u l y
A u g u s t 3 7 1 1 5 5 3 6 . 6 9 1 5
S e p t e m b e r 1 3 2 2 4 5 2 5 4 . 2 2 1
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 3 8 9 8 7 5 4 7 . 2 8 1 9
D e c e m b e r 1 3 5 6 9 2 2 6 0 . 8 4 7
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U N E M P L O \ U N E M P U H E M P L O Y E E S N O U T P U T / P E R S C M A N U F A C T U R I N (
M E N T M E N T M A N U F A C T . E M P L O Y E D O U T P U T
D a t e ( t h o u s .  s / a ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 0 0 0 ' s  S / A 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 1 1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0  ( S / A ) 1 9 8 5  =  1 0 0 ( s / a )
W h o l e  E c o n . l a b . f o r c e
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 1 2 1 . 7 1 0 0 8 5 . 2 1 3 3 . 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 1 2 8 . 5 1 0 0 . 6 0 6 2 8 4 . 8 1 3 3 . 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 7 8 . 6 1 0 5 . 0 7 2 7 8 5 . 3 1 3 4 . 2
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 1 9 9 . 5 1 0 6 . 9 3 5 9 8 5 . 8 1 3 4 . 1
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 1 7 9 . 1 1 0 5 . 1 1 7 2 8 6 . 2 1 3 3 . 4
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 1 5 9 . 5 1 0 3 . 3 6 9 9 7 1 4 3 1 0 0 8 7 . 7 1 3 3
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 1 4 6 . 1 1 0 2 . 1 7 5 3 7 1 4 6 1 0 0 . 0 4 2 8 8 . 2 1 3 3 . 2
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 1 2 6 . 1 1 0 0 . 3 9 2 3 . . 7 1 5 6 1 0 0 . 1 8 2 . . . 8 8 . . 1 3 3 . 5
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 1 0 0 . 7 9 8 . 1 2 7 8 4 7 1 2 9 9 9 . 8 0 4 8 7 . 2 1 3 3 . 1
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 0 8 7 . 6 9 6 . 9 5 9 9 7 7 1 1 3 9 9 . 5 8 9 0 . 4 1 3 2 . 7
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 0 6 4 . 6 9 4 . 9 0 9 5 1 7 0 9 5 9 9 . 3 2 8 8 9 1 3 2 . 6
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 0 5 2 . 5 9 3 . 8 3 0 7 9 7 0 5 3 9 8 . 7 4 8 9 . 2 1 3 1 . 8
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 0 7 2 . 5 9 5 . 6 1 3 8 6 9 4 1 9 7 . 1 7 2 1 8 8 . 5 1 3 0 . 2
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 1 8 4 . 5 1 0 5 . 5 9 8 6 6 8 0 8 9 5 . 3 1 0 1 8 7 . 2 1 2 7 . 9
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 3 4 1 . 2 1 1 9 . 5 6 8 5 6 5 9 9 9 2 . 3 8 4 2 8 6 . 4 1 2 4 . 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 5 9 5 . 1 1 4 2 . 2 0 3 8 6 4 0 8 8 9 . 7 1 0 2 8 6 1 2 0 . 9
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 8 5 9 . 8 1 6 5 . 8 0 1 9 6 2 4 3 8 7 . 4 0 0 3 8 7 . 3 1 1 7 . 8
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 0 6 6 . 7 1 8 4 . 2 4 7 1 6 1 0 7 8 5 . 4 9 6 3 8 8 . 3 1 1 5 . 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 2 2 5 . 4 1 9 8 . 3 9 5 3 6 0 2 7 8 4 . 3 7 6 3 8 9 . 7 1 1 3 . 3
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 3 4 0 . 8 2 0 8 . 6 8 3 2 5 9 3 1 8 3 . 0 3 2 3 9 0 . 2 1 1 1 . 8
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U N E M P L O \ U N E M P U H E M P L O Y E E S N O U T P U T / P E R S O m a n u f a c t u r i n g
M E N T M E N T M A N U F A C T . E M P L O Y E D o u t p u t
D a t e ( t h o u s .  s / a ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 0 0 0 ' s  S / A 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 1 1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 ( S / A ) 1 9 8 5  =  1 0 0 ( s / a )
W h o l e  E c o n . l a b . f o r c e
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 4 2 4 . 2 2 1 6 . 1 1 8 4 5 8 6 4 8 2 . 0 9 4 4 9 1 . 1 1 1 0 . 2
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 4 7 5 . 9 2 2 0 . 7 2 7 5 5 7 6 1 8 0 . 6 5 2 4 9 2 . 2 1 0 8 . 6
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 5 5 1 . 6 2 2 7 . 4 7 6 2 5 6 5 9 7 9 . 2 2 4 4 9 3 . 2 1 0 6 . 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 6 3 9 . 6 2 3 5 . 3 2 1 4 5 5 6 0 7 7 . 8 3 8 4 9 3 . 9 1 0 4 . 9
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 7 1 5 . 9 2 4 2 . 1 2 3 6 5 4 8 6 7 6 . 8 0 2 5 9 5 . 7 1 0 3 . 4
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 7 6 4 . 6 2 4 6 . 4 6 5 2 5 4 3 1 7 6 . 0 3 2 5 9 6 . 1 1 0 2 . 3
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 8 0 7 . 8 2 5 0 . 3 1 6 5 5 3 7 8 7 5 . 2 9 0 5 9 6 . 9 1 0 1 . 5
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 8 1 9 . 2 2 5 1 . 3 3 2 8 5 3 4 8 7 4 . 8 7 0 5 9 7 . 5 1 0 0 . 9
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 8 5 0 . 4 2 5 4 . 1 1 4 3 5 3 2 2 7 4 . 5 0 6 5 9 8 . 2 1 0 0 . 6
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 8 7 6 . 5 2 5 6 . 4 4 1 1 5 3 1 6 7 4 . 4 2 2 5 9 7 . 3 1 0 0 . 5
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 9 1 3 . 1 2 5 9 . 7 0 4 5 2 9 3 7 4 . 1 0 0 5 9 7 . 1 1 0 0 . 7
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 9 6 5 . 3 2 6 4 . 3 5 7 7 5 2 9 2 7 4 . 0 8 6 5 9 7 . 8 1 0 0 . 4
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 9 9 4 . 1 2 6 6 . 9 2 5 2 5 2 8 0 7 3 . 9 1 8 5 9 9 . 1 1 0 0 . 3
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 0 3 1 . 5 2 7 0 . 2 5 9 4 5 2 6 9 7 3 . 7 6 4 5 1 0 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 1
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 3 0 2 5 2 6 9 . 6 8 5 2 6 3 7 3 . 6 8 0 5 1 0 0 . 1 9 9 . 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 0 4 0 . 9 2 7 1 . 0 9 7 4 5 2 3 2 7 3 . 2 4 6 5 1 0 0 . 5 9 9 . 7
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 3 0 7 6 . 2 2 7 4 . 2 4 4 5 5 1 9 8 7 2 . 7 7 0 5 1 0 1 . 6 9 9 . 1
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 1 1 1 . 5 2 7 7 . 3 9 1 5 5 1 3 8 7 1 . 9 3 0 6 1 0 2 . 8 9 8 . 2
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r 3 1 2 4 2 7 8 . 5 0 5 8 5 0 9 7 7 1 . 3 5 6 6 1 0 3 . 8 9 7 . 3
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 0 8 0 . 4 2 7 4 . 6 1 8 9 5 0 7 0 7 0 . 9 7 8 6 1 0 4 . 5 9 7
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U N E M P L O \ U N E M P U H E M P L O Y E E S N O U T P U T / P E R S O m a n u f a c t u r i n g
M E N T M E N T M A N U F A C T . 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 1 E M P L O Y E D o u t p u t
D a t e ( t h o u s .  s / a ) 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 0 0 0 ' s  S / A 1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 ( S / A ) 1 9 8 5  =  1 0 0 ( s / a )
W h o l e  E c o n . l a b . f o r c e
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 3 0 4 2 . 6 2 7 1 . 2 4 9 5 0 4 1 7 0 . 5 7 2 6 1 0 5 9 6 . 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 9 4 4 . 3 2 6 2 . 4 8 5 5 5 0 6 4 7 0 . 8 9 4 6 1 0 5 . 7 9 6 . 8
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 7 9 3 . 5 2 4 9 . 0 4 1 6 5 0 7 4 - 7 1 . 0 3 4 6 1 0 6 . 8 9 7 . 2
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 6 4 1 . 9 2 3 5 . 5 2 6 4 5 0 9 6 7 1 . 3 4 2 6 1 0 6 . 9 9 7 . 6
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 2 5 1 9 . 4 2 2 4 . 6 0 5 5 5 1 2 2 7 1 . 7 0 6 6 1 0 7 . 6 9 8 . 2
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 3 9 0 . 4 2 1 3 . 1 0 5 1 5 1 3 1 7 1 . 8 3 2 6 1 0 7 . 5 9 8 . 4
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r 2 2 4 1 . 1 1 9 9 . 7 9 5 5 1 4 8 7 2 . 0 7 0 6 1 0 7 . 9 9 8 . 9
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 1 3 3 1 9 0 . 1 5 7 8 5 1 6 3 7 2 . 2 8 0 6 1 0 7 . 8 9 9 . 2
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 9 8 1 . 6 1 7 6 . 6 6 0 4 5 1 6 9 7 2 . 3 6 4 6 1 0 8 9 9 . 5
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 8 4 6 . 8 1 6 4 . 6 4 3 5 1 5 2 7 2 . 1 2 6 6 1 0 7 . 2 9 9 . 3
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r 1 7 6 6 . 2 1 5 7 . 4 5 7 4 5 1 5 4 7 2 . 1 5 4 6 1 0 7 . 2 9 9 . 4
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 6 7 0 . 4 1 4 8 . 9 1 6 8 5 1 4 4 7 2 . 0 1 4 6 1 0 7 9 9 . 3
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h 1 6 1 5 . 8 1 4 4 . 0 4 9 2 5 1 2 1 7 1 . 6 9 2 6 1 0 7 . 2 9 9 . 2
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 6 0 7 1 4 3 . 2 6 4 7 5 1 1 8 7 1 . 6 5 0 6 1 0 7 . 2 9 8 . 9
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r 0
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 0
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I C H P  P R I M I E A N D  S E C O N D A R Y  F E A L  R E N T A L I N D I C E S
O f f i c e s I n d u s t r i a l S h o p s O f f i c e s B 1 S h o p s I n d u s t r i a
D a t e 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 3
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 9
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 3 1 0 4 1 1 7
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 6 1 1 0 1 2 4
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 3 1 0 9 1 2 2
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 0 1 0 8 1 1 7 5 8 5 0 6 8
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 2 1 0 6 1 1 5
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 5 7 4 9 6 2
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 2 9 7 1 1 2
D e c e m b e r
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I C H P  P R I M I E A N D  S E C O N D A R Y  F E A L  R E N T A L I N D I C E S
D a t e O f f i c e s I n d u s t r i a l S h o p s O f f i c e s B 1 S h o p s I n d u s t r i a
1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 ( 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 0 9 5 1 1 0 5 4 5 0 5 5
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 9 5 9 5 1 1 1
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 0 9 3 1 1 0 5 3 5 0 5 4
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 9 8 9 1 1 1 1
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 9 9 9 1 1 1 3 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 0 9 0 1 1 7
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 1 8 7 1 1 8 5 0 6 1 5 6 5 0
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 0 2 8 9 1 2 4
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 0 7 9 1 1 2 9 5 2 6 4 6 2 5 0
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 1 1 9 2 1 3 8
D e c e m b e r
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I C H P  P R I M I E A N D  S E C O N D A R Y  F E A L  R E h T A L  I N D I C E S
D a t e O f f i c e s I n d u s t r i a l S h o p s O f f i c e s B 1 S h o p s I n d u s t r i a
1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 0 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1 1 9 7 7 = 1 0 1
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 2 3 9 2 1 4 8 5 6 6 9 7 0 5 0
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 4 2 1 0 0 1 7 0
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 5 5 1 1 9 2 0 1 6 7 9 7 9 0 5 8
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 6 5 1 2 8 2 1 5 7 9 1 0 7 9 6 6 4
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 7 5 1 3 7 2 2 1 8 5 1 1 9 1 0 4 7 9
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 8 4 1 4 5 2 2 6 9 2 1 3 4 1 0 8 8 3
D e c e m b e r
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 1 7 8 1 4 5 2 2 0 9 5 1 2 8 1 0 4 7 9
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 1 7 3 1 4 5 2 1 7
D e c e m b e r
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I C H P  A V E R A G E Y I E L D S  (°/< ) I C H P  C A P T A L V A L U E I N D E
R E A L  ’ 1 9 7 7  =  1 0 0
D a t e O f f i c e s S h o p s i n d u s t r i a l G i l t s E q u i t i e s O f f i c e s S h o p s I n d u s t r i a
>
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 6 . 8 6 . 1 8 . 5 1 3 . 1 5 . 7 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 5 . 9 5 . 4 7 . 4 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 8 1 1 8
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 5 . 8 5 . 3 7 . 4 1 2 . 4 5 . 6 1 1 8 1 2 5 1 1 9
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 5 . 7 4 . 8 7 . 4 1 2 . 9 5 . 7 1 2 6 1 5 4 1 2 4
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 5 . 2 4 . 8 6 . 9 1 1 . 7 4 . 8 1 4 7 1 6 6 1 4 3
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 5 . 2 4 . 8 6 . 9 1 3 . 5 6 . 5 1 4 4 1 6 9 1 4 2
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 5 . 2 4 . 8 6 . 9 1 4 . 1 6 . 8 1 4 2 1 6 2 1 4 3
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 5 . 2 4 . 8 6 . 9 1 3 . 2 5 . 8 1 4 5 1 5 8 1 4 3
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 5 . 2 4 . 7 6 . 9 1 3 . 8 5 . 4 1 4 5 1 5 9 1 3 8
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 5 . 2 4 . 7 7 . 1 1 5 . 8 6 . 4 1 4 5 1 5 8 1 3 2
D e c e m b e r
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I C H P  A V E R A G E Y I E L D S  (°A ) I C H P  C A P T A L V A L U E I N D E
R E A L  1 9 7 r =100
D a t e O f f i c e s S h o p s i n d u s t r i a l G i l t s E q u i t i e s O f f i c e s S h o p s I n d u s t r i a
)
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 5 . 4 4 . 7 7 . 2 1 3 . 8 5 . 9 1 3 9 1 5 5 1 3 3
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 6 5 7 . 6 1 0 . 3 5 . 4 1 2 8 1 4 1 1 2 5
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 6 5 8 . 1 1 0 . 5 4 . 7 1 2 6 1 4 5 1 1 7
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 6 . 1 4 . 8 8 . 7 1 1 . 8 . 4 . 9 1 2 3 1 5 0 1 1 1
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y  .
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 6 . 3 4 . 8 9 . 2 1 0 . 3 4 . 3 1 2 3 1 5 5 1 0 6
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t 6 . 5 4 . 8 9 . 6 1 1 . 3 5 . 1
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 6 . 7 4 . 8 1 0 . 2 1 0 . 3 4 . 6 1 2 0 1 6 1 9 5
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 6 . 8 4 . 8 1 0 . 2 1 0 . 8 4 . 3
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 6 . 8 4 . 8 1 0 . 2 1 0 . 6 4 . 5 1 2 3 1 6 2 9 3
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 4 . 9 1 0 . 4 1 0 . 3 4 . 6
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 7 4 . 9 1 0 . 4 1 0 . 3 4 . 3 1 2 6 1 7 2 9 3
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 7 5 . 1 1 0 . 6 1 0 . 8 4 . 3
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 7 . 4 5 . 1 1 0 . 6 8 . 9 3 . 8 1 2 7 1 6 9 9 9
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 . 4 5 . 2 1 0 . 6 9 . 6 4 . 1
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 7 . 5 5 . 2 1 0 . 5 1 0 . 3 4 1 3 3 1 7 0 1 0 1
D e c e m b e r
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I C H P  A V E R A G E Y I E L D S  ( ° / ) I C H P  C A P T A L V A L U E I N D E
R E A L  1 9 7 f  =  1 0 0
D a t e O f f i c e s S h o p s i n d u s t r i a l G i l t s E q u i t i e s O f f i c e s S h o p s I n d u s t r i a
I
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 7 . 5 5 . 2 1 0 . 5 1 0 3 . 7
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 7 . 6 5 . 3 1 0 . 5 8 . 9 3 . 3 1 5 1 1 8 3 1 0 4
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 . 6 5 . 4 1 0 . 1 9 . 7 3
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 7 . 4 5 . 3 9 . 8 9 . 3 4 . 2 1 7 5 2 0 9 1 2 0
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 7 . 4 5 . 4 9 . 8 9 . 4 4 . 2
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 7 . 2 5 . 3 9 . 6 9 . 3 4 . 2 1 9 8 2 4 8 1 4 8
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 . 1 5 . 4 9 . 3 9 . 4 4 . 2
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 7 . 1 5 . 4 9 . 1 9 . 1 4 . 4 2 1 7 2 6 1 1 6 6
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y .
F e b r u a r y 7 5 . 6 9 9 . 1 4 . 2
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 6 . 9 5 . 8 8 . 8 9 . 4 4 . 2 2 3 8 2 4 8 1 8 5
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t 6 . 8 6 . 1 8 . 8 9 . 6 4 . 3
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 7 . 1 6 . 4 8 . 8 9 . 8 4 . 5 2 4 2 2 3 1 1 9 5
D e c e m b e r
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y 7 . 3 6 . 6 9 . 2 1 0 . 4 4 . 4
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y 8 7 1 0 . 1 1 2 . 3 5 . 2 2 1 4 1 9 7 1 7 3
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 8 . 4 7 . 3 1 0 . 3 1 1 . 1 4 . 8 2 0 1 1 8 7 1 6 9
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r 8 . 7 7 . 4 1 0 . 9 1 1 . 3 5 . 7 1 8 7 1 8 2 1 5 9
D e c e m b e r
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( A v a i l a b l e  I r d .  S p a c e R a t e a b l e  V s l u e s  -  E n g l ; i n d  £ t h o u s a n d s
( m i l l i o n s  o f s q u a r e  f e e t ) S h o p s * O f f i c e s * W ' h s e s ,  S t o r e s F a c t o r i e s ,
D a t e &  W o r k s h o p s M i l l s  e t c
1 9 7 7  =  1 0 0
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 8 3 . 7 1 0 0 4 8 4 7 4 1 5 5 3 3 8 2 2 7 1 5 2 1 7 3 0 1 2 1
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 6 . 3 9 1 . 1 5 8 9 0 0 8
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 0 7 . 2 1 2 8 . 0 7 6 4 6 4
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 7 0 . 9 5 8 4 . 7 6 7 0 2 5 1 4 8 8 7 7 9 5 6 6 2 3 1 2 8 3 9 5 7 7 2 5 4 0 7
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 1 . 6 8 8 5 . 6 3 9 1 8 7 6
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 6 4 . 1 7 6 . 5 8 3 0 3 4 6
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 5 6 . 3 2 6 7 . 2 8 7 9 3 3 1 4 9 4 5 1 0 5 9 0 3 1 5 2 9 7 2 9 0 7 2 4 6 2 5
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 5 1 . 2 1 6 1 . 1 8 2 7 9 5 7
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 5 3 . 8 3 6 4 . 3 1 3 0 2 2 7
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 5 8 . 2 9 6 9 . 6 4 1 5 7 7 1 5 0 2 3 9 8 6 1 3 6 2 3 3 1 2 4 1 8 7 2 8 0 1 3
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 7 5 . 9 2 9 0 . 7 0 4 8 9 8 4
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 0 2 . 8 7 1 2 2 . 9 0 3 2 2 6
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 1 1 6 . 5 4 1 3 9 . 2 3 5 3 6 4
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 1 3 7 . 5 8 1 6 4 . 3 7 2 7 6
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 4 5 . 7 6 1 7 4 . 1 4 5 7 5 9
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K A V A L A B L E I N D .  S P A C E R a t e a b l e  V s l u e s  -  E n g l ; i n d  E t h o u s a n d s
( m i l l i o n s  o f s q u a r e  f e e t ) S h o p s * O f f i c e s * W ' h s e s ,  S t o r e s F a c t o r i e s ,
D a t e &  W o r k s h o p s M i l l s  e t c
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 1 5 8 . 9 8 1 8 9 . 9 4 0 2 6 3 5 1 9 6 1 6 6 5 5 0 2 9 3 5 1 6 0 7 7 3 2 4 5 6
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 1 6 9 . 7 4 2 0 2 . 7 9 5 6 9 9
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 7 5 . 0 7 2 0 9 . 1 6 3 6 8
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 1 7 7 . 6 2 1 2 . 1 8 6 3 8 5 2 6 5 3 8 6 7 6 2 6 0 3 7 1 8 6 6 7 2 3 3 1 1
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 1 6 9 . 5 2 2 0 2 . 5 3 2 8 5 5
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 7 1 . 6 7 2 0 5 . 1 0 1 5 5 3
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 1 6 3 . 4 1 1 9 5 . 2 3 2 9 7 5 5 3 4 2 2 1 6 9 7 1 1 5 3 9 0 6 0 9 7 1 0 6 2 6
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t 1 5 3 . 3 8 1 8 3 . 2 4 9 7 0 1
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 4 3 . 1 3 1 7 1 . 0 0 3 5 8 4
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 1 3 4 . 5 1 6 0 . 6 9 2 9 5 1 5 4 0 9 8 0 7 1 6 3 1 4 4 0 7 1 2 3 7 0 0 6 9 3
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t 1 3 5 . 3 9 1 6 1 . 7 5 6 2 7 2
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 2 6 . 5 4 1 5 1 . 1 8 2 7 9 6
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 1 1 9 . 4 9 1 4 2 . 7 5 9 8 5 7 5 4 6 3 8 3 7 4 2 0 7 2 4 2 4 2 0 3 6 9 0 9 0 5
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t 1 1 4 . 4 1 1 3 6 . 6 9 0 5 6 2
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 0 2 . 2 8 1 2 2 . 1 9 8 3 2 7
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( A V A I L A B L I I N D .  S P A C E R a t e a b l e  V i l u e s  •  E n g l i n d  E t h o u s a n d s
( m i l l i o n s  o f s q u a r e  f e e t ) S h o p s * O f f i c e s * W ' h s e s ,  S t o r e s F a c t o r i e s ,
D a t e &  W o r k s h o p s M i l l s  e t c
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 9 5 . 8 3 1 1 4 . 4 9 2 2 3 4 5 5 3 5 2 9 7 6 1 6 3 7 4 3 7 6 0 4 6 8 5 4 5 5
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 9 4 . 2 2 1 1 2 . 5 6 8 6 9 8
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 9 4 . 0 5 1 1 2 . 3 6 5 5 9 1
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 8 8 . 4 7 1 0 5 . 6 9 8 9 2 5 5 5 8 9 9 8 7 8 3 2 6 9 4 5 2 0 7 2 6 7 8 8 7 4
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 8 6 . 0 6 1 0 2 . 8 1 9 5 9 4
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 7 7 . 2 7 9 2 . 3 1 7 8 0 1 7
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 7 2 . 4 8 8 6 . 5 9 4 9 8 2 1 5 6 7 5 5 6 8 0 7 8 2 4 4 6 4 2 3 8 6 7 1 9 2 9
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t 7 3 . 8 1 8 8 . 1 8 3 9 9 0 4
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 7 5 . 7 4 9 0 . 4 8 9 8 4 4 7
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l 8 3 . 1 9 9 . 2 8 3 1 5 4 1
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t 9 5 . 1 1 1 3 . 6 2 0 0 7 2
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 0
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A v a i l a b l e  O f f i c e F l o o r s p a c e 1 9 8 1 - 8 7 e x i s t i n g  b u I d n e w  d e v e l c p m e n t
M .  s q . f t . P l a c e d P l a c e d
D a t e e x i s t i n g  b u i l d n e w  d e v ' s T o t a l o n  M a r k e t L e t o n  M a r k e t l e t
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y 8 . 2 5 6 . 3 8 1 4 . 6 3
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 . 2 3 2 . 3 1 2 . 6 4 0 . 9 7
J u l y 7 . 8 7 . 9 1 1 5 . 7 1
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 . 3 8 1 . 6 2 . 2 2 1 . 2 5
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A v a i l a b l e  O f f i c e F l o o r s p a c e 1 9 8 1 - 8 7 e x i s t i n g  b u I d n e w  D e v e l c p m e n t
M .  s g . f t . P l a c e d P l a c e d
D a t e e x i s t i n g  b u i l d n e w  d e v ' s T o t a l o n  M a r k e t L e t o n  M a r k e t l e t
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y 9 . 2 1 8 . 4 4 1 7 . 6 5
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 . 3 2 1 . 1 5 2 . 5 1
J u l y 9 . 8 4 9 . 8 5 1 9 . 6 9
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 . 0 6 1 . 5 2 2 . 3 4 1 . 2 7
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y 1 0 . 8 8 1 0 . 6 6 2 1 . 5 4
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 2 . 7 1 1 . 4 6 5 . 4 1 1 . 9 1
J u l y 1 1 . 5 8 1 3 . 9 2 5 . 4 8
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 . 0 7 2 . 3 9 3 . 5 8 1 . 9 5
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y 1 1 . 3 7 1 5 . 1 5 2 6 . 5 2
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 . 8 3 1 . 7 2 2 . 7 8 2 . 6 1
J u l y 1 2 . 5 8 1 4 . 5 7 2 7 . 1 5
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 . 9 7 2 . 7 5 3 . 0 9 2 . 2 3
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y 1 2 . 1 6 1 4 . 8 1 2 6 . 9 7
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 . 3 1 2 . 0 3 3 . 4 3 . 1 4
J u l y 1 2 . 6 4 1 4 . 6 3 2 7 . 2 7
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 . 7 5 2 . 6 7 4 . 1 4 3 . 9 8
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y 1 1 . 7 9 1 4 . 4 6 2 6 . 2 5
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 3 . 4 3 3 . 0 4 5 . 3 2 5 . 3 9
J u l y 1 1 . 8 1 1 3 . 8 8 2 5 . 6 9
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 . 5 3 3 . 9 8 5 . 5 3 4 . 4 7
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A v a i l a b l e  O f f i c e F l o o r s p a c e 1 9 8 1 - 8 7 e x i i s t i n g  b u I d n e w  D e v e l c p m e n t
M .  s q . f t . P l a c e d P l a c e d
D a t e e x i s t i n g  b u i l d n e w  d e v ' s T o t a l o n  M a r k e t L e t o n  M a r k e t l e t
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y 1 0 . 5 6 1 4 . 0 3 2 4 . 5 9
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
192
Available Floorspace
Appendix A: Time Series Data
R e t a i l  F l o o i s p a c e :  n e w d e v e l o p m e n t
T o w n  C e n t i e o u t - o f - t o w n r e t a i l  w a r e h c u s e  p a r k s
D a t e n o .  o f  a n n u y r  e n d  t o t a l n o .  o f  a n n u y r  e n d  t o t a l n o .  o f  a n n u a y r  e n d  t o t a l
o p e n i n g s 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t . o p e n i n g s 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t . o p e n i n g s 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t .
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 2 6 1 1 9 7 5 1 4 0 5
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r . . . 2 5 . 6 4 6 6 6 2 1 7 1 9
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 1 6 8 3 3 6 4 2 0 0 9
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 6 7 0 5 2 0 2 2 1 1 9
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 5 7 3 8 4 3 6 2 6 9 8 1 1 0 8
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R e t a i l  F l o o i s p a c e :  n e w d e v e l o p m e f i t
T o w n  C e n t i e o u t - o f - t o w n r e t a i l  w a r e h c u s e  p a r k s
D a t e n o .  o f  a n n u y r  e n d  t o t a l n o .  o f  a n n u y r  e n d  t o t a l n o .  o f  a n n u a y r  e n d  t o t a l
o p e n i n g s ' 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t o p e n i n g s ' 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t o p e n i n g s ' 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 5 7 5 9 1 4 2 2 8 8 8 1 2 0 1
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 5 7 8 4 2 2 5 3 3 2 9 3 5 0 7
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y .
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 0 8 0 9 5 9 4 3 9 8 4 0 5 0 7
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 6 8 2 8 1 8 0 3 9 8 4 6 1 1 4 1
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 5 8 4 8 2 0 5 6 1 0 0 8 2 0 3 0
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R e t a i l  F l o o i s p a c e :  n e w d e v e l o p m e i t
T o w n  C e n t i e o u t - o f - t o w r r e t a i l  w a r e h c u s e  p a r k s
D a t e n o .  o f  a n n u y r  e n d  t o t a l n o .  o f  a n n u y r  e n d  t o t a l n o .  o f  a n n u a y r  e n d  t o t a l
o p e n i n g s ' 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t o p e n i n g s ' 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t o p e n i n g s ' 0 0 0 ' s  s q . f t
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 5 8 8 3 2 1 6 7 1 8 6 2 8 5 9 2 3
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 6 9 1 2 6 3 8 8 5 0 3 5 1 1 2 5 4 2
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y .
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 0 9 5 8 6 0 5 1 0 2 0 7 6 9 2 0 6 5 2
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u q u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 3 1 1 0 0 6 9 1 5 1 3 0 2 7 4 1 2 5 9 1 9
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I P D  P r o p e r t y  F i i n d i n g  F l o w s
U K  I n s t i t u t i o n s O v e r s e a s  i n v
D a t e N e t  P r o p  I n v D e v  E x p  £ n i n  U K  p r o p e r t y
E M O f f i c e R e t a i l I n d u s t r i a l E M
1 9 7 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 7 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r .
1 9 7 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 7 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 0 0
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r
1 9 8 1 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 7 0
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 8 2 6 2 . 5 1 1 6 . 1 1 6 5 . 1
196
Institutional Investment
Appendix A: Time Series Data
I P D  P r o p e r t y  F i i n d i n g  F l o w s
U K  I n s t i t u t i o n s O v e r s e a s  i n v
D a t e N e t  P r o p  I n v D e v  E x p  £ n i n  U K  p r o p e r t y
£ M O f f i c e R e t a i l I n d u s t r i a l £ M
1 9 8 2 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 2 0
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 2 0 9 9 3 9 1 . 8 1 4 6 . 5 1 3 6 . 2
1 9 8 3 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 8 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 5 1 6 3 6 9 . 4 1 5 1 . 9 1 0 4 . 9
1 9 8 4 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 6 5
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 7 8 8 3 4 4 . 5 2 2 6 . 5 1 2 6 . 8
1 9 8 5 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 9 0
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 4 0 0 4 1 0 . 6 2 7 7 . 2 1 1 7 . 4
1 9 8 6 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 9 2
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 1 5 4 4 4 1 . 8 3 5 3 . 1 1 0 1 . 2
197
Institutional Investment
Appendix A: Time Series Data
I P D  P r o p e r t y  F i i n d i n g  F l o w s
U K  I n s t i t u t i o n s O v e r s e a s  i n v
D a t e N e t  P r o p  I n v D e v  E x p  £ r i n  U K  p r o p e r t y
£ M O f f i c e R e t a i l I n d u s t r i a l £ M
1 9 8 7 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 4 6 3
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 4 6 7 6 2 7 . 3 4 9 9 . 2 1 0 9 . 2
1 9 8 8 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 4 4 6
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 5 1 3 8 3 2 . 2 6 0 2 . 2 1 9 7 . 4
1 9 8 9 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e 1 2 3 7
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 1 6 3 3 1 0 8 0 . 7 7 0 8 . 7 3 4 3 . 1
1 9 9 0 J a n u a r y
F e b r u a r y
M a r c h
A p r i l
M a y
J u n e
J u l y
A u g u s t
S e p t e m b e r
O c t o b e r
N o v e m b e r
D e c e m b e r 5 2 8 8 4 2 . 2 5 4 4 . 3 1 5 1 . 1
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